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ABSTRACT 
The South African War of 1899−1902 or Anglo-Boer War was one of the modern 
examples of propaganda in history. It revealed an enormous agitprop conducted by 
British and Boer forces. The European and American public closely followed the 
struggle between the mighty British Empire and the “little white Christians”. 
This thesis examines the pro-British propaganda of the Ottoman intellectuals and 
policy-makers by focusing on the work of Ismail Kemal Vlora, Transval Meselesi. 
Ismail Kemal Bey’s pamphlet on the war is a crucial propagandist instrument and 
legitimiser of British imperialism in South Africa and in other British colonies. 
This work aims to grasp the understanding of imperialism and civilisation by the pro-
British Ottoman intelligentsia, by looking at their attitude towards the South African 
War of 1899-1902. In this sense, it aims to make a contribution to Ottoman and South 
African history. 
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GLOSSARY 
Ahrar Fırkası: Liberal political party in the Ottoman Empire. The party was founded 
by the liberal Young Turks in 1908 and ended in 1910. 
Alim: Scholar, the person who holds a degree in Islamic sciences.  
Anglophilia: A person who admires England, English ways and English things.  
Bab-ı Ali: The Sublime Porte, the Ottoman court. 
Bey: Amir, chief, provincial governor in the Ottoman Empire. 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP): The Young Turk organ founded in 1889. 
Coup d’état: Sudden action in politics which aims at a change of government 
illegally. 
Effendi: Master, a Turkish title of respect similar to “Sir”. 
Eyalet: Province, an administrative district. 
Ferman: An official decree or edict issued in the name of the Ottoman sultan. 
Hareket Ordusu: The Action Army, the third army based in Thessaloniki. It was sent 
by the Unionists to suppress the 31 March incident. 
Kanun-u Esasi: Basic Law, the first Ottoman constitution of 1876. 
Kuloğlu: Its meaning is ‘the son of the servant’. The term was used to describe 
mixed-race offspring of Turkish men and local North African women during the 
Ottoman period. 
Meclis-i Mebusan: Chamber of deputies in the government of the Ottoman Empire. 
Pasha: A title held by high officials. 
Sadrazam: Grand Vizier, the chief officer. 
Sultan: King, leader 
Young Turks (Jön Türkler): A group of people who aimed to replace administration 
through the absolute rule of the Sultan with a constitutional government, in the 
Ottoman Empire in the early 20
th
 century. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the standpoint of the pro-British faction of Young Turks towards 
the South African War (the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902) in the light of the work of 
Ismail Kemal of Vlora, Transval Meselesi. The South African War, fought between 
Great Britain and the two Afrikaner States (Die Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek or South 
African Republic and the Oranjevrijstaat or Orange Free State), ended in British 
victory. The war created a great international stir and led to huge propaganda 
campaigns by both sides. Criticism of the war went beyond Europe and South Africa. 
The war in South Africa, while geographically far from the Ottoman Empire, made an 
immense impact upon Ottoman intellectual and political circles. The Ottoman press 
discussed it broadly. One of the longest texts written on the South African War was the 
work of Ismail Kemal: his Transval Meselesi (1900). Ismail Kemal’s work was 
translated from Ottoman Turkish into three languages: English (The Transvaal 
Question from the Mussulman Point of View, 1901); French (La Question du Transvaal 
ou le Role Civilisateur de l’Angleterre Juge au Point de vue Musulman, 1901); and 
Arabic: (Mas’ala al-Transfal, 1901). What is more, the Ottoman sultan, Abdülhamid II, 
sent a military attaché, Major Aziz Bey, to monitor the war. 
Transval Meselesi was a thoroughly pro-British and anti-Boer work. The pamphlet 
was published in 1900, when the world criticised the British Empire for the harsh war 
strategies it used against the Boers. Ismail Kemal endeavoured to justify the war, and 
thus British imperialism, in his writing. The work gives some important clues to his 
stance on colonialism, his perception of imperialism and his conception of 
civilisation. Internalising the colonialist attitudes of England, Ismail Kemal claimed 
that Great Britain desired to civilise Africans, as well as aspiring to promote Muslims 
under British domination, while the Boers were oppressing these people. As an 
Anglophile statesman, he advocated the support of Britain against the Boers. 
Ismail Kemal was a prominent Ottoman-Albanian intellectual. He had served as 
governor in many Ottoman provinces and as a deputy in the Ottoman parliament. He 
was also a great Albanian nationalist who led the region’s breakaway from the 
Ottoman Empire and one of the leaders who established an independent Albania. 
Despite his prominent position in the empire and his role in the foundation of Albania, 
XI 
there has been no specific study in English of Ismail Kemal, nor of his work, Transval 
Meselesi. There is an article, Avlonyalı İsmail Kemal Bey’in Siyasi Faaliyetleri: 
1870−1908, (The Political Activities of Ismail Kemal Bey: 1870-1908) by İhsan 
Burak Birecikli (2009) in Turkish. This article is a very detailed work on the political 
life of Ismail Kemal before the second constitutional monarchy of 1908. There is also 
some information about his relations with the Young Turks, his escape to Europe in 
1900 and a coup attempt against the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II in 1903. Birecikli 
used Ottoman archival documents as well as a great many other primary and 
secondary sources. 
There is also an unpublished Masters thesis entitled The Emergence of Albanian 
National Identity and Three Figures: Semsettin Sami, Ismail Kemal, Fan S. Noli by 
Endri Ziu (2012). Ziu’s study aims to understand the emergence of Albanian national 
identity by concentrating on the intellectual activities of three Albanian intellectuals. 
The last chapter in particular, analyzes the struggle of Ismail Kemal in the Albanian 
cause. There are also plenty of secondary sources on Albanian nationalism that 
elaborate the political and intellectual activities of Ismail Kemal. Ziu’s thesis is, 
therefore, a modest contribution to the study of Ismail Kemal Bey of Vlora.  
Chapter One of this thesis examines Ottoman interests and activities on the African 
continent, with a special focus on South Africa. The Ottoman interests in Africa 
started in 1517 with the occupation of Egypt and the subsequent domination of North 
Africa. In relation to this, establishing good relations with the Muslim states of the 
continent is examined briefly. The focus of this chapter is on the religious activities of 
Ottoman scholars in the Cape Colony, characterized by the relocation of Abu Bakr 
Effendi to Cape Town in 1863. In addition, the pan-Islamic propaganda conducted by 
Abdülhamid II is discussed. Ahmet Uçar’s book, 140 Yıllık Miras Güney Afrika`da 
Osmanlılar (The Ottomans in South Africa (2001) and studies by Ahmet Kavas of 
Ottomans in Africa are important sources for this chapter. The unpublished MA thesis 
of Selim Argun: The Life and Contribution of the Osmanlı Scholar, Abu Bakr Effendi, 
Towards Islamic Thought and Culture in South Africa (2000); and that of Serhat 
Orakçı: A Historical Analysis of the Emerging Links between the Ottoman Empire and 
South Africa Between 1861−1923 (2007) have both been used frequently. 
XII 
In order to understand the support of the British cause by Ismail Kemal, it is crucial to 
examine his background.  
In Chapter Two, the political and intellectual activities of Ismail Kemal are evaluated, 
in terms of both the Ottoman Empire and the Albanian cause. He was a Young Turk 
who presented reform reports to the Ottoman sultans and opposed Abdülhamid II. 
Later, he became the opponent of the Committee of Union and Progress as well. The 
role of Ismail Kemal in the counter-revolution against the CUP, in 1908, is still 
debated by historians. He had close ties with Britain and sought the assistance of 
England for a coup d’état against Abdülhamid II as well as against the rule of the 
CUP. Ismail Kemal fled to Europe in 1900, after being appointed governor of Tripoli. 
Later, he started to strive for an independent Albania. In this chapter, The Memoirs of 
Ismail Kemal Bey (1920) are used widely as a primary source. 
The Ottoman Empire had gone through many economic, social, administrative and 
military difficulties, beginning in the seventeenth century. The following centuries 
brought great transformations, among which the intellectual evolution ranked first in 
importance. The ideas of Ottoman intellectuals in a crumbling empire changed 
enormously. The pro-British intelligentsia was one of the biggest of these groups. 
Others were pro-French and pro-German. 
Chapter Three, on the pro-British faction of the Young Turks, aims to fit Ismail 
Kemal into his intellectual context and understand the contemporary opinion of the 
Ottoman intellectuals about Britain. This group had similar naïve ideas to Ismail 
Kemal’s, which amounted to an exalted admiration of British culture. This chapter 
discusses the admiration of the pro-British Ottoman intellectuals and how they and 
Ismail Kemal understood the concept of civilisation. The reasons for their pro-British 
inclination are evaluated within the historical context. Britain’s response and her 
foreign policy towards Turkey are also discussed. Apart from some other secondary 
sources, this chapter extensively uses the works of Şükrü Hanioğlu, Jön Türkler in 
DİA, Young Turks in Opposition (2008), and Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı 
İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük: 1889−1902 (The Committee of Union and 
Progress as a Political Organisation and Young Turkism: 1889−1902) (1986) as 
secondary sources. 
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Undoubtedly, the war of 1899-1902 was a crucial milestone in the history of South 
Africa. As one might expect, the pro-British Young Turks produced many 
publications on the South African War. Chapter Four thus gives insight into the seeds 
of the struggle and the South African War itself. In addition, it focuses on the 
perspectives of the pro-British Ottoman intelligentsia on England and the British 
struggle in South Africa. The purpose here is to evaluate an aspect of Ottoman public 
opinion and the stances of the Ottoman policy makers towards the war. The Young 
Turk publications, such as Servet-i Fünûn (1891-1944) and the memoirs of 
contemporary Ottoman intellectuals, are crucial sources to consult, in order to have 
insight into their views of the war. 
In order to comprehend the reasons for Ismail Kemal’s positive view of England, the 
factors influencing him must be taken into consideration. It is possible to infer that his 
admiration of Great Britain was fed by its contemporary superpower status vis-a-vis 
Russia. Ismail Kemal expressed his fear of Russia in his works, such as the preface to 
The Transvaal Question from the Mussulman Point of View (1901), his memoirs 
(1920) and his reform proposal to the sultan (1897). Russia was seen as the biggest 
threat to the fate of Turkey from the seventeenth century until the end of the empire. 
Chapter Five examines the Russian threat against the Turks, with the historical 
process. The chapter also examines details of the history of Russian expansion over 
the Ottoman territories, especially focusing on Russia’s pan-Slavic policy and her 
ambition to take over Istanbul and the Bosporus straits. Ottoman public opinion is 
analyzed, as well as the positions of the Ottoman intelligentsia and policy makers 
towards Russia’s actions harmful to the empire. 
The core chapter of this thesis is an analysis of Ismail Kemal’s text on the South 
African War, Transval Meselesi. It was published in Ottoman Turkish in 1900 and in 
27 pages of English in 1901. Ismail Kemal’s work is a great propaganda piece, written 
by a pro-British Ottoman intellectual, in order to justify British imperialism. The work 
deals with the British administration, particularly of South Africa, by analyzing the 
management of the Dutch East India Company there. There is an Islamic discourse 
throughout the pamphlet. Ismail Kemal advocated Muslims’ support of Britain for 
their moral and political improvement. There are considerable clues to the 
XIV 
contemporary concept of imperialism, civilisation, and progress. For ease of 
comprehension, the pamphlet is divided into subjects. 
This study aspires to investigate the framework of advocacy of Britain by the pro-
British intelligentsia, in the light of Ismail Kemal’s work. Ismail Kemal was the leader 
of the pro-British Ottoman statesmen and intelligentsia. In this respect, his work is 
part of the intellectual history of the period. Ismail Kemal’s personal interest in the 
South African War, which made him write a study of the war, seems noteworthy. This 
thesis attempts to find answers to the questions of how and why a war in southern 
Africa massively affected an Ottoman intellectual and politician. It is also intended to 
fill the gap in the literature on the British bias of Ismail Kemal as a significant 
historical figure. As a pro-British Ottoman intellectual, Ismail Kemal’s point of view 
about concepts like civilisation, progress, colonialism and imperialism are evaluated. 
In this way, the pro-British group he represented can be better comprehended. 
 1 
CHAPTER 1. 
“Afrikâ-yi Osmânî” The Ottomans in Africa 
Introduction 
The Ottoman presence in Africa began in 1517, especially through the creation of the 
eyalet or provinces in North Africa. Ottoman administrators established Ottoman systems 
of government in these newly conquered territories and the Ottoman language was used 
in the administration of these provinces. There was no mass migration of people from the 
heartlands of the empire but there was inter-marriage between officials and soldiers with 
locals. Later, in the nineteenth century, there were also small Turkish communities on the 
continent. On the whole, Ottoman relations with Muslims in Africa were substantial. The 
focus of this chapter is on the Ottomans in the southernmost tip of the continent. There, in 
the British-ruled Cape Colony, the religious activities of Ottoman scholars after 1863 
were substantial. Finally, the chapter analyzes the politicization of Islam after 1878 and 
the use of the caliphate as an instrument of counter balance to British domination. 
1. Ottoman activities on the African continent 
After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Empire started to spread with 
its growing fleet and army, with the idea of world domination.
1
 This expansion spread to 
the south of the empire and the eastern Mediterranean. Subsequently, in the 
Mediterranean, the Ottoman Empire struggled with Spain and Portugal, to a certain 
extent, at the beginning of the 
 
sixteenth century.
2
 Upon the threat to the Holy Cities 
(Mecca and Medina) by the Portuguese, the Ottoman Empire put an end to the Mamluk 
sultanate (1250-1517) centred in Cairo, Egypt and held the Holy Cities, from 1517 in 
order to protect the cities from Portuguese threat. 
The first relations of the Ottoman Empire with Africa started with the conquest of Egypt.
3
 
This conquest became one of the most crucial milestones for the Ottoman state.
4
 The 
Ottoman Sultan Selim I (reign 1512-1520) took the title of Caliph from the last Abbasid 
Caliph, Al-Mutawakkil. The Ottomans thereafter made good use of this ‘Caliph’ title as a 
religious and political right to rule over the Muslim world. The prestige of the Ottoman 
                                                     
1
 Salih Özbaran, “Osmanlı Imparatorlugu ve Hindistan Yolu: Onaltıncı Yüzyılda Ticaret Yolları Üzerinde 
Türk-Portekiz Rekabet ve Iliskileri,” Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi, no. 
31 (1977): 82. 
2
 Ahmet Kavas, “Afrika’da Sömürgeciliğin XIX. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısına Kadar Kurulamamasında 
Osmanlı Devleti’nin Rolü,” Yükselen Afrika ve Türkiye / Rising Africa and Turkey I. Uluslararası Türk-
Afrika Kongresi (23 November 2005), ed. by Ahmet Kavas and Hasan Öztürk (Istanbul: Tasam, 2006), 103. 
3
 Ahmet Kavas, Osmanlı-Afrika İlişkileri (Istanbul: Tasam Yayınları, 2006), 11, 12. 
4
 Özbaran, “Osmanlı Imparatorlugu ve Hindistan Yolu,” 82. 
 2 
sultans increased immensely among the Sunni Muslims of the world after this. The idea 
of the caliphate based in Istanbul gave them political legitimization. 
The Ottoman Empire established relations with the African continent in every sphere of 
life. From 1517 to 1578, the empire took hold of all northern Africa, from Egypt to the 
borders of what is today Morocco, but failed to gain the allegiance of the rulers of the 
various sultanates of the Maghrib (north-west Africa). Since it was very hard to 
administer the regions of Africa from Istanbul, the centre of the empire, some Turkish 
noble families founded the powerful eyalet (province) system in Africa with the support 
of a sultanic ferman (edict). Egypt in 1517, Trablusgarp (Libya and some parts of Niger 
and Chad) in 1551, Tunisia in 1574, and Cezayir-i Garb (Algeria) in 1535 eyalets were 
founded by the Ottoman Empire. Trablusgarp, Cezayir-i Garb and Tunisia eyalets were 
called ‘Garp Ocakları’. These eyalets were semi-independent and administered by noble 
Turkish dynasties. These were Karamanids in Trablusgarp (1711-1835), Hüseyniler in 
Tunisia (1705-1735 and 1756−1957), Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha and his successors 
(1805-1879) in Egypt. All had some privileges different from the other eyalets.
5
 
2. Ottoman interests in eastern and southern Africa 
The Ottoman presence in Africa was not limited to the north, but extended to the east and 
the south as well.
6
 The conquest of Egypt also opened the western coasts of the Red Sea. 
The empire accessed the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea and fought against the 
Portuguese to defend the African coasts.
7
 The cities occupied by Spain and Portugal in 
North Africa, the Red Sea and East Africa were taken. The Portuguese fleet was driven 
from the Red-Sea entirely.
8
 Port cities in North Africa, Egypt and the Red Sea fell under 
the sovereignty of the Ottomans. The Ottomans took the coasts of Eritrea, Djibouti, 
Somalia and some parts of Ethiopia. Habeş Eyaleti is centred today on Suakin Island, 
Sudan, but was founded on the west coast of the Red Sea, in contemporary Somalia, 
Eritrea, Djibouti and the coasts of Sudan and Harar, Ethiopia.
9
 In 1555 this area was 
conquered by Özdemir Pasha. 
During the time of increasing European penetration of Africa, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali 
Pasha or Muhammad Ali of Egypt (reign 1805-1848) campaigned into the hinterlands of 
                                                     
5
 Muhammed Tandoğan, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Afrika’da Avrupa Sömürgeciliğine Karsı Siyaseti (XIX. 
Yüzyıl ve XX. Yüzyılın Basları)” (Master’s diss., Istanbul Üniversitesi, 2011), 7.  
6
 Ibid, 6. 
7
 Ibid, 5. 
8
 Arif Celal Özdemir, “II. Abdülhamid’in Afrika Siyaseti” (Master’s diss., Afyonkarahisar Üniversitesi, 
2017), 19. 
9
 For a study on Ottomans in Suakin see, A. C. S. Peacock, “Suakin: A Northeast African Port in the 
Ottoman Empire,” Northeast African Studies 12, no. 1 (2012): 29-50.  
 3 
Africa in the 1820s.
10
 Mehmed Ali Pasha sent missions -often led by European explorers- 
into the southern parts of the Sudan.
11
 Sudan was held by the Ottoman rule from Egypt 
for over sixty years. The rulers in the Sudan during this period were usually referred to as 
Turks by the Sudanese and by Europeans in the Sudan.
12
 Hatt-ı İstiva Vilayeti was 
established in 1876, via the Khediviate of Egypt in Equatoria (present-day Southern 
Sudan, along the White Nile and northern Uganda).This province was the most south-
eastern land of the empire’s physical contact in East Africa, but was lost in 1889 and had 
little real impact on the Ottoman presence in Africa.
13
 
On paper, or in theory, the Ottoman Empire had claims over the territories of thirteen 
modern states, from Morocco to Somalia.
14
 The Empire held the northern and eastern 
coasts of Africa, with soldiers brought from Anatolia, the Balkans and the Caucasus.
15
 
This policy was quite different from those of the European imperial states. The European 
powers mobilized the native people by force and drove them to the hinterlands of the 
continent for their imperialistic ambitions. The indigenous people of Africa also fought 
for their masters in the World Wars, when Europeans battled against each other.
16
 
Ottoman Turkish men, soldiers and sailors in Trablusgarp, Tunisia and Algeria married 
native Arab and Berber women, and their children were called kuloğlu like mestiços who 
were the descendants of intermarriages of Portuguese with locals. These children held 
important positions in the history of North Africa and were well educated with some 
privileges. In the middle of the
 
nineteenth century, there were about 50 000 kuloğlu.17 
The Ottoman Empire also contributed to the material culture of Africa, constructing 
many monuments on the continent. Several mosques, madrasahs (Muslim theological 
schools), hamams (public baths), and bridges still exist in Libya and Tunisia, but were 
demolished in Algeria during the French occupation, beginning in 1830.
18
 Another form 
of Ottoman support was a surgery opened in Khartoum, Sudan by a doctor of Prussian 
descent, Mehmed Emin Pasha (Eduard Schnitzer) (1840-1892).
19
 Khartoum was 
                                                     
10
 Kavas, Osmanlı-Afrika İlişkileri, 12- 13. 
11
 Ahmet Kavas, “Afrika’da Türklerin Hakimiyeti ve Kurdukları Devletler,” in Türkler, vol. 9 (Ankara: 
Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), 1058. 
12
 Richard Hill, Egypt in the Sudan: 1820−1881 (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 1. 
13
 Hatice Babavatan, “Understanding ‘Afrikâ-yi ‘Osmânî’ in the Late Ottoman Period: the Case of 
Zanzibar” (Master’s diss., Boğaziçi University, 2003), 42. 
14
 Kavas, “Afrika’da Türklerin Hakimiyeti ve Kurdukları Devletler,” 1064. 
15
 Kavas, “Afrika’da Sömürgeciliğin XIX. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısına Kadar Kurulamamasında Osmanlı 
Devleti’nin Rolü,” 106. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ahmet Kavas, “Kuloğlu,” in DİA, vol. 26 (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2001), 360. 
18
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established by Osman Bey Jarkas al-Birinji, a Circassian Mamluk, in 1825 during the 
Turco-Egyptian administration of Sudan.
20
  
3. Ottoman relations with the Muslim states in sub-Saharan Africa 
The Ottoman Empire established good relationships with the Muslim states in sub-
Saharan Africa.
21
 Securing good relations with the states and tribes in Africa became 
possible with the establishment of Ottoman sovereignty in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.
22
 
Funj
23
, Darfur, Kordofan and Sennar sultans settled between present-day Sudan and 
Chad; the Emirate of Harar in Sudan and the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, 
Ethiopia); Kano sultanate and the Hausa states between the present south of Niger and 
north of Nigeria and the Zanzibar sultanate in the coasts of Kenya, Tanzania and 
Mozambique all had close relations with the Ottoman Empire. Nearly all Muslims on the 
African continent were either under Ottoman sovereignty or accepted the Ottoman Sultan 
as their Caliph.
24
 At that time, nearly half of the African continent was Muslim and they 
preserved their relationships with the Ottoman Empire. They appealed to the Ottomans 
when any threat of occupation by European powers arose, or any unrest broke out in their 
own territories.
25
 For instance the city of Mombasa, in present-day Kenya, was taken 
from Portugal by the Ottomans at the end of the sixteenth century. The Empire prevented 
an attack by the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia and the Portuguese against the Emirate of 
Harar. The Ottomans also sent rifles to the Emirate of Harar to protect itself against any 
threat, as well as trainers to educate people in using these guns.
26
 
Abdülhamid II (reign 1876-1909) sent Muhammad Başala to Morocco and Bornu (Chad) 
on some secret missions. Muhammad Başala was a prominent public figure in Tripoli and 
had full knowledge of the area and of the nature of the population. He provided 
information about the power and glory of the Ottoman Caliph to each major African 
group. Accordingly, Muslims had great reverence for the Caliph everywhere Başala 
travelled in Africa. For instance, a group of Africans told him that they had killed a group 
of French officials, who did not have a sultan’s ferman allowing them to travel in what 
the tribe considered to be the sultan’s dominions. Muhammad Başala proposed that 
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special missions should be send to Muslims to advise and guide the local rulers, in order 
to incorporate these lands into the imperial domains.
27
  
Besides this, the Ottoman Empire had observer status at the Congo Conference or Berlin 
Conference held in Berlin in 1884−1885, which fifteen republics, empires, duchies, and 
kingdoms attended.
28
 This further demonstrates that the Empire had a voice about Africa 
among the European states that were establishing colonies in Africa at the time.
29
 The 
noteworthy study of Mostafa Minawi, The Ottoman Scramble for Africa: Empire and 
Diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz (2016) confirms the Ottoman interest and power 
in the eastern Sahara, the Lake Chad basin and western Arabia even in the 1880s and 
1890, despite the fact that the Empire was regarded as ‘the sick man of Europe’ at that 
time
30
.  
Furthermore, the Empire sent the religious scholar Abu-Bakr Effendi to South Africa in 
1863, in order to resolve the problems in Muslim communities there, which is discussed 
later.  
Although the Act of Berlin of 1885 was an instrument to justify European expansionism, 
the relations of the Muslim states in Africa with the Ottomans continued until the 
beginning of the twentieth century.
31
 For instance, Muslims in Mauritius and Madagascar 
sent funds to Ankara, the capital of modern Turkey, in the first years of the Turkish 
Republic, founded in 1923.
32
  
4. Ottoman relations with South African Muslims 
Geographical distance prevented contact with South Africa for the Ottomans. Ottoman 
flat-bottomed ships were built for the Mediterranean and were not durable enough for the 
ocean voyages, while the Ottoman’s naval adversary Portugal had tall ships. The 
Portuguese fleet was technologically superior and the Ottoman navy could not deter them 
in the Indian Ocean. Since the Empire never held the southern parts of the continent, 
Ottoman relations with South African Muslims under British rule were indirect. The 
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assistance of Britain to the Ottoman Empire, in the Crimean War in 1856, initiated a 
friendly Ottoman−British relationship. The support of Great Britain to Turkey in the 
Crimean War against Russia, and the Paris Treaty signed after the war, had a great impact 
in Ottoman circles.
33
 Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals then came to regard Britain as 
the traditional friend and powerful ally of Turkey in Europe. During the time Britain and 
the Ottomans were on a friendly footing, the Ottoman alim (scholar) Abu Bakr Effendi 
was sent to the Cape Colony, a British dominion, in 1863.  
5. An Ottoman scholar, Abu Bakr Effendi, in South Africa 
Initially, the Cape Muslims requested a scholar from a Muslim country with a petition to 
the Cape Governor, in April 1862.
34
 This petition was sent to the British Queen Victoria 
and then the British Parliament. The House of Commons referred the matter to Musurus 
Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to London. Musurus Pasha mentioned the matter to the 
Ottoman Sultan Abdülaziz and he sent Abu Bakr Effendi as an emissary of the Sultan at 
the request of Queen Victoria in 1863.
35
 The intention of his assignment to the Cape 
Colony was to resolve religious conflicts among the Muslim community in Cape Town. 
These conflicts were about questions such as: “Whether shaving one’s moustache renders 
a person a disbeliever or not?” or “Whether a marriage would be inaccurate if the mehir 
(bride wealth) of a woman exceeds 27.5 kuruş?” although the answers were common 
knowledge in a Muslim country.
36
 
In order to educate people and resolve the conflicts among the Muslim community, Abu 
Bakr Effendi opened two different Ottoman Theological schools, for boys and girls, in 
Cape Town. The school for boys was opened fifteen days after his arrival. There were 
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more than three-hundred pupils enrolled in twenty days.
37
 Some of the grandsons of the 
famous religious scholar Tuan Guru or Imam Abdullah Qadhu Abdus Salaam 
(1712−1807) were among his students.38 Abu Bakr Effendi travelled to some other cities 
in South Africa as well as Mozambique and Mauritius at the request of Muslim 
communities.
39
  
So as to make an intimate contact with the South African Muslims, Abu Bakr Effendi 
learned English and Afrikaans (a dialect of Dutch). He wrote two books Bayan ud-din 
(1869) and Marasid ud-din in Afrikaans with Arabic scripts. Bayan ud-din, which was a 
condensed translation of Mülteka’l-Ebhur of İbrahim b. Muhammed el-Halebi (died in 
956)
40
, was printed in 1877 in Constantinople with 1500 copies and distributed to the 
Cape Muslims; while Marasid ud-din
 
presumably could never be published.
41
 His book 
Bayan ud-din was one of the earliest examples of Arabic-Afrikaans or Ajami works, and 
therefore of great significance to historical linguists.
42
 Abu Bakr Effendi’s pupils were 
familiar with Afrikaans, but not with its Latin scripts, as they could not go to the public 
schools. For liturgical reasons they could only read Arabic scripts, but were not able to 
speak Arabic.
43
 Abu Bakr Effendi’s letters were also published by Mecmua-i Fünun, a 
Turkish newspaper, between 1863 and 1880. From his arrival to his death in Cape Town, 
Abu Bakr Effendi gave relevant information about the history, geography, climate, 
economy, politics and culture of the Cape Colony to the Ottoman intellectuals.
44
 He 
continued his education and religious activities until his death in 1880. 
Abu Bakr Effendi initiated a good relationship between the Ottoman Empire and 
Muslims in South Africa and had a profound impact on the Cape Muslims. Sixty Cape 
Muslims wrote a letter presenting their thankfulness to Abdülaziz in 1863, for sending a 
religious alim to the Cape Colony.
45
 The traditional Ottoman hat, the Fez became popular 
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among Cape Muslim men after Abu Bakr Effendi introduced it and when an Australian 
troopship stopped over in Cape Town on its way to the Ottoman Empire in the time of 
WWI. Australian soldiers supposed that Turks already occupied the Cape, when they saw 
the Cape Muslims wearing fezes. This already demoralized them completely, before 
fighting on the front line.
46
 The Ottoman sultan’s name as the Caliph of all Muslims was 
mentioned in the Friday Sermons in the Cape Colony after Abu Bakr Effendi’s arrival.47 
Cape Muslims also started to celebrate the birthday of the Ottoman Sultan a couple of 
years after Abu Bakr’s arrival.48 For instance, Cape Muslims who had attended the 
ceremony of the British Queen’s birthday for years, celebrated the birthday of Sultan 
Abdülaziz as a great occasion in the mosques in 1867.49 This demonstrated the 
charismatic leadership of the Ottoman Caliph-Sultan for the Muslims of Cape Town. The 
arrival of Abu Bakr Effendi rendered possible the consolidation of the religious influence 
of the Ottoman Sultan, first among Cape Town Muslims, later those of Port Elizabeth and 
the Transvaal.  
One of Abu Bakr Effendi’s students, Abdullah Agmat opened a cricket club called the 
“Ottoman Cricket Club” in Cape Town in 1882, which is still active today.  
Abu Bakr Effendi was very important figure for the Ottoman Empire as well as the South 
African Muslims. He was the only Islamic alim (scholar) appointed from the Ottoman 
territories to a foreign country in order to educate non-Ottoman people.
50
 
6. Ottoman activities in South Africa after Abu Bakr Effendi 
Islamic activities in South Africa continued with his sons, after the demise of Abu Bakr 
Effendi. Abu Bakr Effendi’s eldest son Achmed Ataullah Effendi was appointed as 
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principal of the Kimberley Ottoman Hamidiye School by Abdülhamid II in 1884, after 
receiving some education in Mecca and Al-Azhar, Cairo.
51
 Al-Azhar was one of the most 
outstanding educational institutions of that time. Kimberley Ottoman Hamidiye School 
was closed during the South African War (1899-1902) and he was appointed as principal 
of the Ottoman Theological School in Cape Town. He also learned Urdu in addition to 
English and Afrikaans. His study of Urdu, beyond any doubt, demonstrates his intimate 
relations with Indian Muslims in South Africa.
52
 Achmed Ataullah Effendi left South 
Africa when he was appointed as the first Ottoman Consul-General to Singapore for two 
years until his death in 1903.
53
  
Another son of Abu Bakr Effendi, Hisham Nimetullah Effendi was also a scholar in 
South Africa and was educated in Turkey for more than twenty years. He was regarded as 
a qualified alim (scholar) after his return to South Africa.
54
 In 1894, he wrote three 
religious books in Afrikaans with Arabic script. Hisham Nimetullah Effendi was a 
prominent figure who strengthened the ties between the Ottoman caliphate and South 
African Muslims. He was rewarded with the fourth-rank Hamidiye medal (imperial 
medal) for his labour in educational activities and fund raising for the Hejaz Railway.
55
 
South African Muslims, surprisingly, donated at least 366 551 pounds for the 
construction of Hejaz Railway between 1900 and 1907.
56
 
Apart from the work of these prominent Ottoman figures, the Ottoman Empire 
established many educational and religious services for South African Muslims. Upon the 
request of Muslims, Sultan Abdülaziz donated 400 lira to finish the construction of a 
mosque that had remained incomplete, called Grace Street Mosque, in Port Elizabeth.
57
 
The mosque, completed in 1864, was the first in the Cape Colony to have a dome and 
minaret.
58
 The Ottoman Empire afterwards opened schools named ‘Hamidiye schools’ in 
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the reign of Abdülhamid II and established mosques in Cape Town, Durban, Kimberley 
and Port Elizabeth.
59
 
7. Ottoman Pan-Islamist policy in South Africa 
The intention of the rulers of the Ottoman Empire to to contribute to South African 
Muslims was primarily religious and political. Especially after 1878, the Ottoman Empire 
intended to apply an element of pressure on Britain, while using the prestige of the 
caliphate as an Islamic power.
60
 Britain had a substantial Muslim population in her 
dominions, particularly in India. The largest group of South African Muslims was of 
Indian descent who had immigrated to South Africa from 1860 onwards. Abdülhamid II 
politicized Islam remarkably with his pan-Islamist policy and managed the influence of 
the caliphate against Britain. South Africa was a crucial playground for pan-Islamic 
propaganda. The Ottoman Empire endeavoured to secure good relations with South 
African Muslims via Ottoman scholars and consular representatives.
61
 In order to apply 
another element of pressure to Britain, Abdülhamid sent a war observer to the South 
African War in 1899, which will be discussed later. 
South African Muslims were attached to the Ottoman sultan as their Caliph with 
profound respect. For instance, in 1900 Natal Muslims wrote a letter to Abdülhamid II on 
his silver jubilee with the assistance of Mahatma Gandhi. In the letter the Muslims 
referred to Abdülhamid as Caliph of the Faithful, protector of the Holy Cities and 
defender of the Islamic faith.
62
 In 1908, the opening ceremony of the Hijaz Railway Line 
and thirty-third anniversary of the reign of Abdülhamid II were celebrated by Muslims in 
South Africa, and they congratulated the Ottoman Sultan with telegrams. Imams gave 
speeches in every mosque about the occasion, while pupils of Islamic schools marched in 
Cape Town.
63
 
Muslims in South Africa held charity functions to collect money on behalf of people 
injured in the Russo-Ottoman War in 1877-78. The threat against the Ottoman sultan as 
Caliph and the Holy Sites during the Italian-Ottoman War and WWI also activated the 
South African Muslims. Particularly Cape Town and Transvaal Muslims protested the 
wars against the Ottoman Empire and raised funds for the Ottoman Red Crescent Society. 
During the war in Tripoli, Libya in 1911, a mass meeting was held in the Hamidia 
Islamic Society to protest Italy’s hostilities and request British intervention in the matter. 
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For South African Muslims, Italian action against the Ottoman Empire was “immoral, 
unjustifiable, uncivilised and high-handed”. They wished to frustrate Italy in her ‘evil’ 
designs and desired an Ottoman victory in her struggle for ‘honour’.64 South African 
Muslims even declared their willingness to participate in the Ottoman−Italy war in 
Tripoli.
65
 A total of nineteen Johannesburg Muslims informed the Ottoman Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs about their willingness to fight in the Italo−Turkish War.66   
During WWI, South African Muslims could not openly support the Ottoman Empire 
since they were British subjects. Only a couple of protests were held. The Transvaal 
Mohammedan Congress in Pretoria and the Hamidia Islamic Society in Johannesburg 
criticised the European threat on Constantinople and Palestine. They accepted the 
resolution of 19 March, 1919 signed by the All-Indian Muslim League in Bombay about 
the necessity of retaining Constantinople and Palestine under the sovereignty of the 
Ottoman Empire. South African Muslims sent a fund to the amount of 17.634 lira and 
875 pounds to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey.67 However, the 
newly-founded Turkish Republic, after the War of Independence (1914-1918), abolished 
the caliphate on 3 March, 1924. This abolition was a great blow to Muslims all over the 
world and the decision was confronted with utter disbelief in India.
68
 
Conclusion 
The sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire in Africa started with the taking of Egypt in 1517 
and continued until 1912, with the fall of Libya. Even though no real Ottoman settlement 
existed particularly in North Africa, the Ottoman Empire secured good relations with the 
Muslim states in Africa until the beginning of the twentieth century. Establishing a 
caliphate, with the conquest of Egypt, gave the Ottoman sultans the role of advocates of 
Islam and, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman sultans used the 
religious authority of the Caliphate.  
The Ottoman material contribution to Africa, as well as the pan-Islamist policy of the 
Ottoman Caliph-Sultan, rendered possible the rise of Ottoman influence on this continent. 
The power of the idea of the caliphate was used as an instrument of legitimacy. The 
sacred power of the caliphate was effectively politicized during the Hamidian era to 
constitute a counterbalance against Great Britain. The abolition of the caliphate in 1924 
diluted Turkish influence in Africa almost completely. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
Ismail Kemal as an Ottoman intellectual, politician and Albanian nationalist 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the Ottoman interests and authority in Africa, particularly the 
southernmost tip of the continent, were examined. The political developments in Africa 
were on the agenda of Ottoman public opinion as well as the Ottoman intelligentsia. The 
South African War became an important topic in public discussions. Some intellectuals 
supported the cause of the Boers, while the others supported the British. Ismail Kemal, as 
a prominent Albanian Ottoman intellectual, became the leader of the pro-British 
Ottomans. 
Ismail Kemal had a dual identity as an Ottoman−Albanian intellectual and politician. He 
was a prominent Ottoman political figure working in the Ottoman administrative and 
political service for more than fifty years, as well as a member of the Ottoman Chamber 
in the era of the Second Constitutional period (1908−1912). 
Ismail Kemal was first a supporter and then opponent of the Young Turks, a rising force 
in the last epoch of the Ottoman Empire, advocating constitutional monarchy and 
opposing the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II. Initially, he was a liberal reformist attached 
to Ottoman identity and bent upon an autonomous Albania within the Ottoman Empire. 
Then he embarked on power struggles with Abdülhamid, the ruling sultan, and the Young 
Turks. 
Ismail Kemal turned into an Albanian nationalist when he abandoned hope for the future 
of the Empire. On seeing the threat of the disintegration of Albanian-inhabited territories, 
during the Balkan Wars of 1912, he obtained approval from the Great Powers to found an 
independent Albania. Ismail Kemal was one of the crucial leaders of the Albanian cause 
and the first president of Albania. He embraced the nationalist doctrine of Albanian 
intellectuals founded during the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, 
announcing the freedom of Albania on 28 November, 1912. 
This chapter investigates the political and intellectual life of Ismail Kemal as well as his 
relations with the Young Turks. Ismail Kemal’s struggle for the Albanian cause and his 
personality are also examined. In this way, an attempt is made to understand his British 
advocacy by looking at his political and intellectual background. It is also hoped to make 
a contribution to the literature on Ismail Kemal. 
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2. 1. The political activities of Ismail Kemal 
Ismail Kemal Bey is referred to variously in the documentation as ‘Avlonyalı İsmail 
Kemal’, İsmail Kemal Vlora’, ‘İsmail Kemal Bey’, ‘Ismail Kemal Bej’, ‘Ismail Qemali’, 
‘Ismail Qemali Vlora’, ‘Ismail Kemal Bey Avlona’ or ‘Ismail Qemal Bey Vlora’. He was 
born in 1844 according to his memoirs and 1847 according to the Ottoman archival 
documents in Avlonya (Valona), Albania as the son of a well-known Albanian family and 
a descendant of Sinan Pasha who was a kaptan-ı derya (Grand Admiral of the fleet).69 
Sinan Pasha was the son-in-law of Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II, whose family stretched 
back four hundred years.
70
 Many Ottoman administrators were recruited from the Vlora 
dynasty, until the collapse of the empire.
71
 
Ismail Kemal learned Turkish when he was in elementary school.
72
 In 1855 he graduated 
first in his class in the famous Zosimaia Elen, which was one of the most outstanding 
high schools of Greece at that time. Ismail Kemal studied Greek, French and Italian at the 
school. Many of the Albanian-speaking elite studied at this Greek state-funded high 
school in Ioannina, such as the Frasheri brothers, Daut Boriçi, Hodo Sokoli, and Jusuf 
Tabaku.
73
  
Ismail Kemal came to Constantinople in 1860 to study law and, with the assistance of his 
uncle, he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a translator.
74
 He was appointed 
attaché to the Paris embassy (sefaret), though he did not take up this position due to the 
death of his sister.
75
 He established a relationship with the Young Ottomans, such as 
Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha in 1865.76 Kemal became the governor of Rusçuk (Ruse, 
Bulgaria) in May 1866.
77
 
Ismail Kemal was a close collaborator of Midhat Pasha (1822−1884), the Grand Vizier 
and he advanced rapidly in Pasha’s entourage.78 During the governorship of Midhat 
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Pasha in Tuna, Danube (now Bulgaria), Ismail Kemal became the correspondence 
manager and the editor of the newspaper Le Danube.
79
 When Midhat Pasha was 
appointed as the president of newly founded Conseil d’Etat in 1867, Ismail Kemal 
became the maître de requêtes of the first class in the Conseil d’Etat office.80 Midhat 
Pasha was assigned as the governor-general of Mesopotamia after a year and Ismail 
Kemal returned to the Diplomatic and Political Department in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.
81
  
Albanian intellectuals in Istanbul, and Ismail Kemal, wanted Sadrazam (the Grand 
Vizier) Âli Pasha (1815-1875), to open an Albanian-language-medium school. Kemal 
Bey fell into disfavour and was appointed to the governorship of Varna, to remove him 
from Istanbul.
82
 He became the delegate of the Lower Danube Province and the Ottoman 
president of the European Commission of the Danube.
83
 He returned to Istanbul in 1871 
and worked on the Albanian alphabet and opening schools in Albanian with Albanian 
intellectuals such as Şemsettin Sami Fresheri and Mehmed Ferid Vlora. However, their 
attempts remained inconclusive until 1878, with the foundation of the League of 
Prizren.
84
  
Ismail Kemal resigned and went to Europe. Subsequently, in 1876 with the declaration of 
the First Constitutional Monarchy, Ismail Kemal arrived in Istanbul. He worked with 
Midhat Pasha on the preparation of Kanun-u Esasi (The Ottoman Basic Law).
85
 The 
Eyalet system would be applied in the empire and all the Albanian vilayets would be 
gathered in a single eyalet according to the reforms that Midhat Pasha proposed.
86
 During 
the Grand Vizierate of Midhat Pasha (December 1876 to February 1877), Ismail Kemal 
was appointed Secretary General of the Foreign Office. Nevertheless, when Midhat Pasha 
was exiled, Ismail Kemal resigned his office.
87
  
2. 2. The League of Prizren and the exile of Ismail Kemal 
Ismail Kemal was one of the leaders of the League of Prizren, founded in 1878 in Prizren, 
Kosova Vilayeti (province) of the Ottoman Empire. This organisation was established 
after the disgrace of Turkey in the Russo-Ottoman War in 1877−1878. The empire was 
imposed upon by Russia to sign the severe articles of the Treaty of San Stefano. The 
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Ottomans left a great deal of Albanian-inhabited territory to the Balkan Slavic nations. 
The Great Powers especially Great Britain and Austria-Hungary refused the provisions of 
the treaty, which were detrimental to their interests. The Congress of Berlin was held to 
revise the Treaty of San Stefano on 13 June, 1878. The Albanian leaders gathered in 
Prizren to take action for Albanian territorial integrity and founded the Albanian League 
for the Defence of the Rights of the Albanian Nation (the League of Prizren).
88
 Initially, 
the Ottoman government supported this formation. However, the League was dismantled 
by Bab-ı Ali (the Sublime Porte) when it claimed political autonomy and the movement 
was suppressed by Ottoman troops.
89
 Ismail Kemal was put on probation in Kütahya by 
Abdülhamid II between 1877 and 1884, presumably because he took an active part in the 
foundation of the League of Prizren. Besides this, he also became the leader of the 
demonstration held for Midhat Pasha on the day he was exiled to Europe.
90
 With ninety 
deputies, Ismail Kemal requested Abdülhamid to reinstate Midhat on 22 May, 1877.91  
2. 3. Forgiveness of Ismail Kemal Bey 
In 1884, he was pardoned and nominated to the governorship of Bolu. Abdülhamid II 
then assigned him to the governorship of Gallipoli. Ismail Kemal rejected it many times, 
but accepted eventually in 1890.
92
 He stayed there for two months and was appointed to 
the governorship of Beirut. Probably, Abdülhamid II wanted to send him away from the 
centre of the empire. He was also summoned to the governorship of Syria for a month 
until the coming of Mehmed Şerif Rauf Pasha in 1892.93   
Ismail Kemal returned to Istanbul in 1892 and stayed there until 1900. Kemal proposed 
memorandums to Abdülhamid II about liberal reforms in the Ottoman Empire during his 
stay in payitaht, Istanbul. Particularly famous is Kemal Bey’s “windy, wordy and 
pusillanimous project of reform” proposed to Abdülhamid II, dated in 1897.94 
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After the exile of Midhat Pasha and himself, Ismail Kemal struggled for a constitutional 
monarchy in the Ottoman Empire.
95
 Süreyya Bey Vlora (1860-1940), cousin of Kemal 
Ismail Bey and an Ottoman statesman and intellectual, noted that Ismail Kemal was one 
of the notables who endeavoured most for the constitutional monarchy.
96
 However, 
according to him, Ismail Kemal never followed a political order devoutly.
97
 Ismail 
Kemal’s other objective, after falling into disfavor, was an autonomous Albania within 
the Ottoman state. However, after the Balkan Wars in 1912, he struggled wholeheartedly 
for an independent Albania.  
2. 4. The flight of Ismail Kemal  
In May, 1900, he was assigned to the governorship of Tripoli by Abdülhamid II. It is 
surely beyond doubt that this post was a proper exile, and so Ismail Kemal fled to Greece. 
The importance of his flight for the palace was Ismail Kemal’s important position among 
prominent Albanian leaders.
98
  
The Ottoman government already had suspicions about his activities for the Albanian 
cause, even before his escape.
99
 According to Ottoman Archival documents, Kemal 
sought to get support from Greece for an independent Albania, while he was in Greece.
100
 
He mentioned the ‘Greek-Albanian fraternity’ in a memorandum that was published 
there, and also tried to found a Greek-Albanian Union.
101 
Moreover, there was a rumour 
that Ismail Kemal gathered the Albanian Christians of Ioannina, who could possibly 
create a Christian-Muslim consensus for the Albanian cause. His cousin, Ferid Pasha the 
Grand Vizier however, assured Abdülhamid that Ismail Kemal was an insignificant 
person for the Albanians.
102
 
After his flight to Europe, Ismail Kemal published a newspaper called Albania with Faik 
Bey Konitza (Koniçe) in Brussels in 1897.103 Since Ismail Kemal could not achieve 
consensus with Faik Bey, he published Le Salut de l’Albanie (Salvation of Albania) in 
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Albanian, Greek and Turkish, by himself.
104
 The Turkish part was published at 
Folkestone, England, the Albanian version was printed at Brussels, and the Greek was 
sent to Athens to be set up.
105
 
In 1901 Ismail Kemal was invited to Egypt by the Albanian diaspora. The Ottoman 
Archival documents show that in Egypt Ismail Kemal founded an association called 
‘Şafak’ with the Albanians, the Armenians and some of the Young Turks, with the help 
of the Khedive.
106
 Moreover, Kemal was denounced by Mehmed Ali Pasha, brother of 
the Khedive, after Kemal offered Mehmed Ali Pasha the Albanian throne. Kemal was 
tried for high treason in the court of Constantinople upon this denunciation. He was 
condemned to death in absentia and his civil rights, ranks, dignities, decorations and 
property were taken.
107
 Henceforth, he was mentioned in the Ottoman Archival 
documents as ‘müfsid’ (seditious), ‘escapee Ismail Kemal Vlora and a number of pests’ 
and ‘abuse instrument of the British’.108 Ali Kemal (1867−1922), an Ottoman journalist 
and politician indicated that Ismail Kemal’s offering the Albanian throne to the brother of 
Khedive was a lie. To him, Kemal regarded the Khedive and his brother as worthless 
men.
109
  
Ismail Kemal got in touch with the Young Turks when he fled to Europe. The Committee 
of Union and Progress organised a congress in Paris, at which the Young Turks who 
escaped to Europe would discuss the situation of the Empire. However, the Young Turk 
groups could not reach consensus. Ismail Kemal Bey’s group attempted a coup that 
proved to be unsuccessfull with British cooperation in 1903. They persuaded Recep 
Pasha, the governor of Tripoli of their plan.
110
 The committee also agreed upon the 
Armenian and the Albanian organisations to get assistance.
111
 He had already prepared 
the declaration which he would give to the soldiers when they arrived at Istanbul: “If you 
do not overthrow Abdülhamid, settling at Yıldız Hill today, the cross will stand on the 
dome of Ayasofya (Hagia Sophia) and on Sultanahmet (Blue Mosque) on this other 
hill.”112 However, the coup attempt fell by the wayside when Recep Pasha changed his 
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mind. The reason of the failure of the coup was not, presumably, Ismail Kemal’s 
frivolous attitude but rather that he struggled for the independence of Albania.
113
 
2. 5. The April 13th (31 March) incident 
The Committee of Union and Progress declared Meşrutiyet (constitutionalism) in 23 July, 
1908 with an uprising against Abdülhamid II, the ruling Sultan. Until 1908, Ismail Kemal 
lived between Rome, Paris, Geneva, London and Brussels. Right after the Young Turk 
Revolution in 1908, Ismail Kemal returned to Istanbul as the Deputy for Berat, Albania in 
the Ottoman Parliament. There were two parties in the chamber, the Party of Union and 
Progress as the ruling party and the liberal wing “Ahrar Fırkası” in opposition, of which 
Ismail Kemal took on the leadership. The CUP had indirect control of the government 
and discontent emerged against the oppression of the CUP. The Liberal Party could not 
achieve the success that was expected of it, and a majority of Unionist deputies won the 
election.
114
 The opposition recognised the impossibility of obtaining the power through 
legal means, so they tried to provide support to the traditional conservative groups with 
religious discourses.
115
 
On 7 April, Hasan Fehmi who was an anti-Unionist and editor of Serbesti, was 
assassinated on the Galata Bridge, Istanbul. His funeral degenerated into a show of 
political strength by the Liberals. On the night of 12/13 April, 1909, an enormous group 
consisting of the antagonists of the policy conducted by the CUP, carried out a rebellion 
called the ‘Incident of 31 March’. Istanbul garrisons and softas (theological students) 
marched to the Ayasofya Square claiming the restoration of the Sheriat (Islamic Law).
116
 
Despite the existence of both elements, the Incident of 31 March was neither counter-
revolutionary in the political sense nor reactionary in the religious. These elements were 
non-influential and ambiguous once the CUP was overthrown.
117
  
The soldiers captured the Ottoman capital for seven days and requested the abdication of 
the cabinet, resignation of some commanders and enforcement of religious law. They also 
demanded that Ismail Kemal be the president of the chamber and Kamil Pasha be the 
Grand Vizier. Ismail Kemal and Hoca Vasfi Efendi asserted that there was no way but to 
accept the requests of the rebels in order to suppress the mutiny.
118
 Ismail Kemal claimed 
that he was unanimously elected the President of the Chamber with 60 votes, in place of 
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positivist Ahmed Rıza Bey.119 However, the first round of the election achieved no result 
and Mustafa Efendi, the deputy of Halep (Aleppo) was elected with 111 votes in the 
second round, in which Ismail Kemal received only 47 votes.  
It was thought that the Liberal Union (Ahrar Fırkası), Prens Sabahaddin, Ismail Kemal, 
Kamil Pasha and his son Said Pasha, Mizancı Murad, Derviş Vahdeti and his community, 
İttihad-ı Muhammedi Cemiyeti (Muhammadan Union) and theology students had 
organized the rebellion.
120
 Despite the fact that the real instigator of the 13 April incident 
is still unknown today, it was suspected that Britain managed the incident behind the 
scenes. ‘Volkan newspaper’ published by Derviş Vahdeti (1869−1909) had an important 
role in the mutiny.
121
 It is uncertain how Volkan was financed when it was distributed 
free of charge.
122
 Ahmet Emin (Yalman) (1888−1972), who was a journalist at that time, 
averred in his memoirs that Derviş Vahdeti, was chosen by the British intelligence 
service, trained as a revolutionary agent and put on stage to stir the pot.
123
 This suspicion 
about British interference became stronger during the trials after the uprising. The CUP 
hindered the investigations in order not to drive a wedge between the Great Powers.
124
  
It is very hard to say to what extent Great Britain took part in the incident. Nonetheless, 
the most significant unanimity of the opponents of the CUP was their intimacy with 
British politics. Ahrar Fırkası and Derviş Vahdeti were supporters of Britain. 
Furthermore, Britain approved the uprising against the CUP and the British embassy gave 
support to the liberals during the mutiny.
125
 In order to prevent action by the Third Army, 
which would quell the uprising, Ismail Kemal requested British Ambassador Gerard 
Lowther (1858−1916) to request the British consuls in Macedonia “to assure the 
population that the Constitution was not compromised” by the revolution.126 To Ismail 
Kemal, intervention of the Action Army (Hareket Ordusu) would cause massacres and 
looting of a terrible description in the capital.
127
 Britain endeavoured very much to hinder 
the army’s entering Istanbul.128 Furthermore, Lowther, and Gerald Fitzmaurice the first 
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dragoman (translator) of the British Embassy, indicated that Britain had intrigued by 
manipulating the liberal Ahrar Fırkası. They also gave money to some newspaper, which 
provoked the uprising. Liberals, with the support of the British Embassy, negotiated with 
the Action Army, which remained inactive. Presumably, Lowther's intention to assist the 
liberals was to bring back former grand vizier Kamil Pasha, who was an ardent admirer 
of England.
129
 According to Feroz Ahmad, the role of London on this occasion cannot be 
verified since the documents related to the event were removed from the British 
Archives.
130
 
As soon as Ismail Kemal learned by telegram about his imminent arrest by Tevfik Pasha, 
the Grand Vizier, he placed himself under the protection of the British Embassy, on 20 
April, 1909.
131
 Meanwhile, the Third Army or Action Army from Macedonia recaptured 
Istanbul and the success of this army was interpreted as a victory for Germany and a 
thrashing for Britain.
132
 Ismail Kemal was subject to a judicial inquiry, but no evidence 
was found to tie him to the events of 13 April. He returned Istanbul to take part in 
Parliament.
133
 He became the leader of newly-founded Liberal Party ‘Mutedil 
Hürriyetperveran Fırkası’. Ali Haydar Mithat noted that after the suppression of the 
rebellion, Ismail Kemal concentrated only on the Albanian declaration of 
independence.
134
  
2. 6. Ismail Kemal’s opposition to the Young Turks 
After the failure of coup attempt in 1903, Ismail Kemal fell out with with the Prince 
Sabahaddin group as well and started activities openly for the Albanian cause. Especially 
after 1906, pan-Turanism or Turkish nationalism became the administrative ideology of 
the Committee of Union and Progress. This shift caused unrest among the non-Turkish 
members of the CUP and they advocated their own respective nationalist movements. For 
instance, Ismail Kemal took part actively in the Albanian nationalist movement.
135
 
Mizancı Murad, an Ottoman intellectual (1854−1917), implied that the Ali Rıza Bey 
group had decided to “fend off Kemal from the CUP and tried to disfavour him with the 
accusation and slander”.136 They considered him “haric-i vatan” (exempt country).137 
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Indeed, the committee hindered Ismail Kemal’s election to the Ottoman Chamber in 
1912.
138
 
According to Ismail Kemal, initially the political agenda of the committee, “which united 
all the ethnical elements under the same flag of justice and equality”, and consequently 
eliminated foreign intervention, seemed to coincide with the Albanian national 
aspirations.
139
 The Young Turks asked for the assistance of the Albanians to promulgate 
the constitution. Ten thousand armed Albanians gathered in Firzovik (Ferizaj), Kosovo 
and sent Abdülhamid the famous telegram. According to his memoirs, the Sultan 
consulted with Ismail Kemal who advised Abdülhamid to reinstate the constitution.140 It 
was declared two days later. However, the programme of the CUP was originally 
Turkish, nationalist and centralist.
141
 With the efforts of the unionists reinforcing the 
central authority, towards the middle of 1909, Albanian trust was betrayed by the 
committee.
142
 This centralization policy caused many revolts in Albania. The Young 
Turks, to Ismail Kemal, had a plan to deny the different Ottoman ethnicities of their 
origins. The first consequence of this strategy was the declaration of Bulgarian 
independence on 5 October, 1908 and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
Austria-Hungary on 8 October.
143
 According to Ismail Kemal, the most dangerous and 
strongest ethnic element in the committee was the Albanians and “nothing was neglected 
that could foment trouble, and all kinds of repressive measures were resorted to with the 
sole aim of crushing what was believed to be the head of the Nationalist Medusa”.144 The 
committee regarded the Albanian people as “Mussulman people having no political ideal 
beyond a desire to avoid the payment of taxes.” However, the aggressive policy of the 
CUP against the Albanians triggered their nationalist feelings and ignited the rebellion. 
Ismail Kemal made great efforts in the Parliament, with his Albanian colleagues, to 
hinder the ‘senseless’ struggle of the committee on behalf of the Albanian people, yet 
their sincere warnings remained neglected.
145
 With the acceleration of the Albanian 
cause, expectations of the differences of opinion between the Unionists and Albanians 
became far greater in 1910.
146
 The harsh stubbornness of the Young Turks ‘in their 
attempt to absorb the nationalities’ made the Albanian struggle inevitable and forced 
them to fight for their national freedom.
147
 
                                                     
138
 Hacısalihoğlu, Jön Türkler ve Makedonya Sorunu (1890-1918), 351. 
139
 Mizancı Murad Bey’in II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Hatıraları, 365. 
140
 Ibid, 366. 
141
 Robert William Seton-Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (New York: Dutton and 
Company, 1918), 189. 
142
 Çelik, “31 Mart İsyanında İsmail Kemal Bey’in Rolü,” 90. 
143
 The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, 366. 
144
 Ibid, 350. 
145
 Ibid, 367. 
146
 Hacısalihoğlu, Jön Türkler ve Makedonya Sorunu, 386. 
147
 The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, 368. 
 22 
Another crucial element for the Albanian uprising was the threat of Albanian 
disintegration. The fear of the Italo-Turkish war in 1911 caused a general discontent 
among the Albanians. Then, the Balkan Wars of 1912 between the Ottoman Empire and 
Balkan States became an epoch-making period for the Albanians as Albanian territories 
were besieged by Greece and Serbia.
148
 
2. 7. The foundation of Albania 
In the Balkan Wars the Albanians divided into two groups. One group defended their 
lands with the Ottomans, while the Albanian nationalists from Vlora (Valona) and Berat 
were spreading propaganda against the empire. Their propaganda was aimed at the 
Albanian soldiers, such as; “Albania is a state on her own now. So, the Turkish war does 
not concern the Albanians.” Also, in his memoirs Mahmud Şevket Pasha (1856−1913), 
the Grand Vizier, noted the treachery of Ismail Kemal in the fall of Yanya (Ioannina).
149
 
Ismail Kemal went to Romania and held a meeting in Bucharest, and went there by way 
of Dıraç (Durres), Albania.150 Here, Ismail Kemal tried to declare the independence of 
Albania and held a meeting with the dignitaries of Durres. However, the intelligentsia 
were astonished by his idea and viewed it with apprehension. Ismail Kemal then left 
Durres and went to his home-town, Vlora where he met with notables he trusted, such as 
Midhat Frasheri and Murad Bey Toptani.
151
 Ultimately, a total of eighty-three persons 
decided to declare the freedom of Albania and Ismail Kemal announced its independence 
on 28 November, 1912.
152
 The provisional government was founded the next day and 
Ismail Kemal became the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
153
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He said, in the Albanian Declaration of Independence, that there was no other way except 
the independence of his country, since Albania was faced with danger from the Greeks 
and the Serbians.
154
 Ismail Kemal explained the reason for the Albanian uprising as that 
the Albanians had become aware that the empire was weakened. They cried with one 
voice, “Let her commit suicide if she wishes; we intend to survive.”155 
The ex parte declaration of the independence of Albanians increased the desertion of 
Albanian soldiers from the Ottoman army, particularly in Ioannina. Ismail Hakkı Okday 
(1881-1977), military commander during the First Balkan War and diplomat, pointed out 
the number of the escapees, at least 10 000. Vehip Pasha (1877-1940), Commander of the 
Ioannina corps in the Balkan War of 1912 gave speeches constantly in order to preclude 
escapes.
156
 
After the declaration of freedom, Esad Pasha suddenly founded his own government in 
Durres on 12 October, 1913. When Süreyya Bey went to Durres, the government of 
Ismail Kemal in Vlora was further weakened.
157
 According to the memoirs of Süreyya 
Bey Vlora, the Albanians’ hope for Ismail Kemal as a ruler, who had high intelligence 
and profound knowledge, remained unsatisfied. Kemal was careless of his cabinet and he 
appointed people with bad intentions.
158
 He admitted illiterate and inexperienced people 
into the civil service and he invented redundant offices.
159
 
Ismail Kemal Bey also desired foreign intervention in Albanian affairs.
160
 For instance, 
he wanted Austria-Hungary to establish Albanian schools to raise Albanian national 
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consciousness. To him, only Austria could maintain the status quo in the Balkans and 
protect Albanian-inhabited territories against the threat of Pan-Slavism.
161
  
It is also noteworthy to assert that he desired to create Albania as a European state. In his 
memoirs, he expressed his mission to demonstrate to Europe that Albania was capable of 
self-management and was worthy of the confidence of the Great Powers.
162
 Kemal also 
declared, he wanted a Christian and European ruler for Albania, since only a European 
sovereign could guide this newly founded state to its entrance to the great European 
family.
163
 In the telegram he sent to the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire after the 
foundation of Albania, Kemal emphasised that Albania “entered into the family of the 
peoples of Eastern Europe”. He also determined the Albanians to be the oldest Eastern 
European nation.
164
 
Another late Ottoman and Albanian intellectual, Sami Frasheri or Şemseddin Sami 
(1850−1904), also declared in his canonical text named, Albania: Past, Present, Future 
(1899) that the Albanians were not Turks and they were the oldest nation in Europe. For 
him, the Albanians had “more rights upon the land of Europe than any other nation.” 
Albania would soon be modernised and integrated into Europe.
165
 After the declaration of 
independence, another Albanian intellectual Faik Bey Konitza (1875−1942) appealed to 
Ismail Kemal to make Albania a European state like Norway, Denmark, Holland and 
Belgium, not an Oriental state like Afghanistan and Tunisia.
166
  
The International Commission of Control, instituted by the six Great Powers, nominated 
Prince William of Wied, an officer in the German army, to rule Albania, in November 
1913. Upon the arrival of Prince William of Wied at Durres on 7 March, 1914,
167
 Ismail 
Kemal had to resign his office. Interestingly, he verbalized his appreciation to Europe for 
her confirmation of Albania in her national existence by giving Albanians a ruler that 
Europe chose herself.
168
 Ismail Kemal left Albania on 22 January, 1914, after fourteen 
months of administration in the provisional government. However, with the beginning of 
the WWI, Prince Wiliam of Wied left Albania on 5 September, 1914.  
Ismail Kemal was in Barcelona during the First World War (1914-1918) and came to 
Paris in 1917. He dictated his memoirs to William Morton Fullerton and they were 
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published in The Times of London.
169
 In 1920, Sommerville Story published the memoirs 
as 410-page book in London. The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey (1920) is the only 
memoir of an Ottoman intellectual published in English. It was translated into Albanian 
in 1968 and published in Toronto, Canada; then translated into Italian. A Turkish 
translation was published in 2009. Feroz Ahmad emphasises that Ismail Kemal built a 
considerable reputation in Europe by means of his memoirs.
170
  
Upon the invasion of Albania during WWI, Ismail Kemal wrote a letter in 1918 
expressing his wish to go to Rome and then to attend the Peace Conference in Paris. 
Consequently, he was invited to Italy. According to Ethem Vlora, son of Ismail Kemal, 
he was poisoned during the media congress in Perugia, Italy and died there on 24 
January, 1919.
171
 Another claim for his death was that he had a heart attack in Perugia.
172
 
2. 8. Ethno-nationalist thoughts of Ismail Kemal Bey 
Ismail Kemal predicated the Albanian origins on the ‘Pelasg’ race, which was also the 
origin of the Hellenic civilisation.
173
 The Albanians, to him, proudly preserved their 
independence despite so many successive conquests, by Romans, Byzantines, Normans, 
Bulgarians, Serbs, Italians, and Turks. They presented the “singular and interesting 
spectacle of a nationality preserved pure and undefiled.”174 Even though Albania had to 
give up her own government, she never renounced her independence. The Albanians 
accepted submission in order to preserve their existence.
175
 
According to the memoirs of Ismail Kemal, many Albanian families tried to find links to 
noble Anatolian origins as their antecedents, after the conquest of Albania by the 
Ottomans. However, his ancestor Sinan Pasha was ‘pure’ Albanian and his dynasty 
served the Ottoman Empire faithfully, while preserving its undefiled Albanian 
patriotism.
176
 
To Ismail Kemal, the attachments of the Albanians to the Ottoman Empire were not 
related to their common religion, Islam, rather to the national interests of the 
Albanians.
177
 The Ottoman Sultans were respectful of Albanian law and customs and left 
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Albanian chiefs to administer Albania. A “mutual and sincere confidence was 
established” between the Ottoman Empire and the Albanians. The most capable leaders 
occupied the highest civil and military positions in the empire. However, the last fifty 
years witnessed profound changes to this situation. The death of Grand Vizier Âli Pasha, 
the harmful and incoherent policy of his successor Mahmud Nedim Pasha, and territorial 
changes in the Balkans after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 were the first signs of 
this intense alteration.
178
 
According to Ismail Kemal, the Albanian people always believed in the impartiality and 
equality of the liberal governments, especially that of England. The confidence in Britain 
of the Albanians was shaken by their handing over an Albanian inhabited territory to 
Montenegro, by the command of William Ewart Gladstone (1809−1898), the British 
Prime Minister. The Albanians were apprehensive of being abandoned by England rather 
than losing the territorial integrity of their motherland.
179
 This fear ended with the 
appointment of George Goschen (1831−1907), British Ambassador Extraordinary to 
Constantinople, and his defence of the rights and interests of the Albanians. All Albanian 
people were reassured of the real political views of Great Britain by Goschen’s oral 
assurances given to Abidin Dino (1843−1906), Albanian-origin Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.
180
 
2. 9. The character of Ismail Kemal Bey 
According to a British Foreign Office report, Ismail Kemal was a bad speaker but a good 
writer. He was a man of fairly sound ideas. He spoke Albanian, Greek and French 
fluently.
181
 Kemal was fearless and independent. To Süreyya Bey, Ismail Kemal had a 
serious-looking and graceful attitude.
182
 He was a capable politician and had a deep 
knowledge of European diplomacy.
183
 
Ismail Kemal Bey was highly criticised for his love of money and his extravagance. Ali 
Haydar Midhat, son of Midhat Pasha, indicated that Ismail Kemal had a weakness for 
money. He had ceded a zone of influence, in Albanian territory, to Greeks, Italians and 
Austrians to get money. He was also getting a salary of 10 000 drachma from the King of 
Greece.
184
 He received money from Zionists, Italians and British, the Khedive of Egypt 
and even from Abdülhamid II, while denouncing the organizations opposed to the 
                                                     
178
 Ibid, 362, 363. 
179
 Ibid, 363. 
180
 Ibid. 
181
 Bülent Özdemir, İngiliz Istihbarat Raporlarında Fislenen Türkiye (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2008), 
59. 
182
 Süreyya Bey, Osmanlı Sonrası Arnavutluk, 139.  
183
 Ibid, 415. 
184
 Ali Haydar Mithat, Hatıralarım, 164. 
 27 
sultan.
185
 A British Foreign Office document described him as being imprecise about the 
money.
186
 
Süreyya Bey Vlora described his personality as self-centred, self-indulgent and insatiable 
and said that he liked prodigality.
187
 To him, Ismail Kemal never thought of his 
occupation, family or friends, but rather himself. He always had a struggle to earn and his 
only goal in this world was to satisfy his eagerness.
188
 Süreyya Bey accused Ismail 
Kemal of labouring for his own well-being and benefit, not for the welfare of Albania.
189
  
Ismail Kemal was also accused of bribery. Le Jeune Turc, a Young Turk organ published 
in French, claimed that Sir Ernest Cassel, the director of the National Bank bribed Ismail 
Kemal with an amount of 10 000 pounds to float a loan. Ismail Kemal learned about this 
from the editor of the paper and he stated in Parliament: “There could not be anyone in 
that assembly stupid and cowardly enough to have invented such a fable”. Thereupon, 
Member of Parliament Dr. İsmet said that he had inserted that paragraph. Kemal replied: 
“Then it is you who are the coward". Dr. İsmet retaliated and abused him. Kemal flung 
him to the door. Then they were separated and Dr. İsmet was removed from the 
chamber.
190
 
It was asserted that Ismail Kemal was a free-mason like many Albanian revolutionists.
191
 
Conclusion  
Ismail Kemal Bey Vlora established the political stand of the Albanian Nationalist case 
and today is considered a great hero of the Albanians. He was a liberal and pro-British 
Ottoman politician who had held many governorships in the Empire, before he fled to 
Europe in 1900. He primarily struggled for a reformed and autonomous Albania, 
connected to the Ottoman Empire, then laboured for her independence under the 
protection of the European Great Powers. In the face of the danger of the disintegration of 
the Albanian-inhabited territories during the Balkan Wars, he declared the independence 
of Albania in 1912. Kemal was the head of the newly-founded provisional government of 
Albania for fourteen months. He died in 1919 in Italy. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
The Pro-British Young Turks 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the political and intellectual activities of Ismail Kemal. 
Throughout his life, Kemal was an Anglophile and had close affiliations with Great 
Britain. In this sense, he was one of the prominent figures among the pro-British Young 
Turks. As a member of the pro-British group, Kemal sought to get the British to intervene 
in the empire’s internal affairs, including in the form of a coup against the ‘despotic’ 
Ottoman Sultan, Abdülhamid II, and make a declaration of constitutionalism. 
The concept of Genç Türkler or ‘Young Turks’ is used to describe different groups in 
opposition to the Ottoman government, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
However, the most outstanding group consisted of the political forces that arose after 
1878, with the shelving of the Constitution (Meclis-i Mebusan) by Abdülhamid II.192 The 
main target of the Young Turks was to save the Ottoman Empire from dismemberment. 
This would be possible with a system of government including liberty and justice for any 
nation wanting to split from the empire. There was no single ideology or Weltanschauung 
that united the Young Turks. The common ground was their belief that the Hamidian 
regime was responsible for the acute predicament of the Ottoman Empire. Dethronement 
of Abdülhamid II was the sine qua non of the Young Turks plans. This was the only way 
to salvage the empire. They did not want to establish a republican administration, but 
desired the end of the despotic and unjust rule of Abdülhamid II. They wanted an empire 
with a constitutional monarchy. “To side against Yıldız Palace was respected as a 
national mission in the eyes of many intellectuals,” as Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, the author 
and politician (1886-1966) put it.
193
 The Young Turks assumed that the pressure of the 
Great Powers would disappear entirely with a constitutional government in the empire.
194
 
Versions of constitutionalism had developed over the past century or so among the Great 
Powers. This form of government became for them the benchmark of civilised rule. The 
empire, therefore, was outside the realm of civilised or good government. The way to 
change this was to change the way the existing monarchy governed. The Young Turk 
movement began as a small, amorphous group that aimed to create a larger intellectual 
elite, in order, eventually, to administer a reformed Ottoman Empire. They neither 
                                                     
192
 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Jön Türkler,” in DİA, vol. 23 (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2001), 586.  
193
 Kuran, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Milli Mücadele, 216. 
194
 Mahmut Bolat, “1876-1914 Arası Osmanlı Devleti Dıs Politikasının Genel Bir Degerlendirmesi,” Ahi 
Evran Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, vol. 1, no. 1 (2014), 23. 
 29 
wanted the masses to be involved in policy-making nor play a role in the administration 
of the empire
195
.  
In this chapter, the focus is on the foundation of the Young Turk organ, the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP). Admiration for Britain of the Young Turks and Ismail 
Kemal, and also the intellectual activities of the Young Turks with Ismail Kemal in 
Europe, is explored. The shift in British policy and British public opinion towards the 
Ottomans is also discussed. 
3. 1. Origin of the Young Turks 
The founders of the Young Turks were mostly highly educated men, who were 
influenced by then popular ideas originating in Europe, such as biological materialism 
and positivism. They asserted that religion inhibited social development and aspired to 
replace religion with science.
196
 
The Young Turks founded some organizations and published periodicals, newspapers and 
humour magazines to criticise the oppressive regime of Abdülhamid II. Their efforts 
were individual until the foundation of the İttihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti (Ottoman Union 
Society) on 2 June, 1889. It was founded by four students; İbrahim Temo, İshak Sükuti, 
Abdullah Cevdet, Mehmed Reşid at the Royal Medical Academy. Especially after this 
date, the movement became a student movement, in particular for students in higher 
education in Istanbul
197
. Its name changed later to the Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki (The 
Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress) with the participation of Ahmed Rıza, who 
was an outstanding antagonist of Abdülhamid II. 
It was thought that the leader of the Young Turks would have been Ismail Kemal.
198
 
However, it was known that he was fostering an ethnic nationalism in a province of the 
empire. He was developing into a proponent of nascent Albanian nationalism. Thus, his 
political work was at odds with the Young Turks’ aim to preserve the empire, but on a 
reformed basis. British newspapers, however, portrayed him as an important leader of the 
Young Turks.
199
 Ismail Kemal was never fully involved with the CUP.
200
 Ali Haydar 
Midhat, son of Midhat Pasha the Grand Vizier, mentions in his memoirs that Ismail 
Kemal was, “occupied with overthrowing absolutism, intellectually and efficaciously, 
and introducing a contemporary, righteous and legitimate administration”.201 For Ismail 
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Kemal, the Tanzimat Fermanı (Imperial Edict of Reorganization) of 1839 put an end the 
Middle Ages of the empire
202
. 
3. 2. The pro-British bias of the Young Turks 
Except for the Young Turks branch in Paris, one of the main characteristics of the Young 
Turks was its Anglophilia. The movement became a ‘crusade’ driven by the pro-British 
group in mid-1900. They wanted to dominate the Young Turks movement.
203
 It can be 
seen in the writings of the Young Turks in Geneva, Switzerland that being on the side of 
the Ottoman Sultan meant to be an opponent of the British. Conversely, being a Young 
Turk was to be a proponent of the British in contemporary politics.
204
 This is because, 
Great Britain had supported the Ottoman Empire against Russia in Crimean War and she 
had supported young Ottomans for the declaration of the First Constitutional Monarchy 
in 1876.
205
 They set their sights on establishing a pro-British administration, instead of 
the pro-German management of Abdülhamid II.206 
The pro-British Young Turks regarded Britain as a traditional friend of the Ottoman 
Empire and sought her assistance in order to prevent the dissolution of the empire. The 
pro-British group defended the idea of European interference in Ottoman internal affairs 
to make reforms in the empire. For instance, according to Mizancı Murad, the European 
intervention was “the lesser of two evils” in the case of dividing the empire. The threat of 
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire would not be possible so long as Europe 
assisted in the reforms.
207
  
Furthermore, according to a report dated 19 July, 1911 sent from Charles M. Marling, the 
British Ambassador to Constantinople, a letter defending the Young Turks’ 
administration was published in The Times. This letter received ‘considerable attention’ 
and most local newspapers in Constantinople dedicated articles to it. Some of them used 
the opportunity to express their hope of England taking a more active interest in Balkan 
affairs. Furthermore, the Turkish people had faith that Great Britain was a ‘traditional 
friend’ of Turkey and could prevent a serious aftermath of the rebellions.208 
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However, the Ottoman Sultan, Abdülhamid II (reign 1876−1909) asserted, according to 
his memoirs, that the British manipulated the Young Turk organization in Selanik 
(Thessaloniki). In his opinion, they urged the Young Turks continually to launch a coup 
d’état against him.209 In the eyes of Abdülhamid II, Great Britain was a state, which 
constantly dethroned the Ottoman sultans.
210
 
3. 3. British diplomacy and public opinion towards the Ottoman Empire 
The pro-British group and Ismail Kemal sought British intervention in Ottoman politics. 
However, British public opinion towards the ‘Eastern Question’ was changing. For the 
British Empire, the existence of the Ottoman Empire was important for the balance of 
power in Europe. The Ottoman Empire was holding the strategic routes to the eastern 
Mediterranean and India. Therefore, protecting the integrity of that empire seemed 
crucial for the British policy-makers during the nineteenth century.
211
 Besides this, the 
idea of Ottoman progress with European support was one of the key policies of Great 
Britain before the concept of realpolitik predominated in Europe.
212
 The Ottoman Empire 
would be a buffer between Great Britain and Russia, which was a great rival of Britain at 
that time.
213
 British statesmen made a tremendous effort to ‘reform’ the empire. 
Nevertheless, British public opinion lost faith in the reformation of the empire with the 
revolt of Christians in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875; the rebellion in Bulgaria in 1876; 
the great defeat of the Turks in the 1878 Russo-Ottoman War; the Congress of Berlin in 
1878; the clashes between Armenians and Muslims in Istanbul in 1896.
214
 British strategy 
then focused on how to divide the empire after these breaking points.
215
 European public 
opinion, particularly British, had evolved from pro-Turkish to anti-Turkish by 1876, 
largely as a result of the Armenian and Bulgarian events.
216
 British public opinion turned 
against the Turks with the enormous propaganda of Radical-Liberal circles during the 
reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II.217 For instance, Dr Humphry Sandwith, an Englishman 
who spoke Turkish, mentioned the Ottoman Armenians negatively in his book about the 
Crimean War, in 1856. On the other hand, in his article published in 1878 he 
demonstrated an extremely anti-Turkish position.
218
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The Gladstone government came to power in 1868. William Ewart Gladstone pursued an 
antagonistic policy to the Ottoman Empire. Gladstone wrote his Bulgarian Horrors and 
the Question of the East during the Serbo-Turkish War in 1876. In this pamphlet, he 
denigrated Turks as “the one great anti-human specimen of humanity”. According to 
Gladstone, the Turkish race destroyed civilisation.
219
 The British Prime Ministers of the 
Victorian era, William Ewart Gladstone, the Earl of Rosebery and the Marquess of 
Salisbury, thought that an intervention in Ottoman politics was unrealistic.
220
 
The Young Turks could not understand this reversal of public opinion on the part of the 
British. It is possible that, since the vast majority of the Young Turks did not know 
English, they could not follow publications in Great Britain.
221
  
3. 4. Anglophilia of Ismail Kemal  
Throughout his life, Ismail Kemal was an Anglophile, and had close relationships with 
persons in Great Britain. Therefore, he wanted to benefit from the assistance of these 
affiliations, initially for the coup against Abdülhamid II and then for the founding of 
Albania. Ismail Kemal went to London upon the death of Queen Victoria to take part in 
her funeral in 1901.
222
 A British newspaper said that he was saddened by the death of 
English Queen Victoria more than her citizens themselves. Ismail Kemal remarked that 
the Ottomans shared the sorrow.
223
 
Sir Philip Currie, British Ambassador to Constantinople, reported that Ismail Kemal was 
a partisan of England and “defended British interests at the Palace on many occasions”.224 
In many interviews with Ismail Kemal and memoranda given to British authorities, 
Kemal advocated British support for the reforms in the Ottoman Empire. He had some 
relationships with the British authorities as early as 1892.
225
 He said in an interview with 
C. M. Hallward, British Consul in Beirut, that he supported British policy toward 
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Egypt.
226
 In a memorandum on Ismail Kemal, Sir Philip Currie describes the author as 
“one of the few Turks [Muslims] who ventures to advocate a change in the present 
system of government and who has persistently advised the sultan to follow the counsels 
of England”.227 
Through the support of Sir Phillip Currie, the periodical called Mecra-yı Efkar (The 
Course of Ideas) was published by Ismail Kemal in Plovdiv, present Bulgaria. It was 
smuggled into Constantinople. Thereupon, Abdülhamid II wanted him to stop the paper, 
yet he did not. According to the historian Hanioğlu, the Sultan refrained from arresting 
him, because of the British support given to him. He, nevertheless, could not achieve his 
dreams due to the lack of foreign interference in Ottoman politics.
228
 
Ismail Kemal had great admiration for the Anglophile protagonist Midhat Pasha 
(1822−1884).229 He was a pupil of Midhat Pasha and part of the Pasha’s public and 
private entourage.
230
 Therefore, Ismail Kemal was very dependent on Midhat Pasha, but 
this dependency was based on love and respect. Ismail Kemal expressed his respect for 
Midhat Pasha in some newspapers published in Istanbul.
231
 There is a reason to believe 
that Ismail Kemal supported constitutionalism as a show of his admiration for Midhat 
Pasha rather than Ismail Kemal’s own conviction, as Mizancı Murad has put it.232 
Ismail Kemal Bey frequently visited the British ambassador Sir Nicholas O’Connor 
(1843−1908) in the 1890s, in order to get assistance for constitutional government in the 
Ottoman Empire.
233
 On one of his visits, the British ambassador told him that Turks do 
not need constitutionalism. Ismail Kemal stated Turks would sacrifice their lives for the 
first constitution of the Ottoman Empire ‘Kanun-u Esasi’ (the Ottoman Basic Law). 
O’Connor’s and Ismail Kemal’s views of the need for constitutionalism thus were not 
allied. However, O’Connor indicated the British would assist in such a change if the 
support were strong enough.
234
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Another strategy Kemal pursued to achieve constitutional reform was to appeal directly 
to the Sultan. This happened in response to unrest in Crete. Ismail Kemal wrote a 
memorandum to Abdülhamid II proposing administrative reforms in the empire, in 
February, 1897.
235
 He stated: “The bad administration ruling in the provinces brings 
discredit on the authority of the Throne and ruin on your subjects of all classes.”236 After 
mentioning the necessity of “serious and general reforms instead of special reforms 
which were going to be imposed on” the subjects of empire, Ismail Kemal suggested that 
the Sultan “immediately convoke a constituent assembly of the representatives of the 
people of capital and provinces.
237
 When these modifications are adopted, the new charter 
can receive the approval of Your Majesty and be promulgated by a special Hatt [Imperial 
Edict].”238 
This memorandum was published in Le Temps on 8 April, 1897 after being smuggled to 
Europe by Ismail Kemal and its summary was also published by The Times. The CUP in 
Geneva published a Turkish translation of the memorandum.
239
 The prime target of 
Ismail Kemal was not to persuade the sultan to make reforms; nevertheless he wanted to 
enable European intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs, at that time critical.
240
  
3. 5. Escape of Ismail Kemal Bey to Europe 
While Ismail Kemal was naïve in his views, he was successful, to some extent, in 
securing British support. He was able to persuade the British Embassy in Constantinople 
to give him political protection on 25 January, 1898, in the event that his life was 
threatened.
241
 He remained in Istanbul but was under their diplomatic protection. 
Following the demonstration at the British consulate the Sultan effectively exiled Ismail 
Kemal by assigning him to the governorship of Tripoli but he, of course, did not take the 
position.
242
 It was all the Sultan could do to Ismail Kemal, as the Sultan was aware that 
arresting or exiling Ismail Kemal would spark protection from the British Embassy.
243
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However, Ismail Kemal perceived this as a true exile. Therefore, he boarded the British 
ambassador’s yacht and claimed asylum with his three sons on 1 May, 1900. Upon Ismail 
Kemal’s escape, Abdülhamid II told Adam Block, the translator for the British Embassy 
in Constantinople, that if Ismail Kemal wanted “to leave the country he was free to do so 
… if that was his object he could have gone like anyone else by train or by steamer or by 
caique or by horse; there was never any necessity for concealment.”244 
Actually, the Sultan had originally endeavoured to send Ismail Kemal to Tripoli as early 
as in 1895. However, since there was strong French opposition for an Anglophile 
governor next to Tunis, Abdülhamid held off on this idea.245  
Nonetheless, Ismail Kemal’s appointment as Governor in Tripoli was regarded as “being 
practically tantamount to exile” by the British press as well.246 At that time, Sir Philip 
Currie, the British Ambassador to Constantinople, remarked that the Sultan made the 
decision because of Kemal’s support for the British.247 After Ismail Kemal’s escape, the 
central media organ of the Young Turks telegraphed Sir Nicholas. They thanked the 
‘freedom-loving’ British government for the rescue of Ismail Kemal Bey from the claws 
of despotism.
248
 British media covered the attitude of the pro- British Young Turks as: 
“the Ambassador’s action causes intense satisfaction in Turkish circles”.249 
Meanwhile, just before Ismail Kemal’s escape with his sons, Damad Mahmud Pasha -the 
former minister of justice, ambassador, and brother-in-law of Abdülhamid II- fled to 
Europe with his two sons. These two crucial escapes were a great blow to the Sultan and 
their flights revitalized the opposition movement.
250
 The New York Times noted the 
importance of the exile of the two for Abdülhamid II; “flight of Ismail is hardly less 
important than that of Mahmoud Pasha, the Sultan’s brother-in-law who disappeared 
from Constantinople Dec. 14 last, and it is considered another symptom of the state of 
affairs in Turkey.”251    
According to an article in a British newspaper, published after Ismail Kemal’s escape to 
Britain, Ismail Kemal Bey was “an upright, enlightened, and educated man”. Ismail 
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Kemal was not a revolutionist but a royalist, but nevertheless “the Sultan took offence at 
his outspoken advocacy of administrative reforms.”252 Another newspaper specifies 
Ismail Kemal as ‘patriotic’ and “his resolution to leave the country is regarded as clearly 
indicating that he considers the present state of affairs to be such as to render it 
impossible for men of enlightened views to remain in Turkey.”253 It is doubtful that the 
British newspapers had any understanding of Ismail Kemal’s reputation in the empire. 
However, Ismail Kemal’s opposition to the Sultan suited the British view. 
According to Ismail Kemal, his intention to write Transvaal Meselesi was to clarify the 
causes of his escape from Constantinople. Besides, Ismail Kemal remarked that he 
desired to “set forth the feeling of the Mussulman world with regard to the civilising 
work of Great Britain”.254 
Pro-British statesmen were the first to give support to the Young Turk movement. Damad 
Mahmud Pasha, the brother-in-law of Abdülhamid II, and the CUP branch in Geneva sent 
dispatches to Sir Nicholas O’Connor and, with Ismail Kemal this pro-British group 
launched a diplomatic campaign against the Ottoman Sultan, Abdülhamid II.255 They 
desired British support in dethroning the Hamidian regime.
256
 Yahya Kemal 
(1884−1958), poet, author and politician noted in his memoirs that; “the followers of 
Ismail Kemal and Sabahaddin regarded demanding foreign intervention to end the 
Hamidian rule as a civilised action.”257 
Prince Sabahaddin and Lütfullah, sons of Damad Mahmud Pasha, wrote an open letter to 
Abdülhamid II criticising the rule of the Sultan and proposing closer relations with 
England.
258
 Other pro-British members also sent letters to British diplomats and 
published letters praising the British. However, the British government did not respond to 
these approaches of the Young Turks. Ismail Kemal’s request for British citizenship was 
also rejected, despite the fact that Ismail Kemal was highly exalted by the British press.
259
 
The Young Turk movement became an issue of European diplomacy after the escape of 
Damad Mahmud Pasha, Ismail Kemal and other prominent Ottoman statesmen.
260
 British 
diplomats were concerned about the intrigues of some pro-British Ottoman statesmen like 
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Ismail Kemal. However, Britain did not openly support the CUP except for the abortive 
coup attempt of 1902-1903.
261
 
The Criminal Court of Istanbul sentenced Ismail Kemal to death by warrant in absentia, 
forfeiture of property and loss of civil rights in June 1901. He was charged with 
“endeavouring to incite the people against the Government and the Sultan by seditious 
publications and other means”.262 In the court decision it was stated that some Young 
Turks with Ismail Kemal insisted on not coming back to the empire, although 
notifications were sent to them. Besides, they dared to publish the controversial 
publications.
263
  
3. 6. 1902 Young Turk Congress of Paris  
Prince Sabahaddin and Lütfullah decided to host a congress in Europe to deliberate on the 
situation of the Ottoman Empire. The purpose of the congress was to force Abdülhamid 
II to declare a constitutional monarchy and make reforms in the empire. Thus, the 
Ottoman Empire would survive. Lütfullah went to Brussels from Paris to discuss such a 
congress with Ismail Kemal. The latter wanted to attend the congress but on certain 
conditions. Firstly, Ismail Kemal demanded representation for all the ethnicities in the 
Ottoman Empire. In this way, the aspirations of the Ottoman people might be voiced.
264
 
He also said that the congress ought to demonstrate to the Great Powers such as France, 
Great Britain and Austria that the reforms would be implemented for the ‘good of the 
empire’.265 Thus, the assistance of Europe could be provided. Otherwise there would be 
no reason to participate in the congress. Kemal indicated that if those conditions were not 
met, he could not see any benefit, but only expressions of opinions in vain.  
The conditions set by Ismail Kemal to attend the congress were accepted by Prince 
Sabahaddin and Lütfullah, and then he went to Paris for the congress.266 Ismail Kemal 
published some letters supporting European intervention in the empire on the eve of the 
congress.
267
 Because of this, great antagonism appeared against him during the congress. 
For instance, upon Ismail Kemal’s letter being published in Le Matin, Ahmed Ferid wrote 
a letter to him, sarcastically calling him “benevolently disposed”. In his letter Ferid 
asserted, being under the protection of the ‘great enemies’ of the Ottoman Empire was 
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not an ‘honour’, but a ‘disgrace’. Ahmed Ferid accused Ismail Kemal of speaking for all 
the Ottoman nations without distinguishing their ethnicity and religion. Ferid expressed 
his disagreement with Ismail Kemal on the intervention of the Great Powers in Ottoman 
politics.
268
 
Moreover, in Şuray-ı Ümmet, an Ottoman journal, it was declared that when a foreign 
power interfered with Ottoman affairs, a territory of the Ottoman Empire was lost. In 
fact, the foreign affairs of the western powers were based on hypocrisy and trick. No-one 
in the west paid attention the screams of the Boers, Finn and Polish people.
269
 
The divergence between the Young Turk groups’ views was made visible in the Congress 
of Paris, named Osmanlı Hürriyetperveran Kongresi (Ottoman Freedom-lovers 
Congress). One group, which was in the majority (ekseriyet), advocated foreign 
intervention in favour of a coup d’état. The majority group, including Ismail Kemal and 
Prince Sabahaddin, demanded that a Great Power should intervene in the operation 
during the coup. They asserted that during the rebellion, disorder might occur in the 
empire and some ‘malevolent’ states such as Russia might manipulate the disorder.270 In 
order to prevent this probability, the Young Turks were supposed to get assistance from a 
state whose interest coincided with the Ottoman Empire -presumably they meant Great 
Britain or France-.
271
 Prince Sabahaddin wrote in Osmanlı shortly after the Congress of 
Paris that the Constitution was their noble wish and the European intervention would 
emerge unavoidably.
272
 The majority advocated adem-i merkeziyet (decentralization) in 
which all the different ethnicities in the empire would establish autonomous local 
governments. The majority group also demanded a mutiny in the empire by the military 
forces.
273
 According to Ismail Kemal, it was not possible to make a revolution only by 
propaganda and press, which the minority wished for.
274
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However, the other group, led by Ahmet Rıza Bey, did not want foreign intervention 
under any circumstances. The minority (ekalliyet) and anti-intervention group insisted 
that the revolution should be carried out by the Ottoman peoples.
275
 This group defended 
a centralist government. Ahmet Rıza regarded Ismail Kemal as someone capitulating to 
the imperialist ambitions of the Great Powers.
276
 To Yahya Kemal, the actual conflict at 
the congress was between Ismail Kemal and Ahmed Rıza.277 
In this regard, the attempts of Ismail Kemal and the pro-British group he conducted with 
Prince Sabahaddin to achieve the support of Europe yet again, seems quite immature and 
misrepresented. A great antipathy to Ismail Kemal was generated during the Young Turk 
Congress in Paris. The Congress in 1902, assembled to express and resolve the problems 
of the Ottoman Empire, eventually led to a great conflict between the Young Turk 
groups. 
3. 7. Coup d’état attempt of 1903 
The pro-intervention group founded a committee called Osmanlı Hürriyetperveran 
Cemiyeti or La Ligue des Liberaux Ottomans (Ottoman Freedom-lovers Committee). 
Ismail Kemal became the leader of the committee. In 1903, they attempted an 
unsuccessful coup with British support.
278
 He wrote in his memoirs in detail about his 
activities attempting to arouse the interest of Europe. According to Ismail Kemal, the 
Sultan would be forced to compromise in favour of constitutionalism if Kemal could 
guarantee the ‘sympathetic support’ of Europe, especially Great Britain.279 
Ismail Kemal reported on making contact with and getting assistance from British 
statesmen. Kemal said that he was invited by Lord Sanderson, Permanent Under-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to negotiate the coup plan of Osmanlı Hürriyetperveran 
Cemiyeti.
280
 Ismail Kemal also noted that he asked for British protection in case of any 
threat from Russia to prevent their ‘patriotic action’.
281
 Ismail Kemal Bey obtained the 
British foreign secretary’s promise of assistance for the rebellion. A fleet would be sent 
to Beshika, Çanakkale in order to safeguard the Ottoman Empire against a potential 
Russian threat.
282
 Great Britain also advised him to cut the Odessa and Constance parts of 
the Eastern Telegraph cable.
283
 Since some privileges like the Baghdad Railway Project 
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were given to Germany at that time, it must be considered that Great Britain favoured the 
coup attempt against Abdülhamid II, because Britain was endeavouring to hinder the 
railway scheme, starting in late 1902.
284
 
Despite uncertainty of the support to be given to the Young Turks, it was the first time 
the Young Turks in exile secured British support.
285
 There is no official document in the 
British archives about the support given to the Young Turks.
286
 However, masses of Lord 
Lansdowne’s papers (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1900-1905) are kept by his 
family.
287
 It nevertheless sounds credible that Great Britain might play a part in the 
counter-revolution, since England strove to take the Baghdad Railway Project. Damad 
Mahmud Pasha tried to persuade Abdülhamid II to award the project to Great Britain but 
Abdülhamid II awarded it to Germany. Thereupon, Damad Mahmud Pasha escaped to 
Europe with his sons, Sabahaddin and Lütfullah. 
Conclusion  
The Young Turks were a group of intellectuals from different spheres of the Ottoman 
Empire. Their main target was to salvage their weakening empire from dissolution. They 
had different ideas and beliefs. However, the major effective group was the pro-British 
Young Turks, which advocated British intervention in Ottoman politics. 
Anglophile Young Turks regarded the British as the greatest, most powerful and crucial 
supporters of the Turks in the industrialized and formidable west. The pro-British Young 
Turks and one of the well-known Anglophile statesmen, Ismail Kemal, used every means 
possible to provide British intervention in Ottoman politics. 
Nonetheless, their attempts to secure the British support for the empire seemed quite 
immature and naïve. They confronted and collided, especially with the Ottoman Sultan 
Abdülhamid II in this regard. Many Young Turks and Ottoman statesmen such as Ismail 
Kemal and Damad Mahmud Pasha, the brother-in-law of Abdülhamid II, fled to ‘liberal’ 
Europe from the oppressive and ‘unjust’ administration of Abdülhamid II. In 1902, the 
Young Turks in Europe gathered a congress in Paris to discuss the bad situation of the 
Ottoman Empire. However, the congress led to great conflict and division within the 
Young Turks of the pro-intervention and anti-intervention groups. The pro-intervention 
group, led by Ismail Kemal and Prince Sabahaddin, undertook a fruitless coup attempt 
with British support. On the other hand, British public opinion towards Turkey had 
shifted. Britain pursued an anti-Turkish policy, especially after 1878, which the Young 
Turks neglected or failed to recognise. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
The South African War and the standpoint of the pro-British Young Turks towards 
the war 
Introduction 
Dwindle, dwindle, little war, 
How I wonder more and more, 
As about the veld you hop, 
When you really mean to stop.
288
 
It should be clear from the last chapter that the biggest and most influential group among 
the Ottoman intelligentsia was the pro-British Young Turks, of which Ismail Kemal of 
Vlora was a leader. This group of intellectuals tried their utmost to get the British to 
influence Ottoman politics. Presumably it was an effort to ingratiate themselves with 
England. They pushed pro-British propaganda in their publications, particularly on the 
South African War of 1899-1902. 
The South African War emerged between the mighty British Empire and two small 
Afrikaner states: The South African Republic and Orange Free State. It was a result of the 
struggle between republican Boers and the imperial ambitions of the British Empire. The 
South African War, which lasted from 11 October, 1899 to 31 May, 1902, drew more 
international attention than any other event in the history of South Africa up to that 
point.
289
 It can be regarded as the first ‘freedom struggle’ of the twentieth century in 
Africa.
290
 It was also the greatest war in the European scramble for Africa and an 
example of the modern African colonial struggle.
291
 The South African War -the longest, 
the costliest, the bloodiest and the most humiliating war for Britain between 1815 and 
1914- was the first of the twentieth century’s anti-colonial, guerilla wars.292  
The war had a huge international impact. Europeans regarded the struggle as a heroic 
challenge of a small, white, Christian state to a blustering imperial power.
293
 The so-
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called ‘Anglo-Boer War’ or ‘the War of Independence’ to the Boers, made a considerable 
impact on the Ottoman Empire even though the empire was geographically so far from 
South Africa. This topic was widely covered and important to the Ottoman press. The 
Washington military attaché, Major Aziz Bey, was stationed in the British camp in the 
Transvaal to monitor the war, at the request of the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II. 
This chapter examines the reasons behind the South African War as well as its outcome, 
which was pursued by the world’s press with interest. Particular attention is given to the 
stance of Ottoman public opinion and the attitudes of the pro-British Young Turks.  
4. 1. Origins of the Anglo-Boer conflict 
European immigrant settlement started in South Africa after Jan Van Riebeeck, a Dutch 
colonial administrator and sailor, established a ships’ supply station in the name of the 
Dutch East India Company at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. Subsequently, Great 
Britain annexed the Cape in 1806 during the Napoleonic Wars, since the Cape of Good 
Hope had geopolitical significance for Britain on her route to India and the Far East.
294
 
British-Boer hostility started as early as 1806, when Britain occupied the Dutch Cape.
295
 
England constituted an imperial civilisation rather than increasing British intervention.
296
 
After the abolition of slavery by Britain in 1833 throughout the British Empire, 
discontent cropped up among the Dutch settlers in the Cape Colony. Although relatively 
few Afrikaners had slaves, slave emancipation caused a shortage of labour.
297
 
With the loss of traditional tied labour through the abolition of slavery, drought, struggle 
for land ownership and security the first immigration wave led by ‘Voortrekkers’ 
(pioneers) moved north into Africa.
298
 They wanted to become a free people in an 
independent state.
299
 As a result, nearly 14 000 Boers emmigrated, with their coloured 
and African servants, with the intention of breaking free from a centralising and alien 
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power, and to escape to some Promised Land. This became known as the ‘Great Trek’ 
between 1837 and 1854.
300
 It was “a rebellion against the British government”.301 
The Boer farmers created small republics. In 1852, the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek or 
South African Republic (Transvaal) and in 1854 the Oranjevrijstaat or Orange Free State 
were established across the Orange River. These republics were recognised by Britain. 
However, the discovery of diamonds and gold in the region’s high central plateau 
intensified British-Boer antagonism.
302
 The Boers had potential access to immense 
wealth due to their position near the newly discovered diamond and gold sources.
303
 The 
southernmost tip of Africa emerged as an imperative economic and strategic interest for 
England. It was seen by the British that the independent Transvaal Boers, who were 
hindering imperial economic and political dominance, were an obstruction to be 
removed.
304
 From the 1870s, Britain started steadily increasing pressure, interference, 
demands and threats to the Transvaal government which strengthened Boer republican 
nationalism.
305
 Britain occupied the Transvaal in 1877. The Boers rebelled against British 
authority in 1880, which led the ‘First Boer War’ or ‘Transvaal Rebellion’. This conflict 
concluded with a Boer victory at the Battle of Majuba Hill in 1881. 
Nevertheless, with the discovery of gold in 1886 in the Transvaal, Johannesburg started 
rapidly to industrialise and drew international capital or money flow.
306
 The Transvaal 
was the largest single source of a supply of gold in the world by 1898.
307
 The Cape 
administration aimed to possess the treasure of the Transvaal, which had become the 
natural commercial centre of the entire subcontinent.
308
 Britain regarded the new 
economic centre as a threat to England’s imperial supremacy in South Africa.309 
Great Britain also wished to secure her colonies in the imperial race of the time. It was 
clear that Britain’s desire to establish a British federation played a crucial role in the 
occurrence of the Anglo−Boer struggle. 
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In addition, a cosmopolitan population migrated to the region from Europe, America and 
the whole of South Africa, initiating the Witwatersrand Gold Rush. These people, mostly 
of British origin, called uitlanders (foreigners), were mining engineers, craftsmen and 
fortune-seekers.
310
 They believed that they outnumbered the Boers and demanded 
political rights, which the Boer administration in the Transvaal refused them. They were 
also overwhelmed by the tax levels.
311
 The workers claim for enhancement was refused 
by Paul Kruger, President of the South African Republic (reign 1883-1902). He ignored 
all protests by the uitlanders with the words: “Protest! What’s the use of protesting? You 
have not the guns. We have.”312 Thereupon, the uitlanders prepared for an insurrection to 
achieve their rights by force of arms.
313
 
These factors led the British administration to struggle once again with two of the world’s 
smallest states, the independent Orange Free State and independent, yet not fully 
sovereign Transvaal.
314
 
4. 2. Trigger of the war 
On the 29 December 1895, Dr Leander Starr Jameson, the administrator of the British 
South Africa Company and British colonial statesman, led his men to carry out a hare-
brained raid. The aim was to trigger an uprising by the uitlanders against the South 
African Republic. It would provide an excuse for England’s interfering directly in the 
Pretoria’s affairs.315 The workers, called conspirators, had a roughly-outlined plan which 
rendered the raid abortive. Jameson belittled the power of the Boer commandos.
316
 The 
reformers or uitlanders supposed that the Boers stopped him, while Jameson was 
thinking that the reformers would send a substantial reinforcement or armed force to meet 
him. But neither one nor the other occurred.
317
 The raid did not stimulate the British 
workers in the Transvaal, yet heightened the tension between the Cape and the Transvaal 
governments. 
Prior to the raid, Paul Kruger presumably would have come to an agreement with the 
Reformers. However, the raid rendered this compromise hopeless and invigorated the 
British-Boer hostility. It exacerbated the already poor relations, vilified Joseph 
Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary and caused Alfred Milner, British high 
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commissioner of South Africa known to become “as violent and as obstinate as 
himself”’.318 The uitlanders wrote a petition to the British Queen, signed by over 21 000 
people, in February 1899 asking support for their political rights.
319
 
Eventually, an antipathetic and fruitless conference was held between Paul Kruger and 
Lord Milner, British High Commissioner of the Cape Colony, on 30 May, 1899. In 
September 1899, Joseph Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, demanded full 
equality for the uitlanders. Kruger issued an ultimatum on 9 October, 1899, seeing that 
war was inevitable. He gave Britain forty-eight hours to withdraw her forces from the 
borders of both the Transvaal and Orange Free State. This was not the first ultimatum. A 
month before this, Chamberlain (British Colonial Secretary) had already drafted one 
supposing the Transvaal government delayed.
320
 Britain rejected the ultimatum and the 
war started on 11 October, 1899. Sister Boer republic, the fully independent Orange Free 
State, supported the Transvaal government in the war to protect its control over the 
mineral developments in the Transvaal.
321
 
4. 3. The progression of the war 
Neither power thought that the war would last very long.
322
 Britain was over-confident at 
the start of the war. It was thought by Britain that the war would be accomplished 
certainly within six months, perhaps even before Christmas.
323
 They underestimated the 
Boer qualities.
324
 The Boer forces were mobile, talented, skilled shots, used to life in the 
saddle, and familiar with the area.
325
 They had the most modern weaponry, such as 
Mauser rifles imported from Germany.
326
 Their militant philosophy was strategic. It was 
heard from many Boers that: “You English fight to die: we Boers fight to live.”327 
The Boers planned to progress deep into Natal and the Cape Colony and inflict a few 
conclusive defeats on the 20 000 British forces that were in South Africa. Their aim was 
to trigger a Boer uprising in the Cape Colony where the Boers outnumbered the British 
population by 3:2. This might affect Britain’s position in the empire and in the world and 
as a result Great Britain would prefer to negotiate an agreement, rather than send in a 
                                                     
318
 Nasson, The War for South Africa, 33. 
319
 Pemberton, Battles of the Boer War, 24. 
320
 Nasson, The War for South Africa, 35. 
321
 Warwick, Black People and the South African War 1899, 1902, 3. 
322
 Wessels, The Anglo-Boer War 1889-1902: White Man's War, Black Man's War, Traumatic War, 27. 
323
 Peter Warwick, ed., The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 (Essex: Longman, 1980), 
58. 
324
 Wessels, The Anglo-Boer War 1889-1902: White Man's War, Black Man's War, Traumatic War, 22. 
325
 Smith, The Origins of the South African War, 1899-1902, 3. 
326
 Warwick, The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902, 58. 
327
 Pemberton, Battles of the Boer War, 21. 
 46 
massive military power. The Boers thus expected a short struggle and quick peace 
agreement, as had happened in 1880-1881.
328
 
They failed to notice the fact that the Liberal Party was in power in the British 
government at the time of the 1880−1881 Transvaal War, when Gladstone was in office 
as Prime Minister. However, the Conservative Party was in power in London in 1899 
and, as Lord Salisbury the British Prime Minister put it: “the real point to be made good 
to South Africa is that we, not the Dutch, are boss”.329 
The war had three specific stages. At the beginning of the war, the British Army had 
financial problems and a lack of manpower. There was also conflict between the political 
and military leaders as well as internal rivalry in the army. Its information system and its 
administration were inadequate.
330
 
During the first three months of the war, the Boers launched three crucial attacks, 
occupying northern Natal and besieging Ladysmith; invading the Cape Colony, and 
striking westwards to sever British communications with Rhodesia; and laying siege to 
the British garrisons in Kimberley and Mafeking. The Boers defeated the British forces 
on all three fronts; Colenso, the Stormberg and Magersfontein during what was known as 
‘black week’ in December 1899.331   
Undoubtedly, the British army was unprepared at the onset of the war. In the second 
phase of the war, Britain sent to South Africa heavy imperial reinforcements. Under the 
command of Lord Roberts as Commander-in-Chief and Lord Kitchener as his Chief-of-
Staff, British forces prevailed; besieged Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking were 
relieved. The Transvaal and Orange Free State were occupied during the first half of 
1900: on 13 March -Bloemfontein, on 24 May -the Orange Free State, on 31 May 
Johannesburg and on 5 June -Pretoria.
332
 The Transvaal and OFS were annexed as 
colonies of the British Crown by September, 1900.
333
 The war seemed to be won. 
However, it just took another form. 
The most merciless and prolonged period of the war started when the Boers resorted to 
guerilla tactics under leaders such as, Louis Botha, Christiaan de Wet, J. C. Smuts and J. 
H. de la Rey.
334
 The Boer guerillas evaded the imperial forces and continued to harass the 
British army by raiding their stores of materièl also confusing the army’s communication 
                                                     
328
 Smith, The Origins of the South African War, 1899-1902, 1, 2. 
329
 Ibid, 2. 
330
 Wessels, The Anglo-Boer War 1889-1902: White Man's War, Black Man's War, Traumatic War, 22. 
331
 Warwick, Black People and the South African War 1899, 1902, 3. 
332
 Ibid. 
333
 Smith, The Origins of the South African War, 1899-1902, 3. 
334
 Warwick, Black People and the South African War 1899, 1902, 3. 
 47 
system by forming small, mobile military units.
335
 The Boers launched small-scale raids 
in order to establish connections with mutinous republican sympathisers.  
In response to the success of the Boer tactics, the British swept the veld clean under the 
command of Horatio Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916), a British general who was brought 
from the Sudan after defeating the Mahdists. They razed and burnt farms and Boer stock 
was looted.
336
 Around 30 000 farmsteads and approximately forty towns were partially or 
totally destroyed.
337
 Britain constructed 3700 miles of barbed-wire barricades and 8000 
blockhouses, guarded by over 50 000 troops, to restrain the Boer guerilla units.
338
 
Britain herded the Boer women and children into concentration camps. They also 
established camps for African people. The reasoning behind the camps was to ensure that 
the black and white civilians had no part in the support of the war.
339
 They were referred 
as ‘refugee camps’ by many British sources, and ‘murder camps’ by the Boers.340 
Thousands of Boer and black civilians were sent to these internment camps with the 
British scorched-earth policy.
341
 There were tens of thousands of Afrikaners and Africans 
in the concentration camps by the end of the war.
342
 
In these camps more than 50 000 black and white civilians died. Out of the total Boer 
population of 219 000 in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, approximately 28 000 
Afrikaner civilians, of whom nearly 22 000 were children, died in the camps.
343
  
A total of sixty-six refugee camps were set up to house Africans and to make them 
available for manual labour
344
. Here conditions were mostly worse than those in the white 
camps.
345
 More than 14 000 Africans died in the camps.
346
 At the end of the war, there 
were at least 140 000 African people in these camps.
347
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President Kruger declared in his memoirs: 
The war in South Africa exceeded the limits of barbarism. I have fought against 
many barbarous Kaffir tribes in the course of my life; but they are not so 
barbarous as English, who have burnt our farms and driven our children into 
destitution, without food or shelter.
348
 
On 31 May, 1902, the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed declaring the Transvaal and 
Orange Free State colonies of England. Great Britain was only able to win the war 
through superiority in numbers, financial means, military equipment, and using ruthless 
methods of battle; not through any equivalent or higher combat ability against fearless 
and tough warriors.
349
 Or, to put it another way, Britain triumphed over sparsely 
equipped, coarse farmers, but only through pitiless destruction, burning, and the rounding 
up civilians.
350
 
4. 4. The outcomes of the War  
The South African War was not a long war, yet it had far-reaching outcomes. Great 
Britain entered the largest, deadliest and costliest war between the defeat of Napoleon in 
1815 and World War I (1914-1918).
351
 The war cost more than 200 million pounds, 
twenty times more than expected, and caused a rise in income tax.
352
 The British 
government equipped and transported the largest army ever to go overseas and 
maintained it for almost three years.
353
 A total of 450 000 British and Empire troops and 
88 000 Boers were involved in the war.
354
 Approximately 22 000 British soldiers, 7 000 
Afrikaner combatants and an unknown number, but not less than 15 000 of the coloured 
and African populations died.
355
 The weapons used during the war were much more 
costly to the British than to the Boers. It cost the British 1 000 pounds per Boer 
combatant, while it only cost the Boers fifteen pence per British soldier.
356
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Moreover, on both sides, new technology was used in the war, such as automatic 
handguns, magazine-fed rifles, and machine guns. Horses, railways, steamships and the 
telegraph played very important parts.
357
 It was a crucial experience for Britain to fight 
against the well-armed and skilled Boer commandoes who were excellent shots and 
snipers. The First Great War could have had a different outcome without this 
experience.
358
 
There is no doubt that the Anglo−Boer War was not a ‘white man’s war’ only, nor a 
‘gentleman’s war’. Hundreds of thousands of people from all ethnic groups were 
extremely affected by the war. Only a fifth of the total population was white when the 
war was fought in 1899. In the literal sense, it was a ‘South African War’.359 
From the outset, both contesting powers deployed non-Europeans in the war, despite their 
intentions not to use them.
360
 Non-Europeans -blacks, Asians and coloured people- were 
used in passive or defensive roles as spies, messengers, watchmen in the blockhouses, 
transport drivers, scouts, guards, and servants.
361
 As the war prolonged, however, Britain 
used non-Europeans in combatant roles.
362
 Possibly 30 000 blacks fought with the British 
forces at the end of the war.
363
 The Boers were defeated largely as a result of their failure 
to accumulate any significant African support.
364
 
The number of coloured people in the Cape was 2 939, and there were 4 618 Natives in 
Natal, the Orange Free State, and Transvaal. In November 1900, the total non-European 
population used in the war was 10 053, as Kitchener reported.
365
 Possibly 14 000 African 
and coloured commando auxiliaries, and 120 000 African, coloured, and Indian men were 
used in non-combatant roles.
366
 Between 10 000 and 30 000 Africans were recruited by 
Britain. Boers also armed African people. A British major indicated that they were 
“fighting black men, not white ones”.367 At least 20 000 blacks died in this fierce conflict. 
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Tens of thousands black people were traumatised from the war. Many of them lost their 
homes through the British scorched-earth policy. 
Even though Britain won the war, she made an enormous political gaffe. Presumably, the 
best-known feature of the war was the grisly concentration camps built by the British. 
The holocaust in the camps stirred the British conscience.
368
 British public opinion was 
divided by the tactics used in the war. The Liberal leader, Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman criticised these tactics as ‘methods of barbarism’.369 Moreover, surprisingly, 
some English-speaking people in South Africa fought on the Afrikaner side. Many 
British subjects were sympathetic to the Boer cause. A significant number of British 
citizens were also pro-Boer during the war. For instance, Mary Kingsley, a middle-aged 
British woman, went to South Africa to nurse Afrikaners.
370
 Emily Hobhouse was also 
famous British woman visiting South Africa during the war. She went to the 
concentration camps and worked with the women, then returned to  London and protested 
about the conditions to the British parliament and press. Her reports had a considerable 
effect on civilian public opinion. Also, many British officers who were sent to the South 
African War had sympathy for the Boers. According to a Captain Montmorency of the 
21
st
 Lancers: “In my opinion, the cause of the Dutch Burghers was a just one and I 
regarded the Boers as men fighting for their hearths against greedy foreign 
aggressors”.371      
4. 5. Stance of the pro-British Young Turks towards the South-African War of 1899-
1902 
The Ottomans were not unconcerned about the war in the Transvaal. The South African 
War was important for the world as well as the Ottomans. Upon the outbreak of the war 
most pro-British Young Turks wrote articles in the literary journal Servet-i Fünûn 
(Wealth of Science) about the superiority of the British social structure.
372
 For instance, 
Ahmed Şuayib (1876−1910), author and jurist, asserted in July 1900:   
Most of the English people who graduate from college ride a ship and take a 
tour around the World in order to become a second Cecil Rhodes. The 
Frenchman who finishes his education and military service, on the other hand, 
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runs after rich and beautiful girls. Here is the difference between the cultures of 
the two great countries.
373
  
Indeed, the founder of Servet-i Fünûn, Ahmed İhsan (Tokgöz) (1868−1942) later 
confessed in his memoirs about the blind Anglophilia of some of the Young Turks. He 
noted that the Young Turks and he himself spoke against ‘miserable Boers’ in favour of 
the British in the South African War. İhsan asserted that Britain stirred up ‘terrific 
propaganda’ in her favour by all means possible. Great Britain displayed the Boers to the 
world as rebels and treacherous people. Britain declared they were just suppressing the 
rebellion. The Young Turks were affected by this British agitprop. However, the Boers, 
and their beloved leader Paul Kruger, only sought their independence. According to 
Ahmed İhsan, many Turkish intellectuals believed British political propaganda 
immediately, since the Young Turks opposed the Sultan’s anti-British foreign policy.374 
However, Wilhelm II (1888-1918), the German Emperor (Kaiser), sent a telegram to Paul 
Kruger wishing him victory in the war.  Because Wilhelm II had visited Abdülhamid II 
twice in Istanbul and had good relations with the Sultan, the Young Turks gave the 
Kaiser the evil eye.
375
  
In this sense, it can be seen in the memoirs of Ahmed İhsan that the pro-British Young 
Turks supported Britain in the South African War, due to their opposition to Abdülhamid 
II. İhsan also added that they presumed that England was the most freedom-loving and 
most benevolent administration in the world. He wrote that they were pro-British in the 
South African War at least as much as the English.
376
  
To demonstrate their devotion to Britain, İhsan also wrote that when the British 
Ambassador, Edward Malet returned to Istanbul in 1908, some Young Turks filled the 
Sirkeci harbour and gave him a round of applause. Some of them even pulled the horses 
from the the ambassador’s carriage and then drew the carriage away with their bare 
hands.
377
 In this regard, the idea of Ahmed Şuayib and Ahmed İhsan and the group they 
represented, seemed quite immature and misguided.  
On the other hand, some Ottoman journals such as Malumat Gazetesi and İkdam Dergisi 
emphasised that involving Africans in the South African War caused their deaths. 
However, the real owners of the region were actually the African people and this war 
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made no sense for them.
378
 This demonstrates the awareness of some Ottomans for the 
African participation in the South African War. 
One of the longest texts written by the Ottomans on the South African War was Afrika-yı 
Cenubi Muharebesi (South African War) of 96 pages, by Mahmud Muhtar Pasha 
(Katırcıoğlu) (1867-1935), an Ottoman military officer and minister of the Ottoman 
Naval Force. His text is very dense and would reward careful study. Mahmud Muhtar 
Pasha analysed the war from the military perspective by describing the battles of the war. 
Mahmud Muhtar Pasha was pro-Boer in this war. According to him, the initiator of the 
war was the British government.
379
 He described the reason for the Great Trek as the 
British suppression of the Boers.
380
 He noted that the British army in South Africa 
encountered “a hard nut to crack”.381 When he wrote the book, the Boers were 
outmatching the English. Mahmud Muhtar Pasha declared that the British deceived 
themselves and the world by publishing ‘imagined’ telegrams expressing their victory 
over the Boers. However, it became clear that England had had a great defeat in the 
southernmost tip of Africa.
382
 To him, the Boer victory was very significant, since they 
were fighting as guerilla units against regular British forces.
383
 The British public was 
worried about the defeat of the British army in Black Week against “semi-wild 
farmers”.384 
Mehmed Cavid (1875-1926), the famous minister of finance of the CUP, noted in Servet-
i Fünun that the real reason for Britain to go to war in South Africa was to administer the 
Transvaal with her own laws and customs and to apply her own political management. 
According to his article, dated 6 October, 1902, it was slander or irony to claim that the 
British intention in the war was to acquire the gold mines. On the other hand, Britain was 
annoyed with the commercial system, monopoly, heavy duties, and the turbulent 
administration of the republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. The policy of the 
South African republics was damaging the free trade policy of England. 
According to Mehmed Cavid, Britain had experienced an economic downturn for the 
previous ten years. In order to convince British public opinion, the administration 
declared that the war was necessary for commerce. However, it had made the economic 
situation of England worse.  
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Cavid further wrote that an analogy could be drawn between the South African War and 
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, which caused the unification of Germany. 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that the outcomes of the two wars were very different, they 
could not be alike. The Franco-Prussian War instigated German national feelings and 
rejuvenated Germany, while the South African War did not do the same for that 
country.
385
 
The prosperity of South Africa, because of the gold mines, attracted the attention of the 
Ottoman intellectuals, even after the war. In Şehbal dated 14 October, 1909, the Ottoman 
administration was criticised and a photograph was published of “a new government 
palace in a new African country”, in order not to process her mines. Under the 
photograph, the caption said: “The Transvaal government does not waste its mineral 
resources, as we do, by leaving them in the ground.” It was also stated that the small 
Transvaal derived all of her income from her mines. The Transvaal and the Ottoman 
Empire were compared, and it was seen that the places in Transvaal were very 
magnificent, while in the empire’s were poor. In another photograph, the parliament in 
Pretoria was seen and was described as spectacular and “the wonders of a good 
administration”.386 There was also a photograph of a Johannesburg mine headgear, 
followed by the comment: “The main industry that has contributed to the prosperity of 
the Transvaal”.387  
4. 6. The Young Turks’ visit the British Embassy in Istanbul 
Ismail Kemal’s and some pro-British Young Turks’ comments on the South African War 
were strongly influenced by their Anglophile ideas. Ismail Kemal and Hüseyin Siyret 
(1872-1959), a leading actor in Servet-i Fünûn and member of the CUP, were very 
complimentary of Britain in the war. A group of Ottoman intellectuals wanted to visit the 
British embassy in order to wish Great Britain triumph in the South-African War. In 
November, 1899, a declaration was written exalting the British at the instigation of Ismail 
Kemal and Hüseyin Siyret.388 İsmail Safa Bey penned and Hüseyin Siyret engrossed the 
declaration.
389
 According to Kenan Akyüz, Ismail Kemal wrote the declaration by 
himself.
390
 They asserted the Ottomans’ wishes for the victory of the British Empire in 
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the war. Twenty-nine prominent persons from different spheres of the empire signed the 
letter.
391
 The signatories were the authors of Servet-i Fünûn, numerous bureaucrats, naval 
officers and ulema (scholars) from Baghdad and Mosul.  
It was stated in the epistle that Britain was the greatest pioneer state for liberty and justice 
on earth and that the entire world was ‘appreciative’ of her sacrifices for the prohibition 
of captivity and maintenance of liberty. Great Britain assisted Turkey concretely and 
psychologically to defend her rights and to secure her future, especially for the last 
century. This benevolence created an attachment to England in the hearts of the 
Ottomans, which would exist and be constant for ever. Ottomans had a duty to appreciate 
Britain, whose political program was to seek her national interests in the felicity of the 
other nations.  
It was also indicated in this communication, that the native people and thousands of 
Muslims in South Africa had been subjected to human trafficking and cruel oppression. 
However, these people obtained freedom and fairness through the struggle of Britain. In 
this respect, it was a humanitarian obligation to wish success to England for her fight 
against the South African republics [Boers]. The group supported this ‘sacred’ mission in 
the name of Ottoman youth and requested proposing their declaration to Great Britain.
392
 
The signatories of the document wished glory, honour and definite success to Queen 
Victoria in the Transvaal War, which she embarked on with ‘humanitarian intentions’.393  
The letter passed from hand to hand and the signatures were collected. One day the letter 
dropped out of İsmail Safa’s pocket. All Servet-i Fünûn members were very anxious, in 
fear of being denounced. Afterwards, someone found the letter and brought it to the 
journal.
394
 
On 20 November, 1899, Sir Nicholas O’Connor, the British ambassador to 
Constantinople, reported that Ismail Kemal Vlora, who was a member of Conseil d’Etat 
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and a prominent and enlightened statesman, had informed him of a delegation to visit the 
British embassy. The delegation wanted to offer their best wishes and sympathy to the 
British government, which was at war with the South African Republic. O’Connor, 
however, did not want to receive the Young Turks’ delegation at first, as it consisted of 
the opponents of the Sultan. Nonetheless, some prominent leaders of the Young Turks, 
including Ismail Kemal, warranted that this act was not political and not related to the 
Young Turks, but only a group of Muslims who wanted to tender their sturdy sympathy 
to England in this way.
395
 Thereupon, a group of ten Muslims presented the declaration to 
the ambassador at six o’clock.396 They also indicated their readiness to volunteer for 
Britain, while many foreign volunteers were fighting for the Boers in the war.
397
 
In addition, Ismail Kemal and some pro-British Young Turks took part in a silent 
demonstration outside the British Consulate in Istanbul on the same day. The number of 
persons attending was 150 according to the British Foreign Office, but eighty-nine 
according to the Chief Secretary of the Sultan, Tahsin Pasha. Meanwhile, many members 
of the CUP in Europe supported in their articles the ideas emphasised in the declaration. 
The British Ambassador, Sir Nicholas O’Connor, expressed to the delegation that the 
British Queen, who had millions of Muslim subjects, would be glad to learn of this 
spontaneous declaration of Muslim sympathy.
398
  
On the other hand, O’Connor was concerned about the incident and notified the Ottoman 
Foreign Minister about the document. Tevfik Pasha (1845-1936), the Ottoman Foreign 
Minister, conveyed their pleasure in the British victory in the war. He, however, added 
their apprehension for the occasion.
399
 Nonetheless, according to Hüseyin Cahit, the 
government learnt about the letter from Abdullah Zühtü (1869, 1925), author and 
journalist who denounced the group.
400
  
Anthopoulos Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador to London, was entrusted with the task of 
taking up the matter with the British Foreign Office.
401
 Anthopoulos Pasha described in 
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his report, dated 3 December, 1899 to the palace, that all the signatories were erazil (the 
vile men); dishonest, insurgent, ignorant, dissolute and unloving persons.
402
  
German, French and Austrian representatives in the Ottoman centre also reported the 
incident to their countries. The German Ambassador to Istanbul reported that 
Abdülhamid was worried about the incident, which was a political demonstration 
conducted publicly. The French Representative indicated that British influence was 
increased in Istanbul and the Russians and French endeavoured to enhance their influence 
in return. According to the Austrian delegates, this Anglophile demonstration was only a 
part of a broader movement. There were state officials and ulema behind the action.
403
 
Indeed, in a short span of time, there was mobility among the Young Turks in Istanbul. 
Moreover, just before the demonstration at the British Consulate in Istanbul, a great 
Anglophile, Ali Haydar Midhat, son of Midhat Pasha fled to Europe. His flight 
demonstrated to Europe and the Young Turks alike, that he could no longer live in the 
Ottoman Empire under the Sultan.
404
  
Following the protest, signatories and demonstrators were interrogated at Yıldız 
Palace.
405
 Hüseyin Siyret indicated in his inquisition dated 28 November, 1899, at Yıldız 
Palace that one day he went to the house of Ismail Kemal and they talked about the war 
in the Transvaal.
406
 Ismail Kemal first referred to Russian sympathy towards the Boers. 
Showing favour to England, whose interests were always parallel with Turkey’s, would 
contribute to the development of an intimacy between the two countries. When Hüseyin 
Siyret asked in what way they could show their affinity to Britain, Ismail Kemal replied 
that they could write a paper, as men of letters, and have this signed by their fellows. He 
also added that it would be great to go to the British Embassy with some well-known 
young men. After two days Ismail Kemal had a talk with İsmail Safa Bey on the same 
issue and Safa Bey prepared a rough copy on this matter. Hüseyin Siyret Bey made the 
corrections and signed the paper. Then they visited the embassy.
407
 Hüseyin Siyret, 
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however, noted in his memoirs that they visited the British Embassy to show England 
that the Ottoman nation did not share the Sultan’s hostile policy towards Great Britain.408  
Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) did not sign the declaration because of the warnings of Nazım 
Pasha (later the War Minister). He remarked in his memoirs that Ismail Kemal struggled 
with liberty and introducing constitutionalism to Turkey with British support. He asked 
the British Ambassador for this support many times. However, the Ambassador replied, 
that the Empire harmonized with the British monarchy. Thereupon, Ismail Kemal wanted 
to show O’Connor a sign of awakening and youth movement in the Ottoman Empire. To 
write a wish for victory to Britain in the war in the Transvaal would please the British 
Embassy. Kemal sought to provide interference in the Ottoman government by Britain 
with this demonstration of affection. To Hüseyin Cahit, it was not reasonable to expect to 
shift the policy of Britain towards the Ottoman Empire, and force the Sultan to declare 
constitutionalism, just because a few Turkish young men expressed their good wishes for 
the South African War. He also noted that Ismail Kemal wanted to derive his own 
personal benefits from this incident. However, authors of Servet-i Fünûn believed this 
‘fable’ immediately.409   
According to Rıfat Müeyyed, the reason for this partisanship towards Britain was the 
Crimean War of 1853-1856. This action was a kind of duty of loyalty to Britain, who 
defended the Turks against the Russians. Otherwise, Turks would appear ungrateful on 
the stage of history. It should have done something in favour of the British.
410
  
Fifty-seven people were arrested in relation to the incident.
411
 However, the British 
administration as well as the media frowned on penalising the participants.
412
 After some 
interrogation relating to the incident, British Ambassador O’Connor intervened in the 
affair. He indicated that reprimanding the signatories could stir up British public opinion 
and harm relations between the two countries.
413
 The arrested signatories were released 
with the British intervention.
414
 Ismail Kemal was interrogated. However, the Sultan did 
not punish Kemal, to avoid upsetting the British.
415
 Nonetheless, the other participants 
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were arrested and then exiled after a few months.
416
 The Sultan at first exiled Hüseyin 
Siyret to Hısn-ı Mansur (Adıyaman), İsmail Safa Bey to Sivas, Ubeydullah Efendi to 
Taif.
417
 According to Cahit, the government did not understand the affair properly, as 
only some ‘victims’ were exiled.418 Subsequently, Abdülhamid closed Servet-i Fünûn for 
promoting the writing of Hüseyin Cahit.419 
According to Ahmed İhsan, Abdülhamid was not quick to punish the signatories because 
he feared the reaction of Britain.
420
 The Sultan explained to the Ambassador that he had 
other reasons to banish the signatories.
421
 However, a British newspaper afterwards 
reported on “the bad treatment suffered by the signatories if the address of sympathy with 
Great Britain in her struggle with the South African Republics”. Most of the signatories 
were exiled.
422
 
However, according to Necip Fazıl, Abdülhamid asked O’Connor, if he was a 
representative of a foreign country or an extraordinary commissar who inspected 
someone. He did not deign to ask what kind of penalty would be imposed if the same 
kind of action were performed in England. The Sultan also requested that he not offer a 
bribe to him for that kind of subject again.
423
    
According to Sina Akşin, the overreaction of the Sultan towards the incident 
demonstrated his engagement in German politics. To him, the exultation of the Turks for 
the British success against the Boers was also very strange.
424
  
4. 7. Criticism of the pro-British Young Turks 
Not everybody in the Ottoman Empire shared the pro-British views of the South African 
War. For instance, the Turkish nationalist Young Turk organ Türk, published in Cairo, 
later criticised the demonstration held outside the British Consulate in Constantinople and 
the declaration submitted to the Ambassador. Türk drew attention Britain’s struggle to 
                                                     
416
 Akşin, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 41; İsmail Safa was appointed to Sivas with 2 500 
kuruş salary on 29 April 1900. Alaattin Karaca, “Edebi Tenkitleri ve Şiirleriyle İsmail Safa’nın 
Edebiyatımızdaki Yeri” (Master’s diss., Ankara Üniversitesi, 1987), 49; Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in 
Opposition, 139, 146, 147.  
417
 Yahya Kemal, Çocukluğum, Gençliğim, Siyasi ve Edebi Hatıralarım (Istanbul: Istanbul Fetih Cemiyeti 
Yayınları, 1999), 185; Alâattin Karaca, “İsmâil Safâ,” in DİA, vol. 23 (2001), 121. 
418
 Yalçın, Edebiyat Anıları, 132, 133. 
419
 Ahmet İhsan, Matbuat Hatıralarım, 88. 
420
 Ibid; Uçar, 140 Yıllık Miras Güney Afrika`da Osmanlılar, 276. 
421 Çelik, “İsmail Safa’nın Edebiyat Nazariyesine Dair Çalışmaları,” 23. 
422
 “The Flight of Ismail Kemal Bey,” Pall Mall Gazette, 2 May 1900.  
423 Korkmaz, “Servet-i Fünûn Şair Ve Yazarlarının Transvaal (Boer) Savaşları Karşısındakı̇ Tutumu 
Hakkında Biır Araştırma,” 91; Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Ulu Hakan II. Abdülhamîd Han (Istanbul: Büyük 
Doğu Yayınları, 2003), 205. 
424
 Akşin, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 41. 
 59 
seize the gold mines in the Transvaal, where the Boer people lived. It was also indicated 
that the Boers fought against the British, and that the entire world praised their sacrifices 
for their independence. It was further noted in Türk: “Despite this, some of our people, 
who knew well what they were about, went to the British Embassy and expressed their 
hopes for a British triumph.”425 Moreover, Tahsin Pasha, Chief Secretary of Abdülhamid 
II, wrote about the Boers being patriotic people and how people in Istanbul secretly 
supported and admired them when the Boers defeated the British. To Tahsin Pasha, the 
showing-off by some intellectuals, in going to the British Embassy was ‘odd’ and 
‘improper’.426 This makes it very clear that both the Sultan and some Ottoman 
intelligentsia did not share the nascent ideas of Ismail Kemal and the pro-British Young 
Turks.  
Furthermore, after the criticism of Abdülhamid by Peyami Safa, son of İsmail Safa who 
died in exile, Hüseyin Nihal Atsız acknowledged the Sultan to be right. Atsız (1905-
1975), nationalist author, poet and philosopher, asked what kind of liberalism could be 
associated with felicitating Britain, which attacked a handful of Boers with huge 
armies.
427
 Moreover, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904-1983), author, poet and Islamist 
ideologue, claimed that Abdülhamid II was very fair-minded not to execute the 
signatories charged with treason.
428
  
On 2 April, 1902, another incident was experienced in the Ottoman Empire concerning 
the war in South Africa. Some military officers were captured while leaving the house of 
the chief translator of the British Embassy. They informed him of their willingness to 
fight in the war. After the incident, they were dismissed from their professions and were 
exiled by the Ottoman government.
429
 
4. 8. An Ottoman war observer in the South African War, Major Aziz Bey 
The South African War drew remarkable attention from other nations. America, France, 
Germany and Japan sent attachés to accompany both British and Boer armies. Attaches 
from Norway and Russia attended the Boer forces.
430
 Abdülhamid II followed the South 
African War of 1899-1902 closely. He sent Binbaşı (major) Aziz Bey to monitor the war 
first hand on 26 February, 1900 with a salary of 200 lira.
431
  
Aziz Bey was military attaché to Washington, USA and was in Paris when he was 
charged with the task of war observer in the South African War and monitored the war 
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for six months from within the entourage of Field Marshall Lord Roberts., the British 
Commander-in-Chief.
432
 He was given a medal by Britain in 1901.
 
Major Aziz Bey sent two letters to Istanbul via the Ottoman Embassy in London. He 
noted that the financial situations of the other war observers were better than his since 
they were sent to the region with their semi-annual salary as well as travelling expenses. 
Aziz Bey also added that sending cipher telegrams was forbidden by British head-
quarters, where he was observing the war, but an open telegram would bring the Ottoman 
Empire into discredit. For this reason, he preferred to write letters.
433
 His letter was sent 
by Anthopoulos Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador to London on 1 May, 1900.  
Major Aziz Bey was also referred to by his contemporary war correspondents in the 
South African War. James Francis Harry St. Clair-Erskine (5th Earl of Rosslyn), a 
correspondent to the Daily Mail and the Sphere during the war, reported the thought of 
Major Aziz Bey about the fighting capacity of Boers in his book, Twice Captured: A 
Record of Adventure During the Boer War. According to him, military attaché Aziz Bey 
summed up very smartly “Le Boer se batte (bat) lâchement. Il se cache comme un 
renard, et il court comme un lievre!” [The Boer is fighting cowardly. He hides like a fox, 
and he runs like a hare!]
434
  
Aziz Bey returned to Istanbul with the travel expenses sent in August, 1900.
435
 However, 
his observant reports are unknown today.
436
 
Abdülhamid also declared that it was a well-known fact that a word from him as the 
Caliph of all Muslims was sufficient to harm the British authority in India enormously. 
He suggested Germany, Russia, and France to take action against England. The South 
African War was “the best time to ask England to account for its oppression of the 
Indians and for the violent, stern action undertaken against other nations.” This 
opportunity was lost. For him, however, one day Indian Muslims would break the British 
yoke.
437
  
The Ottoman government supported neither British nor Boers in the war. The Ottoman 
administration was very ambivalent in this case. A Boer victory could have caused 
religious restrictions on South African Muslims, the same as during the administration of 
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the Dutch East India Company.
438
 On the other hand, the Ottoman administration never 
wished for British victory in the war. British-Ottoman relations were in hostile footing, 
especially after 1878 and the humiliating defeat of the Ottomans by Russia, as well as the 
anti-British foreign policy during the Hamidian era, the reign of Abdülhamid II. British 
statesmen believed that the Ottomans would collapse eventually and Britain should get 
some portion of the Ottoman territories. A stronger Great Britain could stir up much 
trouble for the Ottoman Empire in world politics.
439
 On the other hand, British defeat 
would provide a weakening of British authority over Muslims in her dominions, so she 
was less likely to intervene in Ottoman domestic issues.
440
 Furthermore, the Ottoman 
field cannons and rifles ordered from the Krupp Gun Factory in Germany were superior 
to British cannons.
441
 The Ottoman government wished Britain to realize that the 
Ottomans’ had their eyes on Britain, while sending an observer. The Empire wanted to 
apply an element of pressure upon Britain. It can be understood how the Ottoman Empire 
viewed the war in South Africa and Britain. 
Conclusion 
The South African War was the largest and most disgraceful war for Britain between 
1815 and 1914. New technology was used in the war and it was a great experience for 
Britain in the light of WWI. Even if the mighty British Empire fought against Boer 
guerrillas, the war affected all the people of South Africa profoundly. Non-Europeans 
were recruited by both warring parties from the outset of the war. Concentration camps 
were founded on a large scale for the first time, and British scorched-earth policy caused 
antipathy both in British and world public opinion.  
The Ottoman Sultan, as well as his subjects, followed the war with interest. The Ottoman 
administration’s attitude towards the South African War was very complex and nuanced. 
This lack of understanding of complexity was very evident amongst the pro-British 
Young Turks, particularly Ismail Kemal. Pro-British Young Turks and Ismail Kemal 
believed Britain was astonishing and was just the savior they needed. However, the 
relationship between Britain and Turkey was not on a friendly footing after the mid-
nineteenth-century. Pro-British Young Turks did not understand how British-Ottoman 
relations had shifted. They were too simplistic and did not have an appreciation of the 
complexity that existed at the stage of the Anglo-Boer War.   
                                                     
438
 Uçar, 140 Yıllık Miras Güney Afrika`da Osmanlılar, 272. 
439
 Orakçı, “A Historical Analysis of the Emerging Links Between the Ottoman Empire and South Africa 
between 1861-1923,” 67. 
440
 Y.A. Hus. 400/127; Uçar, 140 Yıllık Miras Güney Afrika`da Osmanlılar, 272. 
441 Tandoğan, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Afrika’da Avrupa Sömürgeciliğine Karşı Siyaseti (XIX. Yüzyıl ve XX. 
Yüzyılın Başları),” 121. 
 62 
Kemal Bey was also a great opponent of Russia and regarded this great power, at the 
time, as the ultimate formidable enemy of the Ottomans. He gave memoranda to 
Abdülhamid, proposing a compromise with England against Russia. 
  
 63 
CHAPTER 5. 
Russian imperial ambitions in the Balkans and Asia Minor and Ottoman public 
opinion about it 
Introduction 
The last chapter discussed the stance of the pro-British Young Turks towards the South 
African War. The war revealed the extent of British propaganda being disseminated 
among the Anglophile intellectuals. They tried to shape Ottoman public opinion towards 
Britain. Presumably, these compliments and justifications of England in the war, were 
their way of seeking the assistance of Britain, especially against the persistent Russian 
Threat.There is no doubt that the greatest enemy and threat to Turkey was Russia, which 
saw herself as one of the great European powers from the seventeenth century on. The 
Ottoman Empire was weakened by the many humiliating wars undertaken against Russia. 
Ottoman intellectuals and politicians as well as the public, saw the faltering army of 
Turkey and the growing power of Russia. This situation had originated centuries earlier 
and caused antagonism towards Russia among the Ottoman people. Ismail Kemal, as a 
late Ottoman intellectual, expressed his fear of Russia and the Russian threat to the 
Ottoman Balkans in the preface to the English version of Transval Meselesi as well as in 
his memoirs.  
Moreover, Russia and England were great rivals on the world stage throughout the 
nineteenth century.
442
 Since Great Britain advocated the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire, the pro-British Ottoman intelligentsia and politicians leaned towards 
England and against Russia. It can be said that fear of Russia became a great driving 
force in the Ottoman approach to England. In this sense, one can understand their 
inclination toward Great Britain, which was one of the contemporary superpowers, and 
away from Russia. Ismail Kemal said, Russia was the common enemy who threatened the 
British and Ottoman Empires ‘to the same degree’.443 For him, when Great Britain lost 
prestige, the Ottoman Empire would lose power too, and the other way round. Because of 
this, England would decline if Russia took over Constantinople.
444
 The pro-British Young 
Turks and Ismail Kemal supported Britain blindly, seeking a force against Russia, the 
most powerful enemy of the Ottomans throughout the centuries. The Young Turks 
support of Britain in her struggle in South Africa should be seen in the light of the 
Ottoman trepidation about Russia’s ambitions towards Ottoman territory, particularly 
Istanbul, the Bosporus and Dardanelles.  
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In this chapter details of the history of Russia’s spread over Ottoman territories is 
examined, in order to understand the escalating fear of Russia among the Ottomans. Also, 
the Ottoman public response towards the actions of the Russians in the Ottoman 
territories is evaluated.   
5. 1. Reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725) 
Russia was established by the Slavic tribes in the ninth century and was a landlocked 
state. She was trapped, stuck in between the glaciers to the north and the Black Sea, 
under the control of the Ottoman Empire, to the South. Russia sought access to the 
warmer waters from the eighteenth century. Russia’s aspiration was to gain access to the 
Black Sea, Baltic and Caspian Seas, which were closest to her territories; then the warmer 
waters of the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Pacific Ocean.
445
 It was essential to 
her becoming an imperial force with a voice in the world’s politics of the time. Russia, 
therefore, pursued a policy aimed to sever the Balkans and Caucasus connections to the 
Ottoman Empire, in order to further expand into these regions.
446
 
The originator of the policy to access warm waters was Peter Alexeyevich or Peter the 
Great. He undertook many reforms in Russia to develop his country as a powerful 
European state. Peter I wanted to spread his power over Ottoman, Polish and Swedish 
territories and enter the Mediterranean and the Aegean seas, after occupying 
Constantinople.
447
 For this purpose, the Holy Roman Empire, Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, Republic of Venice and Russia, together called the Holy League, went 
to war against the Ottoman Empire between 1683 and 1699. After sixteen years of war, 
the Treaty of Karlowitz (Karlofça) was signed in 1699, manifesting the first sign of 
Ottoman deterioration and the shrinking of her political sovereignty in central Europe. 
Since the Holy League ignored Russian interests, Russia later signed a separate treaty, the 
Treaty of Constantinople. This was signed in 1700 and the fortress of Azak (Azov) on the 
Black Sea was given to Russia. Thereafter, Russia could gain access to the sea. Russia 
also acquired a right to appoint an ambassador in Istanbul. At the time, ambassadors had 
a lot of power in the countries where they were stationed. Count B. C. Minnich, who was 
the intimate of Peter the Great, asserted in 1762 that: “From the moment of the first 
attack on Azov until the hour of his death, [Peter's] grand design ... had always been to 
conquer Constantinople, to chase the infidel Turks and Tatars out of Europe, and thus to 
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re-establish the Greek monarchy”.448 In this vein, he also aimed to establish a navy in the 
Black Sea.  
Russia sent Russian Orthodox missionaries to the Balkans, which also had a population 
of Orthodox Christians, although Greek Orthodox. These missionaries started to imbue 
Serbians, Bulgarians, and Greeks with the ideas of rising up against the Ottoman 
rulers.
449
 Orthodox ethnicities, under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, were 
susceptible to manipulation into favouring Russian geopolitical interests. The Ottoman 
Empire could not quite control the region at the time. The central power and authority of 
the empire in the Balkans were weakened. But Russia had great ambitions in the region. 
This is obvious in the instructions of Peter the Great to the first Russian ambassador sent 
in Istanbul, P.A. Tolstoy. Peter the Great entrusted the ambassador with the task of 
preparing an official and detailed report about the general situation, people, polity, 
bureaucrats, military posture, the situation of the fleet, relations with foreign states, 
military readiness and suchlike information about the Ottoman Empire.
450
 Peter the Great 
never took Constantinople. However, although it is uncertain whether Peter the Great 
instructed his successors, in his will, to take Constantinople,
 
the Tsars and Tsarinas of 
Russia struggled to realize this ambition after him. 
5. 2. Reign of Catherine II (1762-1796) 
Subsequently, Catherine II or Catherine the Great dedicated herself to ‘destroying the 
Turks’. She wanted to get into the Black Sea, annex the Crimea and occupy the Bosporus 
and Dardanelles, Constantinople and Aegean islands, with her ‘Greek Project’. The 
Crimea was an ideal stepping-stone to the ultimate conquest of Constantinople or 
Tsargrad as it was named by many Slavs.
451
 Russia and Austria would share the 
territories of the Ottoman Empire. The Byzantine Empire would be created again under 
the crown of Catherine’s grandson. With this intention, she named her grandson 
Constantine, who was born in 1779, after the founder of Christian Constantinople. She 
sometimes called him Constantine II in her personal correspondences and he learned to 
speak Greek before Russian from his Greek nurses and tutors.
452
 It can be deduced that 
Catherine II was over-ambitious about the territories of the Ottoman Empire. 
The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardja or Küçük Kaynarca, which was the most crucial 
document in the history of Russian-Balkan relations, was signed after the Russo-Ottoman 
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War of 1768-1774. According to the treaty, Russia could open a consulate wherever she 
wanted to establish one in the Balkans and would be the protector of Christian minorities 
of the Ottoman Empire.
453
 This provision (Article VII) of the Treaty of Kuchuk-
Kainardja enabled a deepening of Russia’s policy of manipulating the South Slavs in the 
Balkans. The right to message-handling via consulates was also given to the other 
European powers in time, and evolved into untouchable institutions. Foreign posts could 
not be pursued by the Ottoman government and many prohibited publications were 
smuggled to the empire.
454
   
Furthermore, Russian merchant vessels could navigate between the Bosporus and 
Dardanelles, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, a right which had been granted earlier 
to Britain and France.
455
 Russia henceforth could interfere in the foreign and domestic 
affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The Crimean Khanate also became independent politically 
and was the first step to the occupation of the Crimea by Russia which now became 
possible. Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula with the Treaty of Jassy (Yaş) in 1792, 
after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1787-1792, resulting in a predominantly Turkish-
speaking-Muslim settled territory of the Ottoman Empire being lost for the first time. 
After Kuchuk Kainardja, the Ottoman Empire was rapidly losing its international 
prestige. She was one of the three biggest imperial states in the world, yet was forced to 
accept the superiority of the European states.  
5. 3. The Crimean War of 1853-1856 
Russia had recreated herself as one of the European powers by 1814. In 1853, Russia 
occupied the Ottoman territories of Wallachia and Moldova. Constantinople sent a 
diplomatic note to Russia demanding the withdrawal of the army in her territories in 
fifteen days, which was ignored. Subsequently, the Crimean War started in October, 
1853. At the outbreak of the war, the Ottomans had some victories over the Russians in 
the Balkans, although the Ottoman fleet was sunk by Russia in the Black Sea and the 
direction of the war shifted to the detriment of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain and 
France, who were concerned about Russian expansionism into Ottoman territories, waged 
a war against Russia. The Ottoman, British and French cooperation concluded with the 
Russian defeat.  
In spite of the Ottoman victory, the empire was exhausted financially by war expenses. 
Foreign debt was taken for the first time, which would cause Ottoman bankruptcy 
eventually. The last payment of the foreign debt that was made in 1854 was paid as late 
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as a century later, in 1954. Then, the Ottoman Empire was put under a European 
protectorate. In fact, she had no place in the European balance of power. The Black Sea 
was neutralized, which meant no state could establish arsenals or fortifications on its 
coasts.
456
 Together with Russia, the Ottomans lost their right to have a fleet in the Black 
Sea.
457
 The war also revealed the weakness of the Ottoman army, compared to its modern 
European counterparts. The army was “poorly trained, poorly armed and poorly 
clothed.”458 
The Ottoman Empire declared Islahat Fermanı (an Edict of Reform) towards the end of 
the Crimean War. The ferman was intended to prevent interference by the European 
powers in Ottoman internal affairs in favour of her Christian subjects. However, this 
foresight did not prevent European intervention and also caused discontent among the 
Muslim subjects of the empire.  
With the Paris Treaty (1856), Russia had to recognise its defeat by the Ottoman Empire, 
France, and Great Britain. Nevertheless, Russia also warned the other European states 
that the Ottomans were strengthened and motivated to regain their lost power. After the 
Russian proposal to revise the Paris Treaty, the delegates of European states gathered and 
accepted Russian claims with the Treaty of London in 1871. Impartiality of the Black Sea 
was put aside. The Porte would open the straits during peacetime. The biggest obstacle to 
Russia’s spreading its influence over the Ottoman territories was now removed.459  
5. 4. Pan-Slavism policy of Russia 
After the mid-nineteenth century, Russia fanned the pro-Slav flame in the Balkans and 
acted a crucial part in the disorders in that region in the name of Pan-Slavism. On the 
other side, the Ottoman Empire was declining in the same century. Although the empire 
was still the dominant power at gunpoint, there was no respect from her subjects.
460
 
Russia sought to complete the decline of the Ottoman Empire with her ‘historic mission’ 
in the Ottoman Balkans.
461
 From the Crimean War (1853-1856) to the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877-1878, the main Russian foreign policy towards the Balkans was its pan-
Slavic ideology.
462
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Pan-Slavism primarily emerged among the Slavic people living under the dominance of 
the Ottoman Empire and Austria, with the nationalist ideas of the 1789 French 
Revolution, western romanticism, and German idealist philosophy.
463
 Slavic people 
thought that the Slav ethnicities were small and weak and in order to get a taste of 
liberation, they had to unite.
464
 
Pan-Slavism evolved into a ‘political weapon of Tsarist imperialism’, particularly after 
the British and French collaboration with the Ottoman Empire in the Crimean War of 
1853-1856.
465
 This consolidation inspired Russian nationalism and emotional 
collaboration between the Russians and Slavs living in south-east Europe.
466
 Many 
Russian publicists and statesmen regarded the British, French and Ottoman alliance as 
barring Russia from Europe.
467
  
Most Pan-Slavs regarded the salvation of the southern Slavs from the Muslim yoke as 
uniting Slavs under the strict sway of the Russian Tsar.
468
 Pan-Slavs had advocated that 
Russia should dismiss Turks from Europe and found a Slavic state centred in 
Constantinople. Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin (1800-1875), a history professor at Moscow 
University, was a philanthropist and academic propagandist.
469
 He was one of the 
founders and the presidents of the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent Committee. In 1858, this 
committee was approved by Tsar Alexander II. The Moscow Slavonic Committee 
intended to assist “the southern Slavs to develop their religious, educational and other 
national institutions” and to bring young Slavs to Russia for education.470 Similar 
committees were also established in the forthcoming years. Pogodin also wrote a letter to 
the young Grand Duke Alexander Nikolayevich on Russian history in 1838, mentioning 
that Slavs could become powerful under Russian leadership. Grand Duke Alexander, 
assuming the title of Alexander II, became the ‘rescuer’ of Slavs living in Ottoman lands, 
forty years after that letter (1877-1878).
471
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The Serbia-Montenegro rebellions in 1875-1878; the Bosnia-Herzegovina events in 1875; 
and the Bulgarian question in 1876, emerged as a result of the influence of the Russian-
backed Pan-Slavist movements.
472
 Nikolay Ignatiev, Russian Ambassador in 
Constantinople requested Russian intervention in the Serbian rebellion in Herzegovina in 
1875. He anticipated that the rebellion would settle without European interference, 
through his relations with the Ottoman Sultan and Grand Vizier.
473
  
5. 5. Foundation of the Bulgarian Exarchate 
On March 1870, The Bulgarian Orthodox Church or Bulgarian Exarchate was founded by 
the countless efforts of Russian policy-maker Nikolay Ignatiev, ambassador to Istanbul 
from 1864 to 1877. An independent church meant cultural and legal autonomy at that 
time since it was the admitted religion, rather than ethnic minorities, in the Ottoman state 
system.
474
 Bulgarians, by means of this, separated from the Greek-Orthodox church in 
Istanbul and became bound to a Slav church whose guardian was Russia. The Bulgarian 
national movement gained momentum by this means. In 1875-76, Christian Serbians in 
Herzegovina and Montenegro, as well as Bulgarians, rebelled against the Ottoman 
government, causing ‘tyrannous’ Ottoman suppression.475 Pan-Slavs influenced the 
Russian government to wage war against the Ottoman Empire. With this indoctrination, 
Serbia and Montenegro, with Russia, declared war against the Ottomans in 1876. 
Russians stood at the very gate of Istanbul in Yeşilköy. The Ottoman Empire suffered 
heavy losses and Sultan Abdülhamid II was obliged to sue for peace. Due to the 
paternalistic superiority of the Russians, nevertheless, Russia’s great victory did not drive 
a consolidation of the Bulgarians and their Russian ‘rescuers’, but recrimination. As a 
consequence, this led to a breaking split between the Bulgarian Principality and Russia.
476
 
To eliminate growing tension, the Russian Pan-Slav writer General Alexander Kireev 
published some articles that demanded that Russia give up her historical traditions. On 
the other hand, in his private correspondence with Nikolay Ignatiev, Kireev argued that 
Russian Pan-Slavs should continue secretly to convert all Slavs to Orthodoxy.
477
   
5. 6. Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 
In 1877, the Ottoman Empire embarked on a war with Russia, which was one of the most 
humiliating and devastating wars in Ottoman history. This war was referred to as ‘koca 
bozgun’ (the great defeat) among the Ottoman public. One of the most important causes 
                                                     
472
 Ibid, 130. 
473
 Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla, Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century: Setting 
the Precedent (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 172. 
474
 Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914, 208, 209. 
475
 Vovchenko, “Modernizing Orthodoxy: Russia and Christian East (1856-1914),” 304. 
476
 Ibid. 
477
 Ibid. 
 70 
of the war was Russia’s Pan-Slavic policy in the Balkans. After the foundation of the 
Bulgarian Church, Russia distributed propaganda in the Balkans through the members of 
the church.
478
 
The Treaty of St. Stefano, which concluded the Russo-Ottoman War, was signed in 1878. 
However, the treaty did not come into force because of the opposition of Great Britain, 
Germany, and Austria. These states strongly opposed the growing strength of Russia. 
Ismail Kemal accused the Ottoman administration of failing to avoid such a war with 
Russia. He also advocated the accommodation of England by the Ottoman Empire. 
According to Ismail Kemal, Russia gave an undertaking to England, at the outbreak of 
the Russo-Ottoman War: “to conclude the peace if Turkey asked for it, before the 
Russian armies crossed the Balkan chain, and not to occupy Constantinople”.479 This 
further demonstrates why Britain was seen as a significant force assisting Turkey, in the 
eyes of many Ottoman intellectuals and policy-makers. England was regarded as a power 
able to stop the Russian threat against the Ottoman Empire, which was critical at that 
time.  
Indeed, Russia later accepted the proposal of a new congress and the Treaty of Berlin was 
signed in 1878 between the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Great Britain, Austria−Hungary, 
France, Germany and Italy, as a result of which Serbia, Montenegro and Romania 
became independent. The Treaty of Berlin was the second great step that loosened the 
Balkans from the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire lost many territories after this 
treaty, such as Tunisia to France and Egypt and Sudan to England. They were all lost 
between 1881 and 1885.  
Before assembling the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Abdülhamid II gave Cyprus to Great 
Britain as a way to get her support at the congress. According to the Cyprus Convention 
in 1878, England would support the Ottoman Empire if Russia occupied her territories in 
Asia Minor.
480
 Conversely, Great Britain would manage the island of Cyprus in the name 
of the Ottoman Empire, but the Ottoman Empire would be responsible for the institutions 
of religion, education, and justice. 
On the eve of the First World War (1914-18), the greatest fear for the Ottoman Empire in 
the international arena was the Russian threat.
481
 The only way to block Russia’s plans 
seemed to be to make a security agreement with Great Britain and France.
482
 The 
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Ottoman Empire tried to secure close affiliations with many states at that time, but Russia 
was obviously never considered as an option for many Ottoman statesmen and elite class.  
5. 7. The aggressive image of Russia among the late-Ottoman intelligentsia and 
politicians 
The great defeats by Russia, and the diminishing empire, led to an antipathy against 
Russia among the Ottomans. This aggressive image, undoubtedly, had been generated 
through the centuries. For instance, according to Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904-1983), the 
famous Turkish poet and author, the sharpest example of antagonism between the nations 
of the world was the Turkish and ‘Moskof” (Russian). History does not record such a 
strong dislike between any other states and societies. Compared to the conflicts between 
the other states, the struggles between the Turks and Russians were like the Himalayas, 
while the others were like molehills.  
Kısakürek mentioned that the word ‘Moskof’ actually meant “Moskof gavuru” (infidel 
Russian) in Turkish slang. The faces of Russians were like a “peeled rotten potatoes” and 
their stare was vacant in the eyes of the Turks. The Turkish Military Academy and army 
troops had target boards with the “peeled rotten potato” and vacant stare Russian of faces 
in photographs, with their flat caps between Tanzimat (1839) to the World War I 
(1914).
483
 This important anecdote demonstrates the aggressive image of Russia in 
Ottoman public opinion. 
Moreover, Peter the Great was known as ‘Deli Petro’ (Crazy Peter). He made many 
reforms in Russia and had built his country into a great European nation by the eighteenth 
century. Peter I was also the initiator of the expansionist policy over Ottoman territories. 
The reason for this nickname, given to Peter the Great by Turks, was presumably his 
foolhardiness or over-dependence on his reforms. This example also illustrates the Turks’ 
apprehensive dread of Russia. 
The consecutive wars with Russia caused the corrosion of Ottoman power, so that the 
only means of getting out of the Empire’s plight seemed to be: “to have money as much 
as Britain, knowledge as much France and soldiers as many as Russia” according to Fuad 
Pasha (1814-1868), the Grand Vizier, as he noted in his testament.
484
 
Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, a late-Ottoman intellectual, defined Russia as the ‘eternal enemy’ 
of Turkey.
485
 The Treaty of Karlowitz, signed with Russia in 1699, revealed the first sign 
of the disintegration of Turkey, as he expressed in his book Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda 
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İnkılap Hareketleri ve Milli Mücadele. Rebellions started to arise among Ottoman 
subjects, resulting from the bad situation of the empire.
486
 
Kuran also revealed a letter of Catherine the Great to one of her ministers, Prince Repnin. 
According to this letter, Catherine, who obliged the Turks to sign the Treaty of Kuchuk-
Kainardja in 1774, was very sad to hear of the death of the Ottoman sultan Mustafa III in 
1774, since he was a mutton-head. Catherine also mentioned, in another letter, her 
apprehension about the progressive policy of Selim III (reign 1789-1807) right after his 
succession to the Ottoman throne. The Tsarina of Russia requested the Russian 
ambassador to Constantinople to constrain the Turks from restructuring the Empire by 
any means necessary. Otherwise, it would be a deathblow for Russia, and her plans with 
regard to Turkey would be over-set.
487
  
Moreover, in 1800, Napoleon Bonaparte shared the Ottoman territories in a secret 
agreement with Paul I of Russia (reign 1796-1801). As Ahmed Bedevi Kuran put it, the 
aim of Russia, as he saw it, was to take over Istanbul and to rule the straits.
488
 
Subsequently, Tsar Alexander I of Russia (reign 1801-1825) isolated the Ottoman Empire 
from the community of the European states at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which was 
gathered to settle a long-term peace plan after the Napoleonic Wars. It was one of the 
signs that Alexander I also had no good intention (hüsnüniyet) to the Ottomans, the same 
as the other Russian sovereigns.
489
 Furthermore, Russians and Austrians were seditionists 
in the Bosnia-Herzegovina rebellions of 1875. The Austrian emperor and Russian Tsar 
even planned the division of the Ottoman Empire in 1876.
490
    
On the other hand, to Kuran, Britain, and France were the Christian countries assisting 
Muslim Ottomans against ‘Christian Russia’ in the Crimean War. Moreover, Britain 
provided the Congress of Berlin in order to modify the Treaty of St. Stefano, which had 
extremely harsh provisions for the Ottoman Empire. The British safeguarded Muslim 
Turks against Christian Russians.
491
 
The original purpose of Great Britain’s support of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire was political. In order to safeguard the security of the routes to India after its 
occupation in 1757, England was compelled to hinder the access of the other powers to 
the region. Because of the fact that the Ottoman territories were on the junction of these 
routes, Britain had a policy of defending the territorial integrity and political authority of 
the decadent Empire. The Anglo-Ottoman collaboration started in 1798 with Napoleon’s 
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invasion of Egypt, then Mehmed Ali Pasha’s threat in 1839-1841.492 Then, Russia, 
Austria, and Germany held a conference to negotiate the current situation of the Balkans, 
in 1876, and sent a diplomatic note to Istanbul to order reforms in the region. However, 
Great Britain remarked that giving a note to a country for reforms did not accord with the 
sovereign rights of an independent state. London did not accept the note given to the 
Empire, for this reason and the note was rendered invalid.
493
 
The Russian antagonism towards the Ottomans attracted even the attention of Britain. A 
report dated to 1911, in The National Archives in London, records that the Turkish press 
in Salonico, in contemporary Greece “indulge in the most violent language against 
Russia”. Silah (weapon), whose editor was Hasan Tahsin or Silahçı Tahsin, a member of 
the CUP, published some articles “inciting war against Russia”. Also, it included 
“insulting references to the Ambassador in Constantinople and Tsar himself”. It 
published a list of volunteers for a special Legion for a war, which would be embarked 
on, against Russia.
494
  
5. 8. Stance of Ismail Kemal against Russia 
Ismail Kemal, who was an outstanding Anglophile, was an ardent antagonist of Russia. In 
1870, he became the Turkish delegate to, and the president of the European Commission 
of the Danube. In a report to Sultan Abdülaziz about how to defend the Danube region 
against the Russian threat, he proposed an independent Romania, under the sovereignty 
of Great Britain.
495
 According to Ismail Kemal: “An independent Romania, united in a 
strong coalition with Turkey, would safeguard the latter from all danger of aggression on 
the part of Russia. It would bolt and bar the road to Constantinople.”496 The political 
position of the Ottoman Empire would strengthen and any alliance of Austria-Hungary 
with Russia would be prevented.
497
 
In his memoirs, Ismail Kemal made many analogies between Great Britain and Russia. 
He indicated, in his memorandum to Abdülhamid II, that the two great powers who were 
the most interested in the east were Britain and Russia. However, their political interests, 
as well as their way of defending those interests, were very different from each other. 
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Russia had an “eternal policy tending to the dismemberment of Turkey”, while England 
assured the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, apart from her own interests.
498
  
Kemal proposed a plan to end the isolation of the Ottoman Empire in the international 
arena. The Empire had a choice, to have a consensus with either Russia or Britain, to put 
an end to its isolation in international politics. For Ismail Kemal, it was not possible for 
Turkey to compromise with Russia, since her growing desire to possess Constantinople 
had passed down, generation to generation.
499
 Furthermore, Russia had such a powerful 
naval force in the Black Sea as to be able to seize the Bosporus and the Black Sea. 
On the other hand, Great Britain needed the friendship of the Ottomans to secure her way 
to India and Australia, since her traditional policy was rather to have friends than to 
protect her route by arms and money. Turkey was the only possible guardian for Britain 
because of their reciprocal interests and the geographical position of the Empire. Ismail 
Kemal suggested to Abdülhamid, at this point, coming to an understanding with Britain. 
The empire would suffer if Britain were “forced to take measures to attain the security” 
which she needed, by other means.
500
 
Since the Ottoman officials in the Balkans were monitored by Russia, their activities 
against Russian interests were criticised by that country. Ismail Kemal was accused of 
oppressing Christians and converting them to Islam by force when he was the governor of 
Tultcha (Tulcea in contemporary Romania). Defamatory articles against Ismail Bey were 
published in the French journal, Courrier d’Orient. Because of this slander by the 
Russians, he resigned the governorship of Tultcha.
501
  
5. 9. The Ottoman attitude towards the Russian Ambassador, General Ignatiev and 
the pro-Russian Grand Vizier, Mahmud Nedim Pasha 
Nikolay Ignatiev (ambassador to Constantinople, 1864-1877) was regarded as someone 
who would like to devastate the Empire in the Russian interests. There is no doubt that he 
was highly detested by many among the Ottoman elite and statesmen. Furthermore, the 
Ottoman Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha (reign 1871-1872 and 1875-1876) was 
blamed for his Russian sympathies. Nedim Pasha allowed Ignatiev’s interference in state 
affairs, according to some Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals. 
For instance, one of the prominent politicians of the Tanzimat Era, the Grand Vizier Âli 
Pasha (1815-1871) used to ask General Ignatiev about complicated domestic and foreign 
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matters. Ali Pasha, nevertheless, took decisions contrary to Ignatiev’s opinions, since he 
knew that Russian interests were at cross-purposes with the Ottomans’.502 
A late-Ottoman intellectual, Ahmed Bedevi Kuran (1886-1966), criticised the politics of 
the pro-Russian Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha. To him, the foreign policies of 
Turkey were virtually directed by General Ignatiev during his Grand Viziership. Whereas 
Ignatiev was a Turcophobe to his bones, Mahmud Nedim Pasha did not comprehend or 
ignored this. The Russian ambassador fuelled the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgarian 
revolts.
503
 The Grand Vizier’s only thought was to please Ignatiev, who was self-
interested.
504
  
Ismail Kemal likewise gave harsh criticism in his memoirs of Mahmud Nedim Pasha and 
his policies. He claimed that the appointment of Mahmud Nedim Pasha to Grand 
Vizierate astonished everyone. According to his memoirs, Mahmud Nedim sought to gain 
favour with the Sultan Abdülaziz by satisfying, ironically, his ‘love of money’.505 He 
obtained a large sum of money monthly by borrowing, at an overpriced rate of interest, 
from the bankers of Galata and paid this money Abdülaziz a share of the income.506 
Kemal articulated that Mahmud Nedim Pasha followed a ‘muddle-headed’, ‘stupid’, 
‘blundering’ ‘noxious’ and ‘incoherent’ policy.507 To him, the very first action of his as 
Grand Vizier was to exile or degrade all the ministers and governors who devoted 
themselves to the service of the Ottoman Empire. Pasha appointed new administrators to 
different positions continuously, which caused confusion and chaos.
508
 Mahmud Nedim 
destroyed within ten months all the worthy work of the empire that the former ministers 
had accomplished in thirty years. The empire drifted towards dreadful disorder and 
General Ignatiev, Russian Ambassador to Constantinople, became almost omnipotent at 
the palace.
509
  
The Russian intrigues were effective mostly in Bulgaria, which included the Danube 
Vilayet. To Ismail Kemal, Midhat Pasha administered this region with perfect 
organization, with the aim of hindering any destructive plan of Tsarist Russia. Pasha’s 
successors, who trained in his school, including Kemal himself, continued the work in the 
region. Nevertheless, with Mahmud Nedim Pasha’s lack of policy as well as Russian 
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pressure, all the officials were dismissed except Ismail Kemal himself.
510
 Mahmud 
Nedim, ‘who was the evil genius of the Empire’, operated everything on the inspiration 
of Ignatiev, who was ‘preparing the last blow’ against the Ottomans.511 
Conclusion 
From the beginning of the seventeenth century to the demise of the Ottoman Empire at 
the end of the World War I in 1918, Russia pursued a policy aimed to demolish the 
Ottoman Empire. These centuries witnessed a stream of wars, agreements, great human 
and financial losses for both sides and numerous territorial losses for the Ottoman 
Empire. Russia’s basic mission was to gain access to the warm waters of the 
Mediterranean and re-establish the Eastern Roman Empire, centred in Constantinople or 
Tsargrad as it was called by many Slavs. Russia manipulated Pan-Slavism for the 
annexation of the Balkans, provoking the Balkan Orthodox Slavs against the Ottoman 
Empire. Many states were founded in the Ottoman Balkans with Russian incentives. 
Additionally, Russia made Crimea independent -which was a predominantly Turkic 
Muslim region- and then occupied it in order to gain access to the Black Sea.  
The threat of Russia became the biggest fear for the Ottoman people and their leaders 
during the recession period of the Ottoman Empire. The great thrashing during the Russo-
Ottoman Wars created an aggressive image of ‘Moskof’ (MOCKBA from 
Moscow/Russian) which also meant ‘infidel’ to the Ottoman public. There was an 
enormous fear that the empire would break up if she could not defend herself against 
Russia. Also, until the mid nineteenth century, Great Britain had had a policy of support 
for Ottoman territorial integrity. The British fought with the Ottomans in the Crimean 
War (1853-1856). Moreover, she hindered the enforcement of the Treaty of St. Stefano, 
which was signed after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878. It is beyond doubt that 
British assistance to Turkey was due to her reluctance for Russia to gain strength. 
However, this consolidation was interpreted by the Ottoman elite and statesmen as 
traditional friendship and intimacy by the British. The Russian threat, lasting for 
centuries, caused them to move ever-closer to Britain. 
Among the European powers, Russia showed sympathy with the Boers in government 
circles. Tsar Nicholas II had a deep-seated animosity towards England.
512
 The pro-Boer 
enthusiasm of the Russians originated in their British antipathy. In Russian eyes, a small 
number of Boers ventured to challenge their powerful common enemy. The Russian 
people, particularly rural Russians, empathised with the simple and God-fearing Boers 
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who love the land. They sent funds and ambulance teams to the Afrikaner republics.
513
 
According to the most reliable publications, 225 Russian volunteers fought against the 
British on the Boer front.
514
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CHAPTER 6. 
Analysis of Tranval Meselesi 
Introduction 
This chapter is the main contribution of the thesis to the literature and focuses on 
Transval Meselesi. Written in 1900, it is the longest work of Ismail Kemal Bey (166 
pages). This work is crucial to demonstrate the point of view of a prominent Ottoman-
Albanian intellectual and politician about the South African War of 1899-1902. It is a 
good example to present the standpoint of the pro-British Ottoman intellectuals on British 
imperialism as well as the European colonialism in a broader sense. The pro-British 
propaganda among Ottoman intelligentsia for the South African War is addressed in this 
chapter. It shows the propaganda conducted by the pro-British Ottomans to justify the 
British policy in South Africa during the war. In this context, it is a contribution to the 
history of South African War, as well as the intellectual history of the Ottoman Empire. 
The pamphlet was translated into three languages. The English version was published in 
one of the most influential periodicals in nineteenth century Britain, The Fortnightly 
Review with the title “The Transvaal Question from the Mussulman Point of View” (27 
pages)
515
. The French version was published as, La Question du Transvaal ou le Role 
Civilisateur de l’Angleterre Juge au Point de vue Musulman (61 pages).516 This version 
was republished recently by Forgotten Books.
517
 The Arabic translation, Mas’ala al-
Transfal was made by a Young Turk in Cairo, Egypt (174 pages).
518
 These translations 
demonstrate the importance of the work at the time. 
This work is not used to explain the war in a military sense, but was rather a propaganda 
instrument to legitimise British imperialism. Ismail Kemal tried to convince the Ottomans 
of the legitimacy of the policies of London in the British colonies, including South 
Africa. Ismail Kemal explained his intention to write his pamphlet so as to animate the 
Liberal administration of the United Kingdom, when comparing it with other 
governments, particularly in Muslim countries. To him, England symbolised civilisation, 
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justice, education and freedom in all spheres of life, even though her primary intention 
was to secure her sea-routes for commerce. The other European great powers, such as 
Russia, Holland, and France, oppressed their colonial populations, which were mostly 
Muslim. Only Britain endeavoured to serve the benefit of humanity. Britain expanded her 
territories providing to increase the liberty and the civilisation of the world, so Kemal 
asserted.
519
 
It can be seen from the small print runs of Transval Meselesi that Ismail Kemal Bey tried 
to associate British imperialism with Islamism. Kemal argued the question raised by the 
South African War, from the point of the civilisation of Islam.
520
 To him, Britain had 
made a gigantic effort to enlighten Asia and the other continents. The oppressed people, 
particularly Muslims had to support British imperialism in order to reach their full moral 
and political potential.
521
 Kemal interpreted a passage of the Qur'an to justify his claim 
for the constitutional government exemplified by Britain, such as: “Deliberate upon your 
affairs” (Ali Imran, 3/159)522. He also recorded that Sinan Pasha, the Grand Vizier 
confessed to the Austrian Ambassador that “the English are so nearly like us that all they 
need, in order to be real Mohametans, is to acknowledge the Chehadet (a formula of the 
Mussulman creed)”.523 
Ismail Kemal wrote this pamphlet when England was heavily criticised by European 
public opinion, due to her severe strategies against the Boers. He expressed his 
astonishment at the judgements and criticisms by both the European public and official 
circles of the Transvaal question, despite the liberal policies of England. Furthermore, he 
stated that the European States were ‘jealous’ of Great Britain since she had created an 
immense empire with an admirable system of government and a formidable maritime 
power capable of defending  her interests all over the world.
524
 Any state in the world 
could venture to show opposition to Britain, nevertheless the South African War 
demonstrated their real feelings about England.  
In addition, he looked at the South African War as an influence on global politics. He 
analysed the impact that this war would have on the fate of Muslims and Ottomans. A 
British victory meant the progress of civilisation, according to him. A British triumph 
would assist the progress of humanity and open the way for the improvement of the 
eastern peoples.
525
 On the other hand, a Boer victory would mean that the civilisation of 
humanity would be prevented and the eastern peoples would enter condemnation. One of 
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these two opponents desired liberty, but the other captivity.
526
 The result of the war 
would decide the fate of the East. Either it would become enlightened and civilised, or 
servitude and darkness would dominate.
527
 Muslims and the Ottomans had to consider the 
outcome of the contest. They had to support Britain, whose tendencies and policies 
coincided with the religious and national interests of Muslims.
528
 
Ismail Kemal gushed over his favourite country in his pamphlet. He described Great 
Britain as “the most resolute and faithful champion of liberalism”. To him, the British 
had “admirable proclivities” and always desired to enlighten every single society and 
nation with the glory of civilisation, as well as to strengthen every single continent and 
state with the power of justice. England was ready to struggle with tyranny wherever she 
met it and protect the oppressed people.
529
 
He asserted that, unlike the other big powers, Great Britain did not acquire wealth by 
exhausting the countries she annexed. On the contrary, in order to increase their wealth, 
she made sacrifices. She sought power and wealth from the civilisation and prosperity of 
the others.
530
 Some people accused England of utilitarianism. However, to him England 
was praiseworthy, since she was able to combine her interests with the common benefits 
of the whole of humanity.
531
 To him, the British Empire showed to mankind the real 
direction to progress.
532
  
He characterised the Anglo-Saxons as a “divine class”. Kemal associated the British 
nation with the ancient Romans in terms of ensuring the progress of civilisation and 
bringing excellent liberty and justice. Both nations were superior to the other nations. 
However, to him, an Englishman could resemble the Romans, but could not be 
equated.
533
 These exaltations of the British provide a good clue to the stance of the pro-
British Young Turks towards England and the British nation.  
This chapter first looks at Ismail Kemal’s reasons for supporting Britain in the South 
African War. Then a comparison of the Dutch and the British occupations of South 
Africa, in the eyes of Ismail Kemal are examined. The historical information about South 
Africa given in Transval Meselesi is also analysed. The chapter investigates the 
comparison of the European powers’ administrations in eastern colonies from the stance 
of Ismail Kemal. The pamphlet is divided by subjects in order to comprehend the topics 
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with ease. The irrelevant parts, such as the facts about the Cape given in the pamphlet, 
are not included. 
6. 1. The justifications of Ismail Kemal for the support of Britain 
Ismail Kemal tried to create an image favouring Great Britain. He desired to justify 
British imperialism and her scorched-earth policy on her path to success. According to 
Kemal, all Muslims in the world should wish for British success in her struggle against 
the Boers in South Africa.
534
 The Ottomans owed a real debt of gratitude to the British.
535
 
Wherever British blood was spilled, the Ottomans thrilled, as he expressed it. Especially, 
the Ottomans could not be unconcerned about matters which would enhance British 
power.
536
 He showed three reasons why the Ottomans had to support England against her 
enemies. 
First of all, when the Britons “threw off the Papal yoke”, they attempted to establish close 
relations with Muslims. It was the most significant aim of British policy for three 
centuries.
537
 Secondly, Great Britain helped the Ottoman Empire against France and 
Russia. Kemal declared that there were two great alliances against Islam and the Ottoman 
Empire by Henry IV of France and Alexander I of Russia. The first attempt was 
prevented by Elizabeth I of England and the second by the Prince Regent, George of 
Hanover.
538
 Thirdly, Ismail Kemal referred the British assistance against Russia in the 
Crimean War of 1853-1856. To him, when the Ottomans see England in a struggle, they 
remember that the British “poured out their blood” and mingled it with that of Turkish 
soldiers for the Empire.
539
 The Crimean War also strengthened and declared the sincere 
friendship of the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain that already existed.
540
 Lastly, the 
mighty British Empire administered seventy-million Muslims liberally and humanely, 
under her direct control or her political protection.
541
 
6. 2. Historical information given in Transval Meselesi and the Boer ‘Atrocity’  
Ismail Kemal gave some historical information about the occupation of the Cape of Good 
Hope. He asserted that John II of Portugal desired to annihilate the Muslims of the 
Barbarian coasts.
542
 John II sent an expedition to African coasts, under command of 
Bartholomew Dias, in order to destroy Islam. This expedition reached first Benin, then 
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the Cape of Good Hope.
543
 Subsequently, the British occupied the Cape temporarily in 
the name of King James I in 1620. Yet the land was abandoned until 1652 and the 
occupation of Jan van Riebeeck in the name of the Dutch East India Company (DEIC).
544
  
The DEIC opened a branch and sent a hundred soldiers who had been mustered out of the 
army. Ismail Kemal described the first settlers in the Cape as ‘band’.545 They constructed 
a small fort and barracks where today’s ‘splendid’ city of Cape Town stands. In Ismail 
Kemal’s view, the Boers drove off the black people and stole their women, children, 
cattle, properties, and goods.
546
 They started to engage in agriculture. Their number 
increased continually in this new colony in the Cape with a few hundred orphan girls sent 
from Amsterdam, and after two years, adventurers from all over Europe and the French 
Protestant families (Huguenots), who escaped the oppression against them in France.
547
 
As the early settlers spent most of their time with hunting the African people -whom 
Kemal described as ‘savage’- and wild animals, the DEIC later sent a number of 
shiploads of  black slaves, -described as ‘Negro’ by Kemal- in order to meet their 
agrarian needs. In order to attract the attention of the Ottoman Muslims, Kemal also 
highlighted that a few thousand prominent Muslim families from the Sunda Islands were 
exiled to the Cape to serve them.
548
 The white colonists compelled them to perform the 
hardest work. In fact, they made Muslims their slaves.
549
  
Ismail Kemal identified the Boers as ‘tahrib-i memalike münhemik’ which means, 
addicted to devastating countries and “ravagers of the country”.550 They do not have any 
grand thought, virtue or social ethics except the fanatical ideals of the middle ages.
551
 
Their cruelty was hardened by the feeling that they had left their homeland forever. They 
killed and took the children and confiscated the property of all the people who were not 
followers of their religion, without distinguishing native or foreigner, Pagan, Malay or 
Muslim. The ethical support of the Boers was the Scripture which they believed allowed 
them to shed blood and confiscate property.
552
 Kemal asserted that the Boers annihilated 
all the tribes savagely including more than a million inhabitants in the Cape in one 
hundred and fifty years. 
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Ismail Kemal touched upon the social life and administrative system of the Boers. He 
asserted that they lived an isolated life in which the spread of civilisation or education 
was impossible. Kemal despised the Boers as ‘peasants’. Their towns were large villages. 
None of them engaged in business or trade. They also did not allow the Muslims, the 
Chinese, the Indians, and the black people to own land, to carry arms, and have political 
and civil rights. They were not allowed to live in the same district with the Afrikaners.
553
 
Presumably, in order to leave a negative impression against the Boers in Ottoman public 
opinion, he argued that Malay Muslims who were living well were also enslaved. He 
stated that since they became the slaves of ‘sanguinary’ people and some Muslims who 
used to live in opulence, had died with deep sorrow. The rest of them lost their language, 
tribal customs, and even their religious duties. They only cherished the memory of Islam 
by having Muslim names.
554
 Likely, so as to irritate the Ottoman Muslims about the 
Boers, he compared the Afrikaners with the Jewish people. To him, the Boers assumed an 
attitude similar to that of the Jews. Their leader, Pretorius, was the ‘David’ of the 
Boers.
555
  
6. 3. Post-British occupation of the Cape and the Great Trek 
Ismail Kemal explained the reasons for the British occupation of the Cape of Good Hope. 
He mentioned the geopolitical importance of the Cape for England and her sea-route to 
India. He claimed that Britain placed the black tribespeople and Java Muslims under the 
sovereignty of the Boers in heart-wrenching misery, when she occupied there a hundred 
years ago.
556
 The relationship between the Boers and the people under their authority was 
like the owner and slave, rather than the ruler and ruled. Kemal said that the first attempt 
of Britain to counter this oppression became the establishment of a government to 
provide the colonising people liberty in an absolute manner.
557
 This administration 
inhibited the oppression of the Boers and gave Muslims total freedom and equality. This 
government also recognised the humanity of black people. African people, who regarded 
the white man as a monster and bloodthirsty, resembled the whites humanly, culturally, 
religiously and ethically.
558
 They got used to the law and virtue of the white man. Every 
single person under the British rule attained this equality. Besides this, the Boers were 
forced to appreciate the honour of civilisation and the power of justice.
559
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Kemal Bey asserted that England desired to introduce civilisation into Africa. He 
illustrated the British occupation of the Cape as the start of the regeneration and civilising 
process in this continent. These lands the Boers destroyed were a cemetery and a hell, he 
alleged. It was such a miracle that England civilised the southernmost tip of the 
continent.
560
 
Ismail Kemal characterised the abolition of slavery by Britain as “an eternal honour for 
England” which was an unprecedented practice in the history of the nations.561 According 
to him, the British equipped the native Africans with humanity, civilisation, and piety.
562
 
This expression demonstrated his standpoint to non-western elements. To him, the British 
administration put an end to the ‘detestable’ management of the Afrikaners. As soon as 
the British settlement was established in the Cape, personal liberty was, as much as 
possible, granted to Malay Muslims and the black people who were employed in 
demanding jobs and had been deprived of all kinds of humanitarian law.
563
 Kemal, who 
was a vigorous advocate of constitutionalism, emphasised that England carried out 
constitutional government in the Cape Colony excellently.
564
 
Ismail Kemal also mentioned that with the establishment of the British Cape Colony in 
South Africa, roads, bridges and railways were built and schools, mosques, churches, 
universities, libraries, museums, and big cities were established.
565
 South Africa was 
transformed from a savage land into a prosperous country.
566
 
According to Ismail Kemal, the positions of Muslims in Cape Town and in the big cities 
were very eminent. Their schools and mosques were very tidy and the prosperity of the 
Muslim community was so increased that the demand for the conversion to Islam among 
the native Africans was increasing from day to day. 
Kemal gave information about Petrus Emanuel De Roubaix, Justice of the Peace at Cape 
Town and the first Ottoman consul general in South Africa. According to him, the Cape 
Muslims called the attention of the British administration. Therefore, the British 
government appointed De Roubaix for the affairs of the Muslims. He worked for the 
honour of the Muslims with a great gravity and protected the Muslim interests. In a short 
span of time, the Muslim community held an outstanding position among the other 
communities. In return, the Cape Muslims wrote a letter to the Ottoman Sultan 
Abdülmecid appreciating the justice and prosperity shown by the British, as well as the 
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kindness and assistance shown by De Roubaix. The Ottoman Empire gave a big sum of 
money to De Roubaix for the expense of building a mosque in the city of Port 
Elizabeth.
567
 
Due to the fact that the Cape Afrikaners, feeling rage towards Muslims, annoyed De 
Roubaix, his election to the Lower Chamber was hindered. However, after two years, he 
was elected to the Upper House at a by-election.
568
  
Ismail Kemal also gave information about Abu Bakr Effendi, the Ottoman scholar sent by 
the Ottoman administration to Cape Town. He asserted that Great Britain sought to 
increase the prestige of the Ottoman sultan as the Caliph of Muslims as well as to 
strengthen the political power of the empire. For this reason, England requested a person 
from the ulema (scholars) for Muslims of the Cape. The religious and moral teachings of 
Abu Bakr Effendi and assistance of Emanuel De Roubaix in the Parliament enhanced the 
position of Muslims in South Africa and situated them in an enviable place, as he 
asserted. 
To him, the Afrikaners, superior in numbers, belittled the reforms carried out by the 
British administration in the beginning. Nevertheless, the British immigrants increased in 
number; the black people who escaped to the high mountains from the ‘vexatious’ 
treatment of the Boers returned; and Malay Muslims adopted their innate supremacy 
within the humanitarian policy of England. The Boers had to give up their defiant 
attitudes and obey the new administration at least for some time.
569
 
Ismail Kemal explained the reason of the Great Trek of the Afrikaners by the abolition of 
slavery by Great Britain. The Boers, unhappy with the British administration in the Cape, 
were unable to comprehend living upon an equal footing with their slaves whom they 
regarded as their personal property, he said. Many of them, except the ones who could 
bear to live as civilised, migrated to the north in order not to ‘civilise’ and not to accept 
the justice and humanity. They crossed the Orange River with their children, goods, and 
herds.
570
 
He defined the Boers in Transval Meselesi as people who could not ‘forgive’ the British, 
since England equated the black man with the white man. Therefore, the most obstinate 
group crossed the Vaal River under the command of Hendrik Potgieter (1792-1852), the 
Voortrekker leader, in order not to see British faces.  
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Ismail Kemal also described the struggle of the Boers with the Matabele people in the 
Magaliesberg or Kachan and the Boer victory. According to him, the inhabitants of the 
region were treated roughly by the Matabele. The natives of the region received the Boers 
as liberators at first. However, the Boers took off their wives, children, properties, and 
cattle.
571
 
Kemal said that the Boers regarded the African continent as a kind of Promised Land and 
the African people as particularly created to be their servants. They considered the 
missionaries and the British, and traders from the other nations as objects of suspicion 
because of their intentions to make the ‘Negroes’ civilised and convert them to 
Christianity. The Boers held a grudge against them and obstructed the extension of trade, 
civilisation and religion as a religious duty.
572
 
On the other hand, David Livingstone (1813-1873), a Scottish missionary, opened a 
school at Kolobeng (in today’s Botswana). The teachers who were trained at this school 
were sent to the neighbouring areas to ‘enlighten the Africans with the civilisation 
light’.573 Only the black people in the Transvaal, who were under the government of the 
Boers, were without this opportunity. According to Ismail Kemal, Livingstone demanded 
of Hendrick Potgieter that he remove this prohibition. However, Potgieter replied 
cynically that: “All that it was necessary to teach the Negroes was that they were born to 
be the slaves of white men”.574 
According to Kemal, for Britain, the only effective means to civilise the continent was 
the abolition of slavery and the development of commerce. However, the customs and 
principles of the constitution of the Boers obstructed this policy. There were two 
alternatives for England to remove the obstacles and introduce humanity to Africa: either 
totally to suppress the Boer government or to reform it. Britain had to choose the latter 
plan, since she was dealing with east-European affairs, which would soon to lead to the 
Crimean War. Britain recognised the Transvaal as an independent state in 1852, with a 
convention signed between the governor of the Cape Province and President Pretorius. 
Subsequently, the Orange Free State was recognised as a Free State, with the condition of 
the abolition of slavery.
575
  
6. 4. The causes of the South African War according to Transval Meselesi  
Ismail Kemal asserted that after only a few months, the agreement was broken by the 
Boers. Pretorius asked the governor of the Cape, Sir George Cathcart (1794-1854) “what 
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was to be done about missionaries”, whereas the only obligation for the Boers to be 
independent was not practising slavery and not obstructing commerce. To Ismail Kemal, 
these two obligations were too much for them and they soon failed to keep their 
engagement. Cathcart replied to Pretorius: “You may do what you please with them.” 
This joke was taken seriously by Pretorius and he, with his four hundred armed men, 
attacked the Bechuanas, killed many people and destroyed the city of Kolobeng as well 
as the school founded by Livingstone. After his return from Caruna, Livingstone found 
his books and leaflets slashed and his schoolhouse, the town and its buildings destroyed. 
The parents of his pupils, whose children were enslaved by the Boers, were desperate. 
Livingstone narrated this disaster with sorrowful language.
576
 
According to Kemal, because they had assured their independence, the Boers became 
arrogant. They expelled those Africans whom they could not make their slaves. They 
destroyed missionary institutions, while missionaries were bringing black people to the 
honour of humanity and showing them the means of self-defence. The Boers also 
expelled the British traders, desiring to establish business relations with them and the 
northern colonies.
577
  
Ismail Kemal claimed that Britain assisted the Boers against the attack of Sekhukhune, 
Chief of a great native nation, in order to save the Transvaal and prevent imperilling the 
white inhabitants of Africa. Theophilus Shepstone, an English commissioner, unfurled 
the British flag in the Transvaal and claimed the country with the consent of Paul 
Kruger.
578
 According to Ismail Kemal, it is incontestable that the British intervention 
rescued the Transvaal. Nevertheless, three years later, the Boers rebelled against Great 
Britain despite her assistance.
579
 
Kemal described the British defeat at Majuba Hill in his pamphlet. To him, Mr 
Gladstone, Prime Minister of Great Britain preferred to show moderation while General 
Wood was preparing for revenge. Otherwise, the powerful British Empire would defeat 
the Boers. The Transvaal Republic was acknowledged, with the agreement signed in 
1881 under the express condition of the rule of Great Britain.
580
 Subsequently, with the 
political efforts of Kruger, the total independence of the Transvaal Republic was 
recognised by the agreement signed in 1884. Nonetheless, without the consent of Britain, 
the Transvaal Republic would not sign any agreement with any foreign power or any 
native chief except the Orange Free State. According to Ismail Kemal, the real conflict 
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that led to the South African War was the interpretation of that clause of the 
agreement.
581
 
Ismail Kemal mentioned the deprivation of the political rights of the uitlanders by the 
Transvaal government. He said that the form of the government was republican. In order 
to be a President, an MP or a state official, one had to come from the Cape or have settled 
in the Transvaal before 1876 and had to be Protestant.
582
 
According to him, the Transvaal was not an actual republic, in which the state was at the 
hands of President Kruger for nineteen years. Ismail Kemal reported that human rights 
were only for the whites and for those who had the same religion as the Boers, and that 
political rights were exclusively for their own race. To Ismail Kemal, one of the reasons 
of the conflict was that the Boers continuously denied the rights of other people who had 
different religious and ethnic backgrounds.
583
   
Four-fifths of the uitlander population of the Transvaal was British-born and England 
could not be unconcerned about the practices of an arbitrary and retrograde government, 
as he claimed. Besides, the Boers had an extraordinarily rich country. However, they 
were formerly British subjects who had renounced her government. They also hindered 
British expansion and the civilising policy of England with every means at hand.
584
 To 
Kemal, the civilising process of Africa would be interrupted completely if the economic 
and political development of the Boers -fanatic and cruel inherently- were allowed. To 
him, England could not just give up her humanistic and progressive ambitions and 
intentions for Africa.
585
 
According to Ismail Kemal, England claimed that all of the inhabitants of the Transvaal, 
including the blacks and uitlanders, should obtain the same political and civil rights as 
the Cape Afrikaners. This term, Kemal averred, was the term Afrikaner used to 
distinguish the Boers from the ones who left the administration of Britain, who were the 
British subjects.
586
 
He claimed that the Muslims under the British sovereignty and the Muslim workers in the 
Transvaal mines, who were expelled by the Boers with the declaration of war, stated their 
readiness to fight against the Boers to Sir Alfred Milner, the governor of the Cape. To 
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him, Muslims said they felt that they were obliged to spill their blood in order to perform 
their thanksgiving to Britain for justice and liberty.
587
  
6. 5. Comparison of British imperialism with other European imperialisms 
In his pamphlet, Ismail Kemal Bey compared the British administration in Egypt and 
India with that of France in Algeria, and the Netherlands in Java and Sumatra, as well as 
South Africa. He wanted to make an analogy between the British and French, Russian, 
and Dutch rule in the countries where Muslim population existed.  
Ismail Kemal alleged that the Ottoman-British relations were always on a friendly 
footing. Great Britain had recognised the importance of the Ottoman Empire for the last 
hundred years.
588
 England supported the integration of the Ottoman territory, as Ismail 
Kemal asserted. He indicated that British foreign policy had been shaped in compliance 
with the political existence of Turkey from the day the British statesman Lord Chatham 
(1708-1778) declared that “he considered as a lunatic anyone who denied this 
importance, and refused to speak to him”.589 The other great powers, Russia, France, and 
Holland, who had interests in countries where there were Muslim populations, were 
always hostile to the Ottoman Empire.  
When Napoleon invaded Egypt, Britain attacked the French by destroying their fleet at 
Aboukir. Interestingly enough, Ismail Kemal claimed that the United Kingdom desired to 
maintain the sovereign rights of Turkey on Egypt, especially after the opening of the 
Suez Canal. Kemal also commented on one of the most crucial threats to Ottoman 
sovereignty, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha. To him, Britain only assented to the hereditary 
succession in Mehmed Ali Pasha’s family, providing that Mehmed Ali and his successors 
would remain loyal to the Ottoman sultan.
590
 Then, France occupied Algeria and drove 
Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha into revolt against the Ottoman Sultan by giving him hope of 
occupying the Ottoman throne.
591
 But Britain not only supported the Ottoman Empire 
with weak political assistance on the most important matter which threatened Ottoman 
existence, yet she appointed her representatives, officials and ambassadors for the 
assistance of the Ottomans.
592
 England united Europe against Mehmed Ali Pasha.
593
 
Russia did not want Pasha to gain strength due to her fear; “vivified by the fresh blood 
that would have been infused into it by the Egyptian conqueror”.594 
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Ismail Kemal criticised the occupation of Algeria by France in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881, 
while advocating the annexation of Egypt by England in 1882.
595
 He made a great effort 
to justify the British occupation of Egypt. To him, as a matter of fact, Britain 
concentrated on Egypt and the Straits from the beginning of the eighteenth century, and 
British annexation of one of the most crucial of Ottoman possessions was ‘friendly’ 
interference. The authority of the Ottoman Caliph over Egyptian Muslims remained intact 
after the British occupation.
596
 To him, it was indispensable to ally and be in accord with 
England for the existence of Egypt as a Muslim state, and for the influence of the 
caliphate in this country.
597
 Kemal confessed the real intention of the British annexation 
of Egypt was for the development of trade and to secure her sea-routes. Nevertheless, her 
occupation was a real advantage for the Muslim world as much as the real benefit of 
securing the existence of the Ottoman Empire. Britain brought liberty to Egypt. 
Constitutionalism began in this country with the British occupation. The “moral laws, 
civil rights and individual liberty” as well as freedom of thought and speech, liberty of 
the press were implemented definitely in Egypt.
598
 Egyptian Muslims were still wearing 
the Fez.
599
 On the other hand, France desired to eliminate all authority of the Ottoman 
Sultan in Africa, as well as to demolish the domination exercised by the caliphate over 
the Muslims on the continent.
600
 
Ismail Kemal astonishingly claimed that only France intervened in the Greek War of 
Independence and annihilated the Ottoman fleet in Navarino in 1827.
601
 In fact, the attack 
in Navarino bay was a British-French-Russian collaboration. There was a great role and 
interference of the United Kingdom in the Greek cause. 
According to Kemal, during the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the United Kingdom 
notified France and Austria that she would continue to ally with the Ottomans against 
Russia if a peace treaty were not signed. Thereupon, the Treaty of Paris was signed with 
the great assistance and persistence of Britain. To Kemal, interestingly enough, Napoleon 
Bonaparte proposed to the British cabinet the annexation of Tunis, of Tripoli to 
Piedmont, of Morocco to France, and of Egypt to Britain even before the ink dried upon 
his signature on the agreement. This guaranteed the territorial integrity of Turkey. 
However, Lord Palmerston, the British Prime Minister, wrote a letter to Napoleon stating 
that: 
                                                     
595
 Transval Meselesi, 119; “The Transvaal Question,” 168. 
596
 Transval Meselesi, 128; “The Transvaal Question,” 169. 
597
 Transval Meselesi, 127; “The Transvaal Question,” 169. 
598
 Transval Meselesi, 129; “The Transvaal Question,” 169. 
599
 Transval Meselesi, 130, 131; “The Transvaal Question,” 169. 
600
 Transval Meselesi, 123; “The Transvaal Question,” 168. 
601
 Transval Meselesi, 97; “The Transvaal Question,” 165. 
 91 
...more than one country—Italy, Spain and Sicily—for example, would be 
prosperous if it were united to France, England or Piedmont. What constituted the 
validity of the understanding between France and England was not so much the co-
operation of their fleets as the effect produced by this understanding, which showed 
to the world that it was based upon moral laws, and had for its goal resistance to 
unjust aggressions, the liberation of the oppressed from the hands of their 
oppressors, and the preservation of the political equilibrium of the states. 
Ought we, then, to renew the proceedings employed by others for the partition of 
Poland? And if so, what right could be invoked by France and England for seizing 
the Sultan’s African possessions when they had just defended the integrity of his 
Empire?
602
  
Nevertheless, Ismail Kemal seemed to be blind to the international politics of the states. 
Lord Palmerston, to whom Kemal narrated the words in his pamphlet, had a quote on the 
politics: “Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent 
interests.” This demonstrated Kemal’s lack of comprehension or ignorance of the British 
foreign policy towards Turkey. 
Ismail Kemal also interpreted the lack of de facto assistance from Britain as to British 
public opinion against Turkey, after the Bulgarian revolt of 1876.
603
 This interpretation 
also demonstrated the lack of his comprehension for the switch of British foreign policy 
towards the Ottomans, after the last quarter of the nineteenth century, which was 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
To him, Russia tried to attract the support of Britain by offering her Egypt and Crete. 
However, England did not accept the Russian proposal.
604
 Consequently, Russia decided 
to demolish the Ottoman Empire without the assistance of any power, since Britain 
hindered any Russian-French collaboration as well.
605
 Russia, therefore, attacked the 
Ottoman Empire with diplomatic notes and caused revolts of the Greeks in Crete and the 
Slavs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Britain used all her influence in the Ottoman favour in 
both questions.
606
 
Ismail Kemal asserted that Great Britain already knew that the Ottoman Empire would be 
alone, even after the reforms compelled by the European powers. Britain tried to 
eliminate Russia to gain strength against the Ottoman Empire. British efforts for Turkey 
reached such a point, the European press lampooned the British administration and the 
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British nation, with words such as: “almost became Indian”, “Islamised”, and “preferred 
the cross to the Muslim turban”.607  
According to Kemal, the Ottoman administration thoughtlessly rushed into a fatal war 
despite the English advice not to take part in such a struggle with Russia. This was a big 
political mistake which history never could explain. To Kemal, a possible conflict was 
already prevented by England with the London Protocol in 1877. Even the outcome of 
the Russian-Ottoman war was only an Ottoman fault. Britain made Russia pledge not to 
occupy Constantinople, Egypt, the valley of Euphrates and Basra; Russia would accept 
the offering of Turkey if the Ottomans sued for peace before the crossing of the Balkans 
by the Russian force. Ismail Kemal verbalised the vital assistance of Britain as: “We 
tremble in thinking of what would have happened if England, before and even during the 
hostilities, had not succeeded in rendering impossible the disappearance of Turkey as a 
result of this war.”608 According to Kemal, the Ottoman administration was unsuccessful 
in getting the edge on this situation. England kept Russia out of the Bosporus. The 
Ottomans, however, would always remember with gratitude the British aid to Turkey, 
with her fleet in Constantinople’s waters, its cannons pointed at the Russians; and the 
cancellation of the Agreement of San Stefano which meant the destruction of the 
Empire.
609
  
According to Ismail Kemal, British India was also an example for the liberation and 
civilising process. Apart from material well-being, moral and intellectual development of 
the Indian people was provided as well. Roads were built and big cities were established 
in India. Britain also spread education all across the country.
610
 Under the Liberal 
government in India, Muslims could make religious propaganda, as Ismail Kemal 
alleged. For instance, a Muslim converted two hundred thousand Hindus to Islam. There 
were particular pulpits for the preaching of Islam in the major towns such as Calcutta and 
Bombay. Many Europeans also came to listen to the preachers. Every year from fifty-
thousand to six-hundred-thousand people converted to Islam. Over the last decade, the 
number of the converts exceeded three-million. These convenient conditions for the 
propagation of Islamic faith in India pleased Muslims all over the world.
611
 
Ismail Kemal highlighted that, indeed, France had to be the guardian of liberty and the 
opponent of despotism. Notwithstanding this, the great power of Europe had a great 
desire for the destruction of the caliphate.
612
 Algerian Muslims were deprived of equality 
and liberty. For instance, Algerian people did not enjoy political rights and were excluded 
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from involvement in local government.
613
 The central and municipal administration was 
exclusively restricted to Frenchmen. There was no newspaper published in Arabic, other 
than the government journal, which was devoted to official matters.
614
 The French 
authorities appropriated the lands from Algerians to give them to the French. Ministerial 
officers seized houses and properties. All the mosques, schools, and waqf (charitable 
foundation) revenues were confiscated by the French administration. Kemal also asserted 
that the French administration in Algeria wanted to make Algeria a French territory and a 
Christian country. To him, the French thought that Arabs were in the last stage of 
depravity and Islam was a hindrance to the progress of civilisation. The French did not 
try to attach the Algerian people to the soil, but rather supplanted them by Europeans, as 
Ismail Kemal asserted.
615
 
Ismail Kemal referred to the Dutch administration briefly on the other continents. To 
him, Holland did not take into consideration the progress and development of the people 
in her dominions. Moreover, the Dutch colonial administration held the people, who were 
almost entirely Muslim, under the unbearable yoke of a state monopoly, acquiring the 
products of their labour.
616
 
According to Kemal, it would be idle to explain the Russian threat to people who were 
not Slavic and not followers of their religion.
617
 To him, if Russia moved towards to the 
South with her imperialistic ambitions, it would be inevitable she would invade the 
Muslim people in her way. If, one day, Russia were to occupy India, the Mediterranean, 
the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, it would be the end of the Ottoman Empire, Persia, 
and Afghanistan.
618
 
Ismail Kemal also asserted that the Boers related to the Russians. He highlighted the fact 
that hundreds of conservative Boers attempted to aid Russia in the Crimean War. The 
Boer objective was to rescue the Holy Land and to devastate the Muslims. On the other 
side, England defended Turkey in the war. To the Boers, Muslims were the “enemies of 
their religion”, while the British were “the allies of these same Mussulmans”.619  
Conclusion 
Ismail Kemal Bey of Vlora penned Transval Meselesi when Britain was heavily criticised 
by the European and the Ottoman public. Kemal Bey aimed to give support to England in 
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that critical time. He endeavoured to justify British imperialism in South Africa as well as 
in the other British dominions, such as the most crucial one, India. Ismail Kemal asserted 
that England brought civilisation and progress to the African continent, which the Boers 
wished to obstruct. In this context, it seems that Ismail Kemal tried to ingratiate himself 
with England for his goals, for British interference in Ottoman internal politics and for 
the Albanian cause.  
He tried to justify British imperialism all over the British dominions, within the context 
of the government of the Cape Colony in South Africa. For this reason, he undertook to 
establish a connection between British imperialism and Islamism, since his audience was 
almost entirely Muslim. He tried to persuade the Muslim Ottomans to request the support 
of Britain. Kemal claimed that everyone, particularly Muslims, had to wish Britain 
success in her struggle against the Boers in the Transvaal. The reasons for this support 
were the Liberal Party administration in England and British aid to the Ottoman Empire 
in the political arena, especially against the Russians in the Crimean War. 
According to Ismail Kemal, Muslims under the other European powers were oppressed, 
while Great Britain helped them to arrive at their moral and political potential. In this 
case, he showed his choice of the British imperialism among the other European Great 
Powers, such as France and Russia. He asserted that a British victory would open the way 
to illumination in the East, and meant the Muslim world, while a Boer success would 
cause a darkness on the continent. 
In writing this pamphlet, he presumably aimed to form an alliance between Turkey and 
Great Britain. The Ottoman Empire was alone in the international arena at that time. 
England was one of the biggest contemporary superpowers. Thus, Ismail Kemal Bey 
solicited the support of Britain against the other European Powers in the era of 
colonialism. His other intention in writing this work was probably to get assistance to 
form an independent Albania. As a matter of fact, after a decade, he declared the 
independence of Albania. The Albanians were the only nation in the Balkans without the 
support of a great power. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The main contribution of this thesis is to show the extent of pro-British propaganda 
conducted by the Ottoman intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire, about the South African 
War (Anglo-Boer War) of 1899-1902. It highlights the roles of certain Ottoman 
intellectuals and Ismail Kemal of Vlora. This study makes a contribution to late-Ottoman 
intellectual history, by looking at the standpoint of the Anglophile Ottoman intellectuals 
on the South African War, in light of the study of one of the most eminent Anglophilic 
intellectual, Ismail Kemal. It also contributes to South African history by examining an 
aspect of propaganda in a minor war in South Africa.  
The Ottomans were aware of a struggle in South Africa, despite the distance of the region 
from the Ottoman territories. However, the concern of the pro-British Ottoman 
intellectuals about the South African War was mainly unrelated to the war itself. Instead, 
it resulted from the fact that one of the two fighting forces was British. Besides this, the 
study also reveals the power of the anti-Boer propaganda conducted by the British during 
the South African War.   
Ismail Kemal wanted to establish an alliance with England and therefore, he blindly 
supported all British endeavours, including Britain’s involvement in the South African 
War. He did not fully comprehend Britain’s position towards the Ottoman Empire. He 
either could not understand, or ignored, the changing power structures of the last decades 
of the nineteenth century. Thus Ismail Kemal’s views on the South African War were 
enormously problematic, in addition to being one-sided.  
Presumably, in writing a piece on the Anglo-Boer struggle, Ismail Kemal aspired to make 
an analogy between the Transvaal and the Ottoman Empire. This had become one of the 
most debated questions among Ottoman intellectuals in the last decades of the Empire. 
The Ottoman Empire was the ‘sick man of Europe’ at that time and there were great 
discussions about its destiny. Many Ottoman intellectuals regarded a British mandate, in 
particular, to be a means of salvation. By giving examples from the point of civilisation 
and progress in Transval Meselesi, he probably intended to indicate the plausibility of a 
British mandate. Britain would bring civilisation and freedom while her enemy would 
convey vulgarity instead. According to Ismail Kemal, the British Empire had the highest 
position among the colonial powers. 
Ismail Kemal was also a reformist and liberal intellectual, and wanted to gain support 
from Britain for a constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the minority 
groups, the pro-British Young Turks sought British intervention in Ottoman politics, 
opposing the ‘despotic’ Sultan Abdülhamid II. They saw, in England, the most libertarian 
state in the world. 
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It is likely that another target of Kemal’s seeking of British support was British assistance 
for the independence or autonomy of Albania within the Ottoman Empire. There was a 
real danger of partition of ethnically Albanian territories, among newly-established 
Balkan states. The only ethnic group in the Balkans who could not get support from a 
great European Power, during the nationalist era, was Albania. Ismail Kemal sought 
British aid for the Albanian cause by using his network among English statesmen. 
This study also demonstrates the aggressive image of Russia in the minds of Ottomans. 
The late-Ottoman intelligentsia realised the superior power of Russia and the aspirations 
of this strong state, throughout the nineteenth century, to acquire Ottoman territories. 
Dread of Russia was one of the strongest driving forces behind the inclination of the pro-
British intellectuals and policy-makers, towards the United Kingdom. 
The foreign policy of Great Britain towards Turkey was another key point in the British 
bias of some Ottoman intellectuals. Against the appetite of Russia for the Ottoman 
territories, British policy-makers supported the territorial integrity of Turkey. The 
Crimean War of 1853-1856 also secured the friendship of the Ottomans to Britain. In the 
opinion of the pro-British Ottoman intelligentsia, Turkey was indebted to England.  
It can be understood from this work that the pro-British and the pro-Boer propaganda 
campaigns in other countries, during the South African War, can be studied. This kind of 
research will surely make a great contribution to the knowledge of the foreign 
propaganda created during the South African War. In addition, the viewpoint of the pro-
British Ottoman intelligentsia on British policies at that time could be studied in future 
research. 
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Appendix III. Transvaal Meselesi. Istanbul: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1900. 
(transcription) 
Transvaal Meselesi 
Boerlerle Medeniyet - İngilizlerle İslamiyet 
İngiltere Devleti’nin açmış olduğu Transvaal Muharebesi umum ehli-i şarkı ve ale’l-
husus alem-i İslamiyet’i fevkalade bir surette işgal etmiştir.  
Mutekadat-ı diniyesi, mezahib-i siyasiyesi, menafi-i ticariyesi, müstemlekat-ı vasia ve 
müsta’merat-ı müteaddidesinin vaziyet-i mevkiyesi itibariyle İngiliz milleti Şark 
medeniyetinin [Sayfa 2] iade-i ulviyetine, akvam-ı İslamiye’nin ittihad ve ittisa 
kudretine hadim olmak için min-tarafillah yaratılmış bir kuvve-i muharrike, bir nefha-
i faiza sayılabilir.  
İngiliz milleti papanın ribka-i tahakkümünü koparıp attığı ve engizisyon kanun-ı can-
suzunun mahsulü olan zincir-i esareti kırıp milyonlarca nüfus-ı beşeriyeyi İspanya’nın 
kayd-ı esaretinden kurtardığı günden beri alem-i İslamiyet’e takarrüb etmek, şarkta 
halen ve idareten, hükmen ve kuvveten muvazene-i alemin medar-ı istikrarı 
olabilecek bir heyet-i kaviyenin teşekkülüne devlet-i müstakillenin teessüsüne 
çalışmak mesleğini [Sayfa 3] ihtiyar etmiş ve üç yüz senedir bu meslek dairesinde 
hareketten ayrılmamıştır.  
Selatin-i Osmaniye’nin İstanbul’u payitaht-ı saltanat ve merkez-i hilafet ittihaz ve 
çarh-ı idare-i Osmaniye’yi Avrupa, Asya ve Afrika’nın kıtaat-ı mühimme ve 
mümtazesinden teşekkül eden sehpa üzerine ikad etmekle beraber muvazene-i 
umumiye-i alem öyle bir inkılaba düşürülmüştü ki bütün Avrupa hükümdarını taht ve 
taçlarını tehlikede görmekle muhafaza-ı kavmiyet arzusu ve galeyan-ı taassub 
saikasıyla umum düvel-i garbiye naşir-i İslamiyet nazarıyla baktıkları devlet-i 
Osmaniye aleyhine bir ikinci ehl-i salib [Sayfa 4] kıyamını hazırlamıştı. 
Devr-i istilanın intihası ve devr-i inhitatın ibtidası olan İnebahtı mağlubiyeti gününden 
Navarin hezimet-i bahriyesi gününe kadar olan iki asırlık bir müddet içinde 
İslamiyet’i imha ve devlet-i Osmaniye’yi ilga edecek bir ittifak-ı umuminin husulüne 
iki defa teşebbüs olunmuştur. 
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Birinci defasında selatin-i Osmaniye’nin müzaheret ve sahabeti iktisab sayesinde 
Fransa’nın hayat-ı siyasiyesini temin etmiş ve senelerce emri altında bulundurulan 
Türk kuvve-i bahriyesinin bahşettiği nüfuz [Sayfa 5] ve iktidarın tesiriyle husemasına 
galip gelmiş olan IV. Henry umum akvam-ı mesihiyeden mürekkep bir cumhuriyet-i 
uzma teşkili ve devlet-i Osmaniye’nin vücudunu izale ve anasır-ı İslamiye’yi sürüp 
Asya çöllerine def’e muktedir olacak bir kuvve-i cünudiye-i muhtelitenin tertip ve 
sevkini teklif etmiştir. 
IV. Henry’nin Fransa menafi-i hususiyesiyle telifi kabil olmayan ve adeta küfran-ı 
nimet ıtlakına şayan olan bu tasavvurunun kuvvede kalmasına sebep mahud 
Ravaillac’ın darbe-i desti değil kraliçe Elizabeth’in iştiraktan imtinaı olmuştur.  
[Sayfa 6] İkinci defasında ise Rusya imparatoru I. Aleksandr ittifak-ı mukaddes 
akdetmekle aynı maksadı takip etmişken İngiltere naib kralı George’un vaz’-ı 
imzadan içtinabı bu ittifakın semere-dar olmasına mani olmuştur. 
Şu ahval-i tarihiye ve İngiltere’nin gerek idaresinde ve gerek himaye-i siyasiyesinde 
bulundurduğu yetmiş milyonu mütecaviz nüfus-ı İslamiye’ye karşı ittihaz ettiği 
meslek-i dil-nüvazane ve ibraz eylediği hissiyat-ı hürriyet-perverane dünyanın her 
cihetinde bulunan ehl-i İslam’ı İngiltere’ye daima müteveccih olmaya [Sayfa 7] ve 
İngiltere’nin her hal ve mahalde muvaffakiyetini temenni etmeye mecbur eylemiştir.  
Hele Osmanlılar İngiltere’nin izdiyad-ı kudretine hadim olacak mesailde hiçbir vakit 
bigane kalamazlar, dünyanın hangi cihetinde İngiliz kanı dökülse Osmanlılar derhal 
teheyyüce gelir. 
Vatanımızın aziz toprağını muhafaza, devletimizin mukaddes hukukunu müdafaa 
uğrunda dökülmüş ve Osmanlı şühedasının kanıyla karışmış olan İngiliz kanlarının 
hatıratı gözümüz önüne gelir. O hatıratın tazammun ettiği tahayyülat-ı ümit-bahşa 
tahattur olunur da şanlı mazimize nazar-ı mefharet, ikballi istikbalimize nigah-ı 
[Sayfa 8] emniyet ile bakmak isteriz. 
İngiltere’nin Afrikaca olan tasavvurat-ı medeniyet-cuyane ve teşebbüsat-ı teali-
perveranesine hail olmak isteyen Boer şeraziminin bidayet-i harbde ibraz ettiği şecaat 
ve metanet herkesin hiss-i takdirini tahrik ve İngiltere’nin ihraz etmiş olduğu mevki-i 
iktidarı çekemeyenler, hususiyle tekemmülat-ı milliyelerini onun zevalinden 
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bekleyenler İngiltere’nin zeval ve inhitatına mukaddime olarak Boerlerin 
muvaffakiyatını temenni etmiştir. 
Biz ise bütün insaniyetin şeh-rah-ı irtikasını açmak ve birkaç yüz milyon ebna-yı 
beşeri [Sayfa 9] yed-i idare ve terbiyesine almak gibi şanlı bir mevki-i iktidara misli 
görülmemiş bir kuvvet ve şevkete malik olmuş böyle bir millet-i muazzamanın akıbet 
ve encamının keşfini kitab-ı ilm-i la-yezalin sahaif-i mesturesini küşad eylemek 
kudret ve meziyetini haiz olan zamana talikle meselenin medeniyet ve İslamiyet 
menafiine taalluk eden cihetlerinden bahisle iktifa eyleriz.  
Endülüs Devlet-i İslamiyesi’nin inkırazı Hıristiyanlık alemini istila-yı İslamiyet 
endişesinden masun bırakmış ve akvam-ı garbiyeyi fevkalade bir meserret ve şetaret 
içinde bulundurmuş olduğu bir sırada Fatih Sultan [Sayfa 10] Mehmed merhumun 
medeniyet-i İseviye’nin menba-ı ziya-paşı ve Hıristiyanlık idare-i ruhaniyesinin ikinci 
merkezi olan Konstantiniye’yi fethetmesi bütün Avrupa’yı azim bir dehşete 
düşürmüştü.  
Başlarında papa olduğu halde umum hükümdarın ve rüesa-yı akvam istila-yı 
İslamiyet’e set çekebilmek çaresi araştırmaya kalkıştıkları zaman birçok keşfiyat-ı 
berriye ve bahriye ile iştihar ve müstemlekatını tevsi ile kesb-i iktidar eylemiş olan 
Portekiz kralı II. John dahi İslam’ın def-i mazarratı esbabının istikmali arzusuna 
düşmüş ve bir taraftan [Sayfa 11] sevahil-i Berberiye’de bulunan anasır-ı 
İslamiye’nin imhasına ve diğer taraftan Afrika’nın iç taraflarında ve aktar-ı şarkiyede 
Müslümanlığa dest-zen-i husumet olabilecek bir yar-ı müzaheret-kar taharrisine 
kalkışmıştı. 
Zaten Hindistan’da sıfat-ı ruhaniye ve kuvve-yi cismaniyeyi haiz bir büyük 
hükümdarın vücudu mervi iken Afrika’nın sevahil-i garbiyesini keşfeden Portekiz 
ümera-yı bahriyesinin ve hususiyle Benin hakimi tarafından meb’usan gelen süferanın 
verdiği malumat ve ihbarat bu rivayeti bir kat daha teyit eylemişti.  
Bu malumat ve ihbarata nazaran Benin’ [Sayfa 12] den yirmi aylık mesafede vaki 
olan bir memleket hükümdarının haiz olduğu kuvve-i ruhaniye ve cismaniye 
haysiyetiyle umum Afrika hükümdarının mercii ve sandalî-i hükümete yeni kuud eden 
Afrika hakimlerinin hakk-ı saltanatını tasdik eylediğine alamet olmak üzere taç ve 
asadan maada bir de salib göndermesi delaletiyle kendisinin din-i İsevi’ye mensup 
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olduğu anlaşıldığından bu hükümdarın Kral John’un birçok vakitten beri istediği ve 
kemal-i tehalükle münasebet kesb etmek istediği Prester John yani Papaz Yani’nin 
olacağında şüphe [Sayfa 13] kalmamış ve derhal bir heyet-i keşfiye tertip olunarak 
onun memleketi ve makarr-ı hükümeti keşfolunmak için Bartolomeu Dias namındaki 
amir-i meşhurun idaresi tahtında olarak miladın 1486 senesi Ağustosunda sevk 
olunmuştu. 
İşte Müslümanlığı ref’ u izale etmek çaresini araştırmak maksadıyla sevk olunan bu 
heyet-i keşfiye doğru Benin’e varıp ondan sonra Afrika sevahilini takip ederek ve 
esna-yı seferde envai müşkilat ve muhatarata uğrayarak akıbet Afrika müsellesinin 
re’s-i zaviyesini teşkil eden [Sayfa 14] [b]uruna vasıl olmuştu.  
Heyet-i keşfiye-i deryanın şiddet-i telatumundan yılmış ve karanın manzara-ı dil-
hıraşından ve sükkanının vahşet-i tab’ınden ürkmüş olduğundan ileriye gitmeye 
cesaret etmeyip ve keşfettiği bu nokta-ı mühimmeye Bela Burnu ismini verip avdet 
etmişti. 
Kral John maksadına tamamıyla ermediğinden müteessir olmuş ise de Bela Burnunu 
Ümit Burnu’na tahvil ile bir ikinci heyet-i keşfiye tertip etmişti ki hulul-i eceli 
münasebetiyle halefi tarafından meşhur Vasco De Gama’nın riyaseti tahtında olduğu 
halde sevk [Sayfa 15] olunmuştu.  
Vasco De Gama pek çok müşkilattan sonra Ümit Burnu’na vasıl olmuş ve seyr ü 
sefere devamla birinci defa olarak Natal tesmiye eylediği sevahili de keşfederek 
evvelce Arapların istila ve temdin ettikleri Afrika sevahil-i şarkiyesine uğrayarak ve 
oradan daima Hind’e gidip gelmeye alışmış olan mellahin-i Arab’dan birkaç kılavuz 
alarak nihayet Hind’e vasıl ve bu suretle garp ve şark muvaredat-ı bahriyesiçün bir 
şeh-rah-ı azim küşad eylemek gibi bir muvaffakiyet-i uzmaya nail olmuştu.  
[Sayfa 16] Ümit Burnu’nun ehemmiyet-i mevkiyesi fevkalade olduğu halde tarih-i 
keşfinden bir buçuk asırdan ziyade bir müddet içinde hiç kimse rağbet etmemiştir. 
Ara sıra gelen geçen mellahin vaz’-ı yede kalkışmış ve 1620 senesinde İngilizler Kral 
I. James namına Ümit Burnu’nu işgal etmişler ise de tekrar çekilip ta Hollandalılar 
işgal edinceye kadar orası metruk kalmıştı.  
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Hollanda’nın Hind-i şarki şirketi muamelat-ı ticariyesini ve muvaredat-ı bahriyesini 
temin ve teshil edecek bir merkez-i mübadele ve bir müstamere-i kaviye bulundurmak 
üzere [Sayfa 17] 1652 tarihinde doktor Van Riebeeck namında intihab ettiği bir reis 
ailesi halkı ve yüz kadar asker efrad-ı müstebdelesi ile Ümit Burnu’na izam etmişti.  
Bu şerzime Ümit Burnu’na ayak basmasıyla beraber hemen tahassun edebilmek için 
kuru duvardan bir kalecik ve etrafında şimdiki Cape Town şehrinin bulunduğu 
mahalde birkaç adi baraka inşa ve etrafta bulunan kabail-i zenciyeyi vurup emlak ve 
emvalini gasp ederek ve ele geçirebildikleri efrad-ı kabaili esarete alarak yerleşmeye 
ve ziraat ve felahata mübaşeret eylemişti. Arkalarından Amsterdam [Sayfa 18] yetim 
kızlarından birkaç yüz kız dahi gönderilmiş ve bu müstamere-i nevzadın devam-ı 
tenasülü temin olunduğu gibi birtakım Avrupa serserisi ve Fransa’nın Protestanlar 
hakkında gösterdiği tazyik üzerine terk-i diyara mecbur olan Fransa Protestanlarından 
birkaç yüz aile Ümit Burnu’na gidip Hollandalılara iltihak etmiş ve bu sayede 
müstamerenin nüfusu az müddet zarfında gereği gibi tekessür eylemiş ise de bunlar 
ekser evkatını Afrika’nın insanını ve hayvanını avlamakla geçirdiklerinden ihtiyacat-ı 
ziraiyelerini def etmek için şirket [tara]fından birkaç gemi yükü üsera-yı zenciye sevk 
[Sayfa 19] ve Hollanda hükümeti canibinden de Sund cezayir-i cesimesi ahali-i 
müslimesinin mütehayyizanından birkaç bin aile nefy ve ta’rib suretiyle Ümit 
Burnu’na izam olunmuş ve bu şirzimeye hizmetkarlık ve kulluk etmek vazifesiyle 
mükellef tutulmuş idi. 
Kabail-i zenciye için cellad-ı kaza ve o ahvali için seyl-i bela ıtlakına müstehak 
olacak derecede sefk-i dimaya ve tahrib-i memalike münhemik olan bu Boer güruhu 
zaten kurun-ı vustanın mahsulü olan taassubat-ı diniye ve münakaşat ve müsademat-ı 
hun-rizanenin hatıratından başka bir ulviyet-i fikre [Sayfa 20] ve bir meziyet ya hüsn-
i sirete malik değil iken vatan-ı aslilerinden mahrumiyet-i ebediyenin tesiratı ve vatan 
olarak ihtiyar ettikleri memleketin garabet-i ahvali ve sükkanının vahşet-i evzaı 
huşunet-i tab’larını bir kat daha tezyid etmiş ve tenvir-i vicdan için okuyabildikleri 
kütüb-i mukaddesenin kendilerine mahsus ayet ve hususiyle kısas-ı Benî Yuşa’ı 
bedreka-i hareket addetmiş olduklarından yerli, yabancı, Malay, zenci, dinsiz, ya 
kendi din ve mezheplerinden gayrı din ve mezhebe tabi ne kadar insan varsa 
cümlesinin kanı heder ve malını helal bilerek münferiden, ya müçtemian her [Sayfa 
21] nerede bir zi-ruha tesadüf etseler tiğ-i hunharlarından geçirmeyi ve mezbuh-ı 
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hançer-i bi-emanı olan bi-karca mader ve pederin aguş-ı hun-aludundan düşüp kalan 
sıbyanı pençe-i esarete alıp hayvan gibi kullanmayı rıza-yı Bari’ye muvafık bir amel 
addederek tefahür ederlerdi.  
Şu huşunet ve vahşetin hüküm-ferma olduğu bir buçuk asırlık müddet içinde Ümit 
Burnu müstemlekesini teşkil eden kıta-ı cesimenin havi olduğu on kadar kavim ve 
kabile ve onların cami’ olduğu bir milyon kadar nüfus-ı beşeriye külliyen mahv ve na-
bedid olmuştu.  
[Sayfa 22] Hele biçare Malay Müslüman mütehayyızanı vaktiyle her biri birkaç 
hizmetkar kullanmaya ve envai naz u niamla ömür geçirmeye alışmış iken böyle 
birtakım hun-rizanın esiri olmak bahtsızlığına uğramasıyla birtakımı şiddet-i teessürle 
ölüp gitmiş ve kalanları lisanlarını, adat-ı kavmiyelerini ve hatta faraiz-i diniyelerini 
kaybederek yalnız Müslüman ismini taşımakla asıllarını ve dinlerinin hatıratını 
muhafaza edebilmişler.  
İşte Afrika-yı cenubinin Boer denilen mahlukun cevelangahı olan cihatı umumi bir 
makbere ve yeryüzünde berzahtan numune olacak bir harabe haline girmiş iken 
[Sayfa 23] İngiltere idaresine geçmiş ve o tarihten itibaren Afrika kıtasının ahval-i 
medeniyesi ve hatta dünyanın muamelat-ı siyasiyesi bir devre-i teceddüd ve 
tekemmüle girmiştir.  
İngiltere Hint müstemlekat-ı cesimesinin muvaredat-ı bahriyesini Bahr-i Muhit’le 
Bahr-i Hindi’de bulundurduğu kuva-yı bahriyesinin muvasalet ve irtibatını temin 
edebilmek için Ümit Burnu’nu işgal etmek ihtiyacını çoktan hissetmiş ve hatta 1780 
tarihinde bir donanma dahi sevk eylemiş ise de Fransa donanmasının harben vaki olan 
mümanaatı ve Fransa askerinin Ümit Burnu’ndaki Hollandalılara [Sayfa 24] iltihak ve 
muaveneti cihetiyle yerleşmeye muvaffak olamamıştı. Fakat Fransa’nın daima ateş 
muhabbeti seriü’l-iştial olduğu gibi seriü’l-intifada olduğundan aradan az bir müddet 
geçer geçmez düne kadar müstemlekatını muhafaza için İngiltere’ye karşı harbe 
kalkışan Fransa Hollanda’yı kamilen yed-i zabtına geçirmiş olduğundan İngiltere bu 
halden ve Ümit Burnu’nun iç taraflarında bulunan Boerlerin isyanından bi’l-istifade 
1790 senesinde bir donanma gönderip Ümit Burnu’nu işgal eylemiştir. Amiens 
Muahedesi İngiltere’ye Ümit Burnu’nu Batavya hükümetine [Sayfa 25] radde-i 
mecbur kılmış ise de onun hükmü pek az sürdüğünden Viyana Muahede-i umumiyesi 
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İngiltere’nin hakk-ı temellükünü tasdik eylediğinden Ümit Burnu o tarihten beri 
İngiltere müstemlekesi olmuştur.  
İngiltere idaresi yerleşir yerleşmez Boerlerin muamelat-ı gaddaresine ve tahribat-ı 
mütevaliyesine nihayet verilmek tabii idi. İbtida hayvan gibi hıdemat-ı şakkada 
istihdam olunan ve her türlü hukuk-ı insaniyeden mahrum tutulan Malay 
Müslümanlarına ve yerli zenci userasına hürriyet-i şahsiyeyi mümkün mertebe temin 
edecek bazı müsaadat gösterilmeye [Sayfa 26] başlamıştı. Boerler kesret-i nüfuslarına 
güvenerek İngiltere idaresinin ıslahat ve teklifatını nazar-ı istihfafla telakki etmek 
is[te]miş ise de bir taraftan İngiltere muhacirîninin külliyetle gelip yerleşmesi diğer 
taraftan cibal-i mürtefiaya kaçıp canlarını Boerlerin tiğ-ı hunharından kurtarabilen 
efrad-ı zenciyenin İngiltere idaresinin adaletine emniyet ederek akın akın gelip iltica 
eylemesi ve Malay Müslümanlarının da mazhar oldukları adalet ve siyanetten bi’l-
istifade ulviyet-i fıtriyelerini takınıp adeta İngilizlerin kuvvetü’z-zahrı hükmüne 
girmesi Boerlerin hareket-i serkeşane [Sayfa 27] lerini tadile ve daire-i inkıyada 
girmeye mecbur kılmıştı. 
Boerler zaten İngiliz idare-i adilesinin yerleşmesinden ve adamlık yoluna girmek 
mecburiyetine düşmesinden münfail olup dururken İngiltere parlamentosunun yirmi 
milyon İngiliz liralık bir fidye-i azimenin tahsisiyle yedi yüz elli bin nüfusa baliğ olan 
userayı umumen ve defaten itak etmek gibi tarih-i ümemde misli görülmemiş bir eser-
i civanmerdi teşkil eden ve dünya durdukça insaniyetin nazar-ı takdir ve takdisine 
mazhar olacak olan bir kararı kabul ve ilan etmesi mal-i menkul bildikleri [Sayfa 28] 
insanları esir olarak kullanmaktan mahrum olduklarını anladıklarından ve düne kadar 
köleleri olarak kullandıkları adamlarla hal-i müsavatta yaşamayı havsalalarına 
sığdıramadıklarından artık başlarını alıp Afrika’nın içerilerinde hallerine münasip 
başka bir cevelangah aramak sevdasına düşmüş ve içlerinden kavanin-i medeniyet 
tahtında yaşamaya katlanmış olanlar müstesna olarak kısm-ı küllisi çoluk çocuklarını 
ve hayvanlarını alıp Ümit Burnu’nun cihet-i şimaliyesindeki memalike doğru revan 
olmuşlardı.  
İki asra yakın müddet içinde ikamet [Sayfa 29] edip vatanı ittihaz ettikleri bu diyarı 
mücerret daire-i medeniyete girmemek ve kavanin-i adalet ve insaniyeti kabul 
etmemek için terk eden Boerler birkaç sene evvel kuraklık münasebetiyle hayvanları 
yaydırmak için mevakiini bildikleri Orange Nehri’nin öte cihetlerine geçmiş ve Peter 
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Retief’i reis tanıyarak göçebe halinde yerleşmeye ve Kaffir kabailinin taarruzundan 
masun olmak için onların bulundukları taraflara yanaşmamaya karar vermişti. İngiliz 
memurları arkalarını takiple her nerede bulunacak olsalar daire-i tabiyetten 
çıkamayacaklarını bildirdiklerinden [Sayfa 30] bir kısmı inkıyad etmiş diğer kısmı 
orasını da bırakıp şimale doğru gitmişti. Drakensberg silsile-i cibalinin tepelerine 
doğru gidenler Zulu kabilesi hakimi Dingan ile uyuşarak dağın öte yüzüne geçip 
yerleşmiş ise de Dingan bunların külliyet üzere yerleşmelerinden tevehhüm ederek 
arazi tahdid ve tahsis etmek bahanesiyle bir mahale davet ederek üzerlerine hücum 
etmiş ve ekserisini itlaf eylemiş olduğu halde bakiye-i süyufu tahassun ederek 
yerleşmiş ve yavaş yavaş kesb-i kuvvetle Dingan’ı mevki-i iktidardan düşürüp 
kardeşini [Sayfa 31] hakimiyete geçirdikten sonra Natal idare-i müstakillesini teşkil 
etmişlerdi. İngiltere ise Boerlerin sahil-i bahrda müstakil idare tesisine cevaz 
göstermediğinden daire-i itaate davet eylemiş ve vuku bulan mukavemet üzerine 
kuvve-i cebriye istimaliyle bir kısmı idare-i mutavaata aldırmıştı. 
İngilizlerin siyah adamları beyazlarla müsavi tutmak ve zencileri insaniyet, 
medeniyet, diyanet şerefiyle tezyin etmek kabahatini affedemeyen ve İngiliz yüzü 
görmemek için başlarını alıp Afrika’nın dağlarına kaçan Boerlerin en haşin, en anud 
[Sayfa 32] takımı Hendrik Potgieter’i reis ve kumandan tanıyarak Vaal Nehri’nin 
cihet-i şimaliyesinde vaki Kachan ‘ya’ Magalisberg[*] denilen dağ eteklerine kadar 
yayılmışlardı. Bu havali ise evvelce Matabele hakimi Mzilikazi’nin yed-i zabtına 
geçip Boerlerin duhul ve ikametini iki taraf ahalisi beyninde envai münazaat ve 
ihtilafat tevlid etmişti ki akıbet Mzilikazi hun-rizane olan bir muharebede mağlup ve 
münhezim olub Limpopo Nehri’nin şimal cihetine firar [Sayfa 33] eylemişti. Artık bu 
muharebe ve muzafferiyetten sonra Boerler o havalinin sahibi ve Matabelelilerin cevr 
ve ezasından yılmış olan kabail-i kadime ahalisinin hüsn-i kabulüne mazhar olmuş ise 
de kendilerine diş gösterebilecek bir kavim ve kabilenin kalmadığını görünce huşunet-
i fıtriyelerinin muktezası olan mezalim ve taadiyatı ikaa kıyam ve kabail-i kadime 
halkının mal ve emlakını zabt ve gasb ve çoluk çocuklarını zorla ellerinden alıp köle 
gibi istihdam etmekle Matabelelilere rahmet okutturmuştu. 
                                                     
[*]
 Transvaal Cumhuriyeti’nin makarr-ı hükümeti olan Pretoria şehrinin vaki olduğu ovaya hakim 
cebeldir. 
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Boerler Afrika kıtasını min-tarafi’r- [Sayfa 34] Rahman kendilerine bahş ve ihsan 
edilmiş bir malikane ve Afrika halkını kulluk ile kendilerine hizmet etmek için halk 
edilmiş bir mahluk nazarıyla baktıklarından bunların temeddün ve tedeyyününü 
iltizam eden İngiliz ve sair memalik-i mütemeddine tüccar ve misyonerlerine daima 
adavet ederler kendi idareleri tahtında veya nüfuz ve iktidarlarının cari olduğu 
mahallerde ticaret ve medeniyet ve diyanetin tevsi ve intişarına mani olmayı adeta bir 
vazife-i diniye bilirlerdi. Hatta meşhur Livingstone Bakwena kavminin reisi 
Sechele’nin karargahı olan Kolobeng kasabasında müddet-i medide kalıp bir mektep 
küşad etmiş [Sayfa 35] ve yetiştirdiği muallimleri civar kabaile göndermekle Afrika 
zencilerini nur-ı medeniyetle tenvir eylemiş olduğu halde yalnız Boerlerin taht-ı idare 
ve nüfuzunda bulunan kabail-i zenciye bundan mahrum kalmışidi. Livingstone birkaç 
kere Hendrick Potgieter’in nezdine kadar gitmiş ve kabailin muallim kabulü 
hakkındaki mevaniin ref’ini niyaz ve talep eylemiş ise de Hendrick Potgieter 
temenniyat ve metalibini red ve kabail halkının öğreneceği bir şey varsa o da 
zencilerin beyazlarla müsavi olmamak için yaradılmış olduğunu bilmek lazım 
geleceği cevabını vermiş ve bu suretle Livingstone’u [Sayfa 36] meyusen avdette 
mecbur kılmıştı.  
Vaal ile Limpopo Nehirleri arasında yerleşen Boerler kemal-i şiddet ve gılzetle icra-yı 
mezalim ettiği sırada İngiltere hükümeti Orange cihetinde bulunan Boerlere tabiyet-i 
kayd ve vazifesini kuvve-i cebriye ile tanıttırmış ve İngiltere tabiyetini kabul 
etmeyenler Pretorius’un riyaseti tahtında Transvaal’e geçip orada bulunan 
hemcinslerine iltihak etmiş ve Pretorius’un riyaseti tahtında bir irade-i mahsusa tesis 
etmişlerdi.  
İngiltere, Afrika’da hüküm-ferma olan zulmet-i zulm ve bedeviyetin ref’i ve 
izalesiçün [Sayfa 37] yegane çare esaretin ilgasını ve ticaretin tevessüünü bildiğinden 
Boerlerin mevcudiyet-i ictimaiye, itikadat-ı diniye ve şerait-i intiaşiyesi ise bu iki 
nokta-i mühimmeden ibaret olan maksad-ı insaniyetin husulüne min-külli’l-vücuh 
mani olduğundan bu halde Boer şeraziminin vücudunu kaldırmak ya ahval-i ictimaiye 
ve usul-i idarelerini tadil ve ıslah etmek şıkkından birinin ihtiyarı İngiltere için zaruri 
idi. Fakat o aralık Kırım Muharebesi’ni intaç eden ve muvazene-i alemi sarsan gavail-
i şarkiye, İngiltere’yi fevkalade işgal ettiğinden Ümit Burnu müstemlekatının tevsi ve 
mesari [Sayfa 38] finin teksiri yüzünden birtakım müşkilat hudusüne ihtimal 
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kalmamak için şıkk-ı saninin tercihi ve Vaal Nehri’nin İngiltere müstemlekatının 
münteha-yı hudud-ı şimaliyesi itibariyle onun cihet-i şimaliyesinde bulunacak 
İngiltere tebeasının muhtariyet-i siyasiyeye ve istiklal-i idareye mazhariyeti esasları 
Londra kabinesince kararlaşmış ve 1852 senesinde Ümit Burnu Valisi ile Pretorius’un 
murahhası beyninde bir mukavelename akd ve teati olunarak Transvaal bir 
cumhuriyet-i müstakille olarak tanılmıştı. Bu sıralarda Kırım Muharebesi kesb-i 
ehemmiyet ederek İngiltere Orange kıtasınca da bir gune [Sayfa 39] gaileye mahal 
bırakmamasını münasip gördüğünden esaretin memnuiyet-i katiyesini kabul etmek 
şartıyla istiklalini ve muhtariyet-i siyasiyesini tasdik eylemişti. 
Boerler fima-ba’d İngiltere tüccarının serbesti-i ticaret ve seyahatine mani olmamak 
ve esaret fi’l-i mezmumunu irtikab etmemek şartıyla istiklal ve muhtariyet-i idareyi 
kazanmış oldukları halde taahhüdat-ı vakıalarını icrasız bırakmışlar mukavelenamenin 
esasları müzakere olunur iken Pretorius murahhası İngiliz misyonerleri hakkında ne 
yolda muamele edileceğini Ümit Burnu Valisinden sual [Sayfa 40] eylediğinde Sir 
George Cathcart “Misyonerlere ne isterseniz yapabilirsiniz” cevabını latife olmak 
üzere vermişti. Boerler bu latifeyi ciddiyete haml ve Bakwena kabailinin esliha ve 
barut ithal ve tedarikinden memnu tutulmaları hakkındaki müsaadeyi bu kabail halkını 
tamamiyle ezmekteki hak ve salahiyetlerine delil addederek mukavelenamenin tarih-i 
akdinden daha birkaç ay geçmemiş iken reis Pretorius dört yüz efrad-ı müsellahadan 
mürekkep bir çete tertip ve Livingstone’un karargahı olan Kolobeng’e sevk ile büyut 
ve emakini ve hatta Livingstone’nun mektebini tamamiyle tahrip [Sayfa 41] ettirmiş 
ve birkaç saat devam eden kanlı bir muharebeden sonra kaçamayan birkaç yüz zükur 
ve inas çocuklarla kadınları kayd-ı rıkkıyete aldırmıştı.  
Livingstone Boerlerin bu faciayı ikaından sonra Caruna’dan avdetinde vahşilerin bile 
kıymadıkları kütüb ve resailini parça parça ve mektep ve hanesini ve kasaba ve 
ebniyesini hak ile yeksan ve kendi mektebinin müdavimi olup Boerlerin kabza-i 
esaretine geçmiş olan iki yüz kadar zükur ve inas sıbyanın kurtulabilen ebeveynini 
meyus ve nalan bulmuş olduğundan bu ahval-i faciayı ve hele reis-i kabile Sechele’ 
[Sayfa 42] nin oğlu olup reis-i cumhur Pretorius’un yed-i esaretinden müşkilatla 
kurtarılan bir sabinin iki böğürünün ateşte yanmış olduğu halde iade olunduğunu 
rikkat-engiz bir lisan ile tasvir ve tahkiye etmiştir.  
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Boerler öteden berü takip ettikleri amal-i istila-cuyaneye nail ve İngiltere’nin 
müdahalat ve takibatından vareste olunca fart-ı istikbarla bila-perva her tarafa 
salmağa başlamış ve Afrika’da ribka-i esaretlerinde yaşamayacak ne kadar mahluk 
var ise cümlesinin vücudunu izaleye güya Halık-ı bi-çun tarafından memur imiş gibi 
harekat-ı vahşiyane ve takibat-ı hun-feşaneye [Sayfa 43] inhimakla zencilere insanlık 
hak ve şerefini ve vesait-i müdafaayı ihraz ettiren misyonerlerin müesseselerini bir bir 
tahrip ve kendilerini ve aktar-ı şimaliye ile icra-yı ticaret ve kesb-i münasebet etmek 
isteyen İngilizleri tard ve teb’id etmişti. 
İşte tekebbür ve taassubun hüküm-ferma olduğu bir zamanda Kırım Muharebesi zuhur 
ettiğinden Boerler Rusya’nın mücerret Kudüs’ü ve Arz-ı Filistin’de vaki makamat-ı 
mübareke ve emakin-i mukaddeseyi İslam’ın yed-i istilasından tahlis maksadıyle bu 
muharebeyi açmış olduğuna zahip olarak Moskov ordularına imdad [Sayfa 44] ve 
adüvv-i din bildikleri Müslümanları ve kendi hasm-ı canları ve adüvv-i dinlerinin 
yardımcıları bildikleri İngilizleri mahv edecek muarekat ve muharebata iştirak etmek 
şan u şerefini kazanmak emeliyle birkaç yüz dindar Boerden mürekkep bir müfreze 
tertip ve Arz-ı Filistin’e sevk eylemişti. Bu kafile şimale doğru revan olup birkaç 
günlük yoldan sonra bir büyük nehrin menbaına tesadüf etmiş ve Nil’in menbaı 
zannıyla bu nehre Nil ismini vermişti.  
Kavm-i Beni İsrail şan ve tavrını takınan Boerlerin Davud’u sayılan Pretorius’un 
irtihali makam-ı riyaseti münhal bırakmış [Sayfa 45] ve yerine müteveffanın oğlu II. 
Pretorius ara-yı umumiye ile intihab olunmuştu. Bunun kuvve-i fikriyesi ve idare-i 
memleketçe olan iktidarı pek mahdud olup asar-ı memduhiyet gösterememiş ise de 
şeref-i nisbi sayesinde Transvaalce olan mevkiini tahkim ettiğinden başka bir müddet 
için Orange Cumhuriyeti’nin riyasetini dahi ihraz eylemişti. 1868 senesinde iki 
cumhuriyetin ittisalinde vaki olan Griqualand elmas madeninin keşfi iki cumhuriyeti 
bu memleketin hakk-ı istimlakini davaya sevk eylemişti. Halbuki bu memleket 
vaktiyle Boerlerin izdivaç [Sayfa 46] ettikleri kabail-i nisasından hasıl olan evlad ve 
ahfaddan ibaret ve Griqua namıyla meşhur olan kavmin taht-ı zabt ve idaresinde 
bulunuyordu. Griquaların o tarihte reisi bulunan Waterboer iki tarafın davasını 
reddeylemiş ise de ibtida Orange cumhuru reisi Brand ve akabinde Pretorius elmas 
madeninin çıktığı mahalli zabt ve idare etmek üzere ayrı ayrı birer vali tayin ve izam 
eylemişti. Fakat bu iki cumhurun dava-yı tasarruftan dolayı olan münakaşatı lafzi ve 
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valilerin hükmü gayr-ı mer’i iken kısm-ı azamı İngiliz olmak üzere içtima [Sayfa 47] 
ve maden imalatına germî-i tam ile mübaşeret eden madenciler oralarını imar etmiş ve 
Ümit Burnu valisi o kıtanın İngiltere tabiyetinde bulunan Griqualara aidiyeti cihetiyle 
İngiltere müstemlekesi olduğunu ilan ve bizzat mahaline azimet ederek ahali-i 
mahalliyenin ve madencilerin hüsn-i kabulüne mazhar olmuştu. 
Orange reisi Brand’ın Londra’ya gidip sulhen işi bitirmesi ve meblağ-ı mühim alması 
Boerlerin Pretorius aleyhinde kıyamına ve Hollanda erbab-ı ilm ve kemalinden 
François Burghers’in intihabına sebep olmuştu.  
François Burghers Boerlerin nimet-i [Sayfa 48] medeniyetten mütenaim olmalarını 
temin edecek vesait-i islahiyeyi istihsal eylemek yolunda çalışmış ve Transvaal’den 
Delagoa Bay’e kadar bir demir yolu inşasıçün Portekiz hükümeti ile akd-i mukavele 
etmek üzere Avrupa’ya seyahat ederek bu makasıdın husulüne ve sermaye tedarikine 
muvaffak olup avdet eylemiş ise de bir taraftan şimdiki reis Kruger’in aleyhinde envai 
mefasid ilka etmesi ve diğer taraftan kabail hükümdar-ı kadimi olan Sekhukhune’nin 
eski bir davayı tecdid eylemesi bu muvaffakiyet ve muzafferiyetin iktitaf-ı semeratına 
meydan bırakmamıştı. [Sayfa 49] Sekhukhune ile açılan muharebe Boerlerin 
inhizamını mucip olup Transvaal’in bekası tehlikeye girmiş oluğundan İngiltere hem 
Transvaal’i kurtarmak ve hem de kabail-i kadimenin Avrupa medeniyetine mani 
olabilecek derecede yüz bulmasına mahal kalmamak için müdahaleye karar vermiş ve 
Sir Theophilus Shepstone’u memuriyet-i mahsusa ile Transvaal’e izam eylemişti. 
Mösyö Shepstone otuz süvari ile Pratorya’ya muvasaletinde merkezde ve kasabat-ı 
mütecavirede bulunan Boerlerin ve ale’l-husus Kruger’in gösterdikleri meyil ve 
muvafakat üzerine İngiltere idaresini tesis [Sayfa 50] ve İngiliz sancağını rekz 
eylemişti.  
İngiltere’nin şu suretle müdahalesi Boerleri büyük bir felaketten kurtarmış ise de 
istiklal idarelerini ref’ u izale ettiğinden yavaş yavaş asar-ı na-hoşnudî nümayan 
olmağa başlayıp akıbet 1880 tarihinde yani Mösyö Theophilus Shepstone’un 
Transvaal’i İngiltere idaresi tahtına aldırdığı tarihten üç sene sonra Boerler açıktan 
açığa isyan etmişti. 
İngiltere bu kıyamı teskine Natal Valisi Sir George Colley’i memur edip mevcut olan 
kuvve-i askeriyesiyle Transvaal [Sayfa 51] üzerine yürümüş ise de Natal ile 
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Transvaal beynindeki hudud-ı tabiiyeyi teşkil eden Drakensberg silsile-i cibalinin en 
mühim geçidi olan Laing’s Nek mevkiinde İngiliz müfrezesi dehşetli surette 
münhezim olduğu halde Sir George Colley mütenebbih olmayıp imdadına yetişen 
diğer kuvve-i askeriyesinin iltihakıyla beraber tekrar Transvaal’e geçmeğe kalkışmış 
ve Majuba tepesinde külli inhizama uğrayarak ihtiyatsızlık hatasını kanıyla ödemişti. 
Bu hezimet İngiltere’ye tesir ederek ikmal-i namusu için ahz-ı intikam esbab-ı 
kaviyesini tedarikle İngiliz kumandanları [Sayfa 52] hemen hücuma mütehalik 
olduğu halde itidal fikri meşhur olan Mösyö Gladstone serkarda bulunup İngiltere gibi 
bir devlet-i muazzama için iltizam-ı itidali kuvve-i cebriye ile hasıl olacak 
muzafferiyete müreccah tutarak derhal akd-i musalaha ile Transvaal’in iade-i istiklali 
emrini verdi.  
1881 tarihinde akdolunan muahede Transvaal’in istiklal-i idare-i dahiliyesini temin 
eylemiş ise de İngiltere’nin metbuiyetini ve dahili bazı mesailde hakk-ı müdahalesini 
tazammun ettiğinden Boerler tamamiyle memnun kalmamış ve makam-ı riyasete 
getirilmiş olan Kruger baş [Sayfa 53] kumandan ve maarif müdürü birlikte olduğu 
halde Londra’ya gitmiş ve 1884 tarihinde tadilen bir ikinci muahede tanzim ve teati 
olunarak idare-i dahiliyesince Transvaal tamamiyle müstakil tanılmış ve fakat Orange 
Cumhuriyeti’nden başka düvel-i ecnebiye ve kabail-i mahalliye rüesasıyla 
akdolunacak muahedat ve mukavelatın ahkâmı mer’i olabilmek için İngiltere 
kraliçesinin evvelce o muahedatı tasdik eylemesi lazım geleceği kaydı muahedenin 
dördüncü maddesinde derc edilmişti. 
İşte Transvaal’in mevki-i siyasisiyle hukuk-ı umumiyesini ve şekl-i idaresini tayin 
[Sayfa 54] eden şu son muahededir ki tefsir ve tatbik-i ahkamı muharebenin zuhuruna 
badi olan ihtilafı tevlid eylemiştir. 
İhtilaf-ı hazırın esbab-ı zuhurunu tarife girişmezden evvel Boerlerin ahval-i hususiye 
ve son defaki istiklal-i idarelerinden beri tesis ettikleri idare hakkında bazı malumat 
itasını münasip görürüz.  
Boerler huşunet-i tab’larının saikasıyla medeniyetten kaçıp yayıldıkları mahalde sırf 
çiftçiliğe ve daha doğrusu çobanlığa yakışan tarik-i intiaşı tutmuşlar. Her aile reisi, 
ailesini ve üsera ve huddamdan mürekkep [Sayfa 55] olan dairesini barındırmak ve 
hayvan sürüsünü yaydırmak için en aşağı üç bin morgen yani otuz bin dönümden 
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ibaret ve plats tabir olunan mezraa değil bir koca kıtayı taht-ı tasarrufuna alıp onun 
vasatında ve hakim bir noktasında bir ikametgah ya daha doğrusu bir tahassungah 
bina ederek yerleşmeğe mecburdur. Bu suretle ikamet ve muaşeret nimet-i 
medeniyetin takdirine mani olan uzlet ve infiradın devamına ve terbiye ve maarifin 
adem-i intişarına kafidir. Bunun için daha yakın vakte kadar Boerlerin çoğu hayvanat-
ı vahşiye derilerini iktisa ve ekserisi [Sayfa 56] resimli İncil ve Tevrat’ın sahayifine 
ve üzerinde menkuş olan tesavir-i tarihiyeye göz gezdirmekle icra-i ibadet ederlerdi. 
Kasaba denilen içtimagahları büyük köy halinde iken içinde bulunan Boerlerin hiç 
birisi esnaflığa ve sınaatkarlığa rağbet etmez Orange taraflarında ve Transvaal’in 
Orange’a karib cihetlerinde kabail halkının müçtemian ikametine müsaade 
gösterirlerse de başka taraflarda zenciler muhtelif kabail halkından mürekkep 
olmadıkça müçtemian ikametlerine müsaade etmezler ve bu halde de birkaç senede 
bir mesken ve mevalarını tebdile mecbur tutarlar. Zenciler nerede olur ise [Sayfa 57] 
olsun araziye mutasarrıf olamaz ve silah taşımak hakkını ve sair hukuk-ı medeniyyeyi 
ihraz hatta Boerler ile bir çatı altında değil bir mahalle içinde bile ikamet ve beytutet 
edemezler. Madencilik memleketin en nemadar sıfatı iken zenciler kendi hesaplarına 
maden işletemezler ve amele olarak bir madende işleyecek olurlar ise ücretlerini altın 
olarak ahz edemezler. Ve üzerlerinde altın taşıyamazlar. Taşırlarsa darb ve hapis ile 
mücazat olunurlar. Çinliler, Hintliler, Müslümanlar da hakk-ı ihtilattan mahrum ve 
Transvaal’de ikamet ve icra-yı sanat edebilmek için yirmi [Sayfa 58] beş İngiliz lirası 
mukabilinde bir ruhsat-ı mahsusa almağa mecburdur. 
Gelelim idare-i hükümete: Şekl-i idare cumhuriyettir. Doğrudan doğruya efrad-ı ahali 
tarafından beş sene müddet için intihab olunur bir reis re’s-i idarede bulunur. Her bir 
yerin yirmi dokuz azadan merekkep ve birinci ve ikinci Volksraad namıyla müsemma 
iki meclis-i umumi heyet-i kanuniyesini ve kuvve-i umumiye kumandanı olup reis 
muavini ünvanını taşıyan ve bir nazır ve üç azadan mürekkep olan heyet, heyet-i 
idaresini teşkil ider. Cumhur reisi birinci [Sayfa 59] ve ikinci meclis-i umumi azası ve 
cumhuriyetin büyük küçük memuru olabilmek için aslen ve neslen Burgher yani Ümit 
Burnu’ndan hicret etmiş ve hiç olmazsa 1876 tarihinden evvel Transvaal’de yerleşmiş 
ve Protestan mezhebine mensup bulunmuş olmak iktiza eder. Vaktiyle beyaz olup 
Transvaal’e gelenler için tabiyet hakkını kazanmak kolay iken muahharan madenlerin 
terakki-i imalatı cihetiyle külliyetle gelip yerleşen Avrupalıların ve ale’l-husus 
İngilizlerin bu hakk-ı tabiyetten istifadesini men için ağır şerait vaz’ olunmuştur. İki 
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sene ikametten sonra sıfat-ı tabiyeti [Sayfa 60] kazananlar birinci derecede olan tebea 
sınıfını teşkil eder ki bunlar yanlız ehemmiyetten ari olan ikinci meclis-i umumi 
azasını intihab etmek ve dört sene ikametten sonra sıfat-ı tabiyetini kazananlar ikinci 
meclis-i umumi azalığına intihab olunmak hakkını haizdir. 1890 tarihli kanun 
hükmünce on iki, 1894 tarihli kanun hükümünce on dört ve Kruger ile Ümit Burnu 
Valisi Sir Alfred Milner’ın Orange merkez-i idaresindeki mükalemeden sonra Kruger 
tarafından teklif ve Volksraad tarafından kabul olunan iki kanun hükmünce yedi sene 
ikametten sonra tabiyeti kazananlar [Sayfa 61] üçüncü derecede olan sınıf-ı tebeayı 
teşkil eder ki bunlar kaffe-i hukuk-ı medeniye ve siyasiyeyi haizdir. 
Cumhuriyet denilip on dokuz seneden beri bi’l-istiklal icra-i riyaset eden Kruger’in 
rey-i müstakilline tabi olan Transvaal Cumhuriyeti hakk-ı insaniyeti beyaz levnde 
bulunan insanlara, hukuk-ı medeniyeyi Boerlerin mezhebinde bulunanlara ve hukuk-ı 
siyasiyeyi aslen ve neslen Boer olanlara hasreylemiştir. Dünyanın her tarafından 
kaldırılmasına çalışmakta olan şu ihtilaf-ı cinsi ve mezhep kuyud ve hududunun ref’ 
ve tadilini [Sayfa 62] Afrika-yı Cenubice en ziyade alakadar olan İngiltere’nin talep 
eylemesi muharebeye kadar vardırmıştır.  
Transvaal ve Orange Cumhuriyetlerinin havza-i mülkiyelerini teşkil eden memalik-i 
vasia ve münbite ahalisi olup hayvanat-ı ehliye yetiştirmek ve ziraat eylemek ile 
meluf olan Boerler icra-yı sanat ve felahate münhasır bir halde kalmış olsa idi. Çünkü 
İngiltere Transvaal’in cihet-i şimal-i şarkiyesinde bulunan ve el-an Portekiz’in yed-i 
istimlakinde kalmış olan memalikten başka etraf-ı erbaasını taht-ı tasarrufuna 
geçirmiş ve dairen- [Sayfa 63] madar mamureleri ve demir yolları ile kuşatmış 
olduğundan Boerlerin gerek Afrikaca ve gerek Avrupaca haiz-i ehemmiyet İngiltere 
müstemlekatınca mücib-i vehamet olacak bir hal ve hareketi mutasavver ve muahede-
i mebhusetün-anhanın mutazammın olduğu hakk-ı hakimiyet ve vazife-i mahkumiyet 
istimal ve ifasından dolayı akıdeyn beyninde bir gune ihtilaf hudusuna mahal 
kalmazdı. Bi’l-akis Boerler kendi mahsulatını ancak İngiliz müstemlekelerine 
satabileceklerinden ve muamelat-ı ticariyelerini ancak İngiltere vasıtasıyla icra 
ettirebileceklerinden ilca-yı menfaat ve mürur-ı zamanla Ümid Burnu [Sayfa 64] 
müstemlekesinde kalan Boerler gibi vadi-i medeniyete girmeğe ve İngiltere’nin 
Afrikaca takip ettiği makasıd-ı insaniyet-perveranesine hadim olmağa mecbur 
olacaktı. 
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Halbuki Cenab-ı Hak bu memlekete arazinin kuvve-i inbatiyesinden ziyade cihanda 
misli görülmemiş derecede bir servet-i madeniye ihsan eylemiştir. Transvaal’in 
mesaha-i sathiyesi takriben sekiz yüz bin kilometre murabba olduğu halde bunun bir 
sülüsü kenz-i la-yefna-yı servet denilecek kadar bir havza-i madeniyedir. Bundan on 
altı seneden beri kemal-i keremi ile imal ve ihracına devam olunan altın madenlerinin 
[Sayfa 65] ihracatı o derece terakki etmiştir ki muharebeden evvelki sene içinde on 
yedi milyon İngiliz lirasına karib bir miktara baliğ olmuştur. 
Bu servet-i fevkalade memleketin ehemmiyet-i maliye ve siyasiyesini artırmış ve altın 
ihracatının haiz olduğu kuvve-i cazibenin kalb-i insana olan tesiriyle dünyanın her 
tarafından saadet ve servet arkasına düşen adamların tehalükle içtimaına sebebiyet 
vermiştir.  
Altın madenleri işlemezden evvel Transvaal’de Boer olarak yalnız yetmiş bin nüfus 
var iken şimdi üç yüz bin nüfusu mütecaviz beyaz ve mütemeddin ahali mevcuttur. 
[Sayfa 66] Madenlerin zuhurundan evvel Transvaal hükumetinin senevi varidat-ı 
umumiyesi ancak yüz yetmiş bin liraya çıkabilmiş ve hazine-i merkeziyede bir tek 
sikke-i zehebiye bulundurmak mümkün değil iken bugün varidat dört buçuk milyon 
İngiliz lirasına varmış ve dünyayı servetiyle yıldırmış olan koca İngiltere’ye mukabele 
edebilecek edevat-ı nariye ve esliha-i mükemmele-i harbiye tedarik ettiren nukud-ı 
kesire iddihar ettirilmiştir. Bundan on altı sene evvel yekun-ı ithalat ve ihracat bir 
milyon İngiliz lirasına baliğ iken bugün senevi ticaret-i umumiyenin yekunu otuz 
[Sayfa 67] milyon İngiliz lirası yani tekmil memalik-i Osmaniye’nin ihracat ve 
ithalatına müsavi bir miktarı tecavüz etmiştir. Burasını hatırdan çıkarmamalıdır ki 
böyle bir servet-i fevkalade menabiini cami olan kıta vaktiyle İngiliz tebeasından olup 
da İngiltere’nin idaresinden kaçmış, İngiltere’nin Afrika’ya yaymak istediği 
medeniyete mani olmak istemiş İngiltere’nin meşrebine, mezhebine, takip ettiği 
meslek-i insaniyet-perveranesine malen, bedenen, kalben husumet eylemeği ayn-ı 
ibadet bilmiş Boerlerdir. Burasını nazar-ı muhakemeden dûr etmemelidir ki bu altın 
defayininin kıymet-i [Sayfa 68] itibariyesinin bedeli Londra sermayedaranının 
cüzdanında mahfuz bulunan eshamın teşkil ettiği bir servet-i hakikiyedir. Bu servet ve 
ticareti idare eden İngiliz’dir. Zenciden maada ahali-i mutemeddinenin nısfını teşkil 
eden uitlander’lerin yani ecnebilerin dört humsu İngiliz’dir. Hal böyle iken İngiltere 
devleti Boerlerin şu hudayî tekemmülüne, sırf müsaade-i tali’le olan şu servet-i 
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maliyesine ve o sayede istihzar ettikleri kuvve-i harbiyesine karşı bi-kaydane mi 
davranabilir? Beş on milyarlık servet-i milliyesini terkip eden bir sermaye-i ticaretini 
feda mı edebilir? Kuvve-i fikriye ve maliye [Sayfa 69] lerinin ve mesai-i mütevaliye-i 
bedeniyelerinin mahsulü olan bu maadin-i cesimeye malik olmuş yüz bin tebeasını 
Boerlerin idare-i keyfiyesine, hırs ve tamaına kurban mı edebilir? İşte mesele-i 
hazırayı tevlid eden ahval-i hakika bunlardır. 
Boerlerin huşunet-i tab’ına, taassubat-ı diniyesine, bir de kuvve-i maliye ve kudret-i 
siyasiyesine inzimamına müsaade edilecek olsa İngiltere’nin Afrikaca olan 
tasavvurat-ı cesime-i medeniyet-perveranesi tamamiyle sektedar olur. Fenalık o 
derecede de kalmaz Boerlerin böyle bir kuvve-i maliyesi, böyle bir kudret-i [Sayfa 
70] siyasiyesi Afrika-yı Cenubi’nin en mühim unsurunu teşkil eden ve hemcinsleri 
olup inad ve taassuplarına iştirak etmemekle İngiltere idaresinde kalmış olan tekmil 
Afrikaner’dır. Boerleri tehyiç ve İngiliz hakimiyeti aleyhine tahrik eder ki neticesi iki 
unsurdan birisinin Afrika-yı Cenubi’den çıkmasını müncer olur. İngiltere elbette 
Afrikaca olan amal ve makasıd-ı insaniyetkarane ve teali-perveranesini böyle 
mutaassıp bir güruhun gılzet ve mümanaatı üzerine terk ve feda edemez idi. 
İngiltere bütün dünyayı sarsmış, cihangirlik taslayan devletleri bile yıldırmış [Sayfa 
71] olan metanet ve mikneti Boerlere karşı göstermemekle mevcudiyet-i siyasiyesini 
mevki-i iktidarını tehlikeye düşüremez idi. 
İngiltere’nin bu Boerlere karşı dermeyan ettiği metalib-i siyasiyenin müstenid olduğu 
hukuk-i ahdiyeyi, İngiltere’nin daima insaniyet, medeniyet, hürriyet, menafi ile tevhid 
ettiği menafi-i mahsusasını temin ve istihsal için tevessül ettiği vesait-i harbiyenin 
husul-i muvaffakiyetine kafi olup olmadığnı düşünmeğe mahal görmeyiz!.. İngiltere 
cemi zamanda adalet, hürriyet taraftarı bulunur. Her kavim ve milletin nur-ı 
medeniyet ile münevver her kıta [Sayfa 72] ve ülkenin kuvve-i adalet ile muhkem 
olmasını arzu eder. Dünyanın hangi tarafında bir idare-i zalime baş gösterse ona karşı 
husumet, hangi memleketin halkı zencir-bend-i esaret olacak olsa ona müzaheret 
gösterir. Bu maneviyat-ı insaniyet-perveranesi, bu temenniyat-ı adalet-küsteranesi sırf 
hissiyat-ı vicdaniyenin ulviyetinden münbaistir denilemez. Devlet-i müctemia denilen 
o iki cezire ki rub’-ı meskunun sabih bir karhane-i umumisi ıtlakına şayestedir. Bu 
karhane destgahlarından gece gündüz çıkan milyonlarca mamulat ve mensucatı 
sürdürmek için müşterinin [Sayfa 73] adedini teksire mecburdur. İştira ise rağbete, 
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rağbet ise ihtiyaca bu da medeniyetin, servetin tezayüdüne mütevakkıftır. İngiltere 
sair cihangirler gibi dünyayı istila ettiği mahallerin mal ve servetini gasp ve iğtinam 
ile kesb-i kuvvet ve servet etmek mesleğini tutmamıştır. Bilakis servet ve 
mamuriyetlerini tezyid için malen, nakden fedakarlıkta bulunmuştur. Hasılı daimen 
kendi kudret ve servetini başkalarının medeniyet ve saadetinde aramıştır. İnsaniyet ve 
medeniyete olan hidematını sırf cerr-i menfaat maksadına haml edenler İngiltere’yi 
menfaat-perestlikle itham etmek isterler. [Sayfa 74] Bizce herhalde İngiltere menafi-i 
milliyesini insaniyetin menafi-i umumiyesiyle tevhid edebildiği için şayeste-i tebrik 
ve insaniyete karşı ibraz ettiği hayr-hahlığı menafi-i milliyesi ile muvafık düşürdüğü 
için niyat ve temenniyatı şayan-ı emniyettir. İngiltere’nin Afrikaca olan metalibi 
içinde bulunan iki üç yüz milyon nüfus-ı beşeriyenin nail-i nimet ve medeniyet ve o 
sayede haiz-i servet ve mamuriyet olmasından ibarettir. İngiltere’nin Boer hükümetine 
olan tekalifi Boerlerin mensup olduğu anasırın ma-bihi’l-imtiyazı olan medeniyetin 
hadimi, o medeniyetin Afrikaca [Sayfa 75] naşiri olacak bir idare-i sahiha tesis 
eylemelerinden, İngiliz idaresinde bulunan Afrikanerlar ne gibi hukuk-ı siyasiye ve 
medeniyeye mazhar olursa Transvaal’de bulunan İngilizler, Almanlar, Fransızlar ve 
sair ecnas-ı muhtelife efradı cins ve levne, kavmiyet ve mezhebe bakmayarak aynı o 
hukuk-ı siyasiye ve medeniyeye mazhar olmaktan ibarettir. Bu talebin makrun-ı hak 
olduğunu kim inkar edebilir? 
İngiliz ise bu talepte, bu davada bulunmağa vücuhla salahiyettardır. İngilizler yüz 
sene evvel Ümit Burnu’nu işgal ile Afrika-yı Cenubi’ye vaz’-ı yed ettikleri zaman 
[Sayfa 76] oralarını ne halde ve Boerlerin taht tahakkümünde bulunan kabail-i 
zencileriyle Cava müslümanlarını nasıl dil-hıraş bir zillet ve sefalette bulduklarını 
yukarıda beyan eyledik. Bu hal-i zulmet ve sefalete karşı İngilizlerin birinci işi 
tabakat-ı mütefavitede bulunan ve hakim ile mahkum değil malik ile memluk 
denilecek kadar yekdiğerinden farklı bulunan iki sınıfı terkip eden efradın serbesti-i 
din ve vicdan kaziyesini teminle beraber suret-i mutlakada nail-i hürriyet olmalarına 
kafil olacak bir idare-i salime teessüs idi. Bu idare ise bir taraftan Boerlerin fevka’l-
adl ve’-t-tabia olan [Sayfa 77] tahakkümat ve taaddiyatına set çekmiş diğer taraftan 
da Boerlere tarik-i hak ve salahı kabul ve Müslümanlara hürriyet-i kamile, müsavat-ı 
tamme ihraz ettirmiş ve zencilere şeref-i insaniyeti tanıttırmıştı. Bu idare sayesinde 
insandan hali kalan mahaller meskun oldu. Beyaz insana canavar, hunhar nazarıyla 
bakan zenciler insaniyetçe, terbiyece, dince, ahlakça, medeniyetçe onlara benzedi. 
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Onların hukuk ve mezayatını ihraz etmeğe alıştı. Afrika’da kendilerinden başka her 
manasıyla insan tanımak istemeyen Boerler ki İngiltere idaresinde kaldıkları günden 
beri [Sayfa 78] başını alıp kaçanlardan tefrik için Afrikaner denildi. Bunlar 
medeniyetin şerefini, kanun-ı adaletin kuvvetini takdire mecbur oldu. Efrad 
beynindeki ihtilaf-ı meşreb ber-taraf edildi ecnas beynindeki takaddüm ve tefazul 
davasını halleden hükumet-i adile onun tesis ettiği zabıta-i kanuniye ve rabıta-i 
maneviye sayesinde herkes müsavata, yekdiğeriyle kardeşçe muaşerete alıştı. Her 
tarafa yollar, köprüler, şimendöferler ihdas ve küşad, mektepler, camiler, kiliseler, 
darü’s-sanayiler, darü’l-fünunlar, kütüphaneler, müzehaneler, azim şehirler tesis 
edildi. [Sayfa 79] Hasılı Ümit Burnu her cihetle Avrupa memalikinin en mamuruna 
benzedildi. Nihayetinde de usul-i meşrutiyet mükemmel surette mevki-i tatbika 
konularak kuvve-i idare Ümit Burnu müstemlekesinin sükkan-ı umumiyesine tevdi 
edildi. Usul-i meşveret ise levn ve sıfat, cins ve diyanet gözetileyerek umum ahalinin 
intihab ettiği azadan mürekkep olan meclis-i mebusan ve meclis-i ayanın taht-ı 
damanına aldırıldı. İdare-i merkeziye bu iki meclisin ekseriyetini teşkil eden tarafın 
seramedanından mürekkep bir heyete muhavvel ve heyet-ı idarenin muamelat ve 
icraatı [Sayfa 80] ve sukut ve tecdidi parlamentonun hüküm ve kararına muallaktır.  
Gelelim Müslümanların bahsine: Bunların hali İngiltere idaresinin nazar-i dikkat ve 
rikkatini celp ettiğinden evvel-be-evvel İslamiyet’in şerefiyle mütenasip maabidin 
tesisi ve cemaat-i İslamiye’nin bir mevki-i ihtiram ihrazı çaresini araştırmak için Ümit 
Burnu şehrinde zabıta memurluğunda bulunan Mister De Roubaix namında bir zat 
intihab edilmişti. Mister De Roubaix müslümanların kesb-i şeref ve itibar etmesi 
esbabının istihsaline kemal-i ciddiyetle sa’y etmişti. Kırım Muharebesi İngiltere 
Devleti [Sayfa 81] ile Devlet-i Osmaniye beyninde caygir olan muvalat ve musafat-ı 
kadimenin derece ve ehemmiyetini her tarafa ilan ve işaa etmiş olduğundan o vakte 
kadar Ümit Burnu Müslümanları da bu münasebetin mahiyet ve kıymetini takdir 
edebilecek bir hale gelmiş olduklarından İngiltere idaresi sayesinde mazhar oldukları 
adalet ve saadeti ve Mister De Roubaix’dan gördükleri insaniyet ve muaveneti dinen 
metbu-ı manevi siyaseten metbu-ı hakikilerinin dost-ı muazzamı bildikleri Sultan 
Abdülmecid merhuma arz eylemişlerdi. Mister De Roubaix’nın bu himmet ve hizmeti 
hakan-ı merhumun mahzuziyet-i [Sayfa 82] seniyesini mucip olub nişane-i takdir 
olmak üzere zi-kıymet hedaya-yı seniye ile tesrir olmuştu. Mister De Roubaix mazhar 
olduğu şu takdir-i aliye karşı Müslümanlara olan muhabbet ve muavenetini bir kat 
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daha tezyid eylemiş ve o sayede Ümit Burnunca olan itibar ve haysiyeti artırarak ve 
meclis-i mebusan azalığına namzed olmuştu.  
Afrikanerlar yani Ümit Burnu’nda kalmış olan bu Boerler Müslümanlara karşı olan 
hissiyat-ı istihkarkaranelerini ve husumet-i diniyelerini tamamiyle teskin edememiş 
olduklarından Müslümanlara bu derecede muhabbet [Sayfa 83] göstermemiş bir 
adamı mebusluğa layık görmemiş ve intihabına mani olmuşlar ise de iki sene sonra 
bir hususi intihabda Mister De Roubaix meclis-i ayan azalığına intihab olunmuştu. 
İngiltere Devleti ise Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin istihsal-i vesail-i kuvvet ve şevket etmesi 
yolunda envai müzaherat-i siyasiyede bulunduğu gibi Osmanlı padişahının haiz 
olduğu hilafet-i İslamiye kuvve-i kudsiyesinin alem-i İslamiyet’in her tarafına şaşaa-
paş olmasına da delalet edegeldiğinden Ümit Burnu havalisinde bulunan ahali-i 
İslamiye’ye mukteziyat-ı diniyeyi telkin için ulemadan bir zatın tayin ve izamını Bab-
ı Ali’den [Sayfa 84] talep eylemiş ve Mister De Roubaix’nın meclis-i ayan azalığında 
bulunduğu halde Devlet-i Aliye’nin Ümit Burnu Başşehbenderliğine tayini hususuna 
müsaade eylemişti. Mister De Roubaix Afrika-yı Cenubi Müslümanların ihtiyacat ve 
ahval-i mahsusanını ve çare-i ıslahını bizzat arz ve izah etmek için Sultan Abdulaziz 
merhumun bidayet-i saltanatlarında İstanbul’a kadar gelmiş ve o aralık idare-i devlet 
Fuad ve Âli Paşalar gibi dur-endiş vükelanın yed-i iktidarında bulunduğundan envai 
taltifata mazhar olarak ve iktiza eden talimatı ve Port Elizabeth şehrinde bir camiin 
[Sayfa 85] mesarif-i inşaiyesine karşılık olmak üzere Sultan Abdulaziz merhumun 
ihsan ettiği atiyeyi alarak mahall-i memuriyetine avdet eylemiş ve bir taraftan 
makam-ı hilafet-i kübradan memuren gönderilmiş olan Hoca Bekir Efendi merhumun 
telkin-i din ve tehzib-i ahlak yolundaki gayreti ve diğer taraftan Mister De Roubaix’in 
parlamentoca olan muavenet ve himmeti Müslümanların hukuk-ı medeniye ve 
siyasiyesini ve Afrika-yı Cenubice bir mevki ihrazını temin etmiştir. Maarif-i 
umumiye nizamname layihasının müzakeresi esnasında Afrikanerlar Müslümanları 
mekatib-i umumiyede [Sayfa 86] ulum-ı diniye tahsilinden mahrum kılmak için 
ulum-ı diniyenin vakt-i muayende tedrisini yalnız mekatib-i İseviye’ye hasır etmek 
istemişler ise de ekseriyetle bu davaları reddolunmuş ve meclis-i mebusan ve ayanda 
bulunacak azanın emr-i tahlifi Müslümanların kabul edebileceği şekil ve surete ifrağla 
Müslümanların da şura-yı millete duhulü hakkı temin edilmiştir.  
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Müslümanlar bugün Ümit Burnu’nun merkezinden ve en mühim bender ve 
şehirlerinde pek mümtaz bir mevki tutarak mekatib ve maabidi gayet muntazam ve 
terbiye ve ahlakça olan terakkileri din-i Muhammedi’nin şeref ve ulviyeti ile 
mütenasip dereceye [Sayfa 87] varmış olduğundan ihtidaya rağbet günden güne 
tezayüd etmekte ve muhtedinin aded-i nüfusu mütemadiyen tekessür eylemektedir.  
Ümit Burnu Müslümanları ve Transvaal madenlerinde işleyip ilan-ı harb sebebiyle 
Boerler tarafından tard ve teb’id edilmiş olan Müslümanlar İngiltere idaresi sayesinde 
mazhar oldukları nimet-i hürriyet ve adaletin hakk-ı şükranını ifa için silah altına girip 
düşmanlara karşı kanlarını dökmeğe dinen ve vicdanen mecbur ve bu vazifeyi ifaya 
hazır olduklarını yek-zeban olarak Ümit Burnu Valisi Sir Alfred Milner’a arz u beyan 
etmişlerdir. 
[Sayfa 88] Bu tafsilata girişmekten maksadımız Afrika dağlarında muharebe eden iki 
unsurun kuvvet ve medeniyetçe olan tefavüt ve tefazulu göstermek değildir. Asıl 
maksadımız İngiltere’nin Afrika-yı Cenubice takip ettiği makasıdın husulü Afrika 
zencilerinin, umum insaniyetin ve ale’l-husus alem-i İslamiyet’in menafi-i hazıra ve 
atiyesini temin edeceğini ve Boerlerin muvaffakiyetini temenni eylemek Afrika ahali-
i mazlumesinin ile’l-ebed zulmet-i zulm ve zillet içinde kalmalarını, insaniyetin 
tekemmülden mahrum, alem-i İslamiyet’in de meydan-ı siyaset ve medeniyette bir 
mevki-i mahsus ihraz edebilmek için [Sayfa 89] muhtaç olduğu hürriyet ve meziyete 
nail olmamasını temenni demek olacağını ispat etmektir.  
Bu hakayıka karşı Avrupa mahafil-i siyasiye ve efkar-ı umumiyesinin Transvaal 
Meselesi hakkındaki muhakemat ve takdiratı şayan-ı hayrettir. Dünya kurulalı 
yeryüzünde görülmemiş bir devlet-i muazzama tesisine, akl-ı beşerin şimdiye kadar 
tasavvur edemediği bir düstur-ı idarenin tatbikine muvaffak olan İngiltere’nin azamet 
ve şevketine karşı Avrupa devletlerince bir hiss-i istirkab beslendiği çoktan beri 
istişmam olunmuştu. Fakat İngiltere dünyanın her cihetinde olan hukuk ve şanını ve 
menafi-i mahsusasını [Sayfa 90] dehşetli kuvve-i bahriyesiyle müdafaa ve muhafaza 
ve bu hukuk ve menafiine hadim olan muvazene-i umumiyeyi sarsabilecek her nerede 
bir mesele ya hadise-i siyasiye zuhur eyleyecek olsa onu kuvve-i maneviyesinin 
tesiriyle fasl ederek kendisine muzır olmak maksadıyla el altında tertip olunan 
ittifakat-ı düveliyeye ve olur olmaz müşkilat-ı siyasiyeye nazar-ı bi-kaydiyle 
bakmakta ve hiçbir devlet İngiltere’nin kuvvetine karşı açıktan açığa mukavemet 
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eylemeğe ve boyunu göstermeğe cesaret etmemekte iken bu mesele her kavim ve 
devletin İngilterece olan nazariyat ve hissiyatını zahire çıkarmış [Sayfa 91] ve alemin 
hürriyet ve medeniyetini istihsal ve tezyid etmek şartıyla teali eden İngiliz unsuruyla 
akvam-ı şarkiyeyi esir etmekle cihangirliği kurmuş olan unsur beynindeki 
müsademenin hem la-büd ve hem de karibü’l-vuku olduğunu ispat eylemiştir.  
Bu dehşetli müsademenin neticesi ise iki rakip unsurdan birinin muzafferiyetini temin 
edeceğinden ve birincinin muzafferiyeti bütün insaniyetin tekemmülüne hadim 
olmakla beraber akvam-ı şarkiyenin şeh-rah-ı irtikasını küşad ve ikincinin galibiyeti 
ise medeniyet-i umumiyenin tevkifini ve umum akvam-ı şarkiyenin tahammül-güdaz 
[Sayfa 92] bir rıbka-i mahkumiyete girmesini intaç eyleyeceğinden ehl-i şark, ale’l-
husus birinci hamlenin mahall-i vukuu ve biri insaniyetin hürriyetini diğeri esaretini 
istihsal için boğaz boğaza gelecek iki unsurun kanıyla boyanacak olan mıntıka ahalisi 
ki kamilen Müslümandır gafil ve ikbal ve istikbalini en hatarlı bir hale koyacak böyle 
bir müsademenin ehemmiyetini takdir hususunda bigane bulunamaz. Bu ihtimale 
karşı her Müslim ale’l-husus her Osmanlı mazideki ahval ve vukuat-ı siyasiyeyi 
mikyas tutarak menafi-i atiyesini, temin etmek için ne gibi teşebbüsat ve tevessülata 
[Sayfa 93] muhtaç olacağını tayin etmelidir, alem-i İslamiyet’i esasından sarsacak bu 
melhame-i kübraya girişecek her kavim ve devletin menafi-i maliyesini, meslek-i 
siyasisini adap ve ahlak-ı kavmiyesini tetkik ile hangisinin İslamiyet’e faydası, 
hangisinin mazarratı olabileceğini, hangisinin mecvudiyet-i siyasiyesi ikbaliye kabil-i 
telif, hangisinin tekemmülü anasır-ı şarkiyenin izmihlalini müstelzim olacağnı tetkik 
ve tamik eylemektir. Devlet-i Osmaniye ise şark ve garp beynindeki ihtilafat-ı 
müzmine ve muhacemat-ı mütekabileye nihayet vermek için ara yere girmek, garbın 
[Sayfa 94] medeniyetini kucaklamış, şarkın cism-i müşekkeline arkasını dayanmış ve 
muslih-i kaviyyü’l-azm olarak ortaya çıkmak ve alem-i İslamiyet’in ulviyet ve 
saadetini damin olan din-i Muhammedi’nin harisi, hilafet-i İslamiye’nin haizi 
bulunmak gibi bir kuvvet ve sıfata malik olduğundan kendi menafi-i hususiyesini ve 
şerefin menabi-i umumiyesini telif edecek bir meslek-i ciddi tutmalıdır.  
Şimdi Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin menafii nokta-i nazarından bakarak umur-ı şarkiyede 
alakadar olan ve şarkça tevsi-i iktidar yolunda rekabet-i daimede bulunan düvel-i 
muhtelifenin ahvalini tetkik [Sayfa 95] edelim. Bunların birincisi ve en kuvvetlisi 
İngiltere, ikincisi Rusya, üçüncüsü Fransa, dördüncüsü Boerlerin teşa’ub ettiği 
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Hollanda’dır. İngiltere cezire olmak itibariyle her türlü taarruzat-ı hariciyeden masun 
olmak gibi bir hususiyet-i hale malik olmakla beraber kuvve-i bahriyesine istinad 
ederek hiç kimsenin el uzatamıyacağı memalik-i vasiayı istila etmiş ve asr-ı sabıkın 
son rub’undaki Amerika İhtilali üzerine var kuvvetini Hind’in istimlakine ve aksa-i 
şarkça olan münasebat-ı ticariyesinin teksir ve tevsikine hasreylemiştir. Bu 
müstemlekat-ı cesimenin [Sayfa 96] muvaredat ve muvasalatı kuvve-i bahriyenin 
damanı tahtında bulunup her türlü taarruzdan masun bulunduğu ve fakat cihet-i tehdid 
memalik-i Osmaniye ve Hindistan’da icra-yı hükümet etmek kuvvet ve istidadını haiz 
yegane bir unsur var ise o da oranın Müslümanı olduğu cihetle İngiltere Devlet-i 
Osmaniye’nin ehemmiyetini ve kendüsine zahîr ve muin olmak şartıyla kesb-i kuvvet 
ve şevket eylemesinin menfaatini daha geçen asır içinde takdir etmişti. Bu 
takdiratın  asar-ı fiiliyesini nasıl gösterdiğini devletimizin son asrın tarih-i siyasisini 
ispat eder.  
Büyük Napolyon İngiltere’nin kuvvetini [Sayfa 97] kırmak için hazırladığı kuvve-i 
cünudiyesini memalik-i Osmaniye’ye tevcihle Mısır’ı istila ve Hindistan’ı tehdit etti: 
İngiltere kuvve-i bahriyesiyle Fransa donanmasını Ebuhur pişgahında yakıp 
bitirdikten sonra Süleyman Halebi hançerinin kurbanı olan General Kleber’in 
kumandasındaki Fransız askerini gemilerine irkab ve Fransa’ya iade eyledi. 
Yunanistan’ın istiklalini istihsal için harben müdahale eden ve Navarin’de Devlet-i 
Osmaniye donanmasının mahvına sebeb-i müstakil olan Fransa kuvve-i bahriyeden 
mahrumiyetimizden [Sayfa 98] istifade ederek derhal Cezayir-i Garb’ı elimizden 
aldıktan sonra tekrar Mısır’a göz dikti.  
Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa’yı ayaklandırıp amaline hadim olabilmek için Osmanlı 
tahtını bile ihraz etmek ümidini verdi. İngiltere Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin mevcudiyetini 
tehdit eden gavailin en muhimmi olan bu Mısır meselesinde dost bir devlete ait kuru 
bir müzaheret-i siyasiye göstermekle iktifa eylemedi. Vükelasını bahr u ber ümerasını, 
süferasını, siyasi memurinini Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin hizmetine tahsis etti. İnsanın 
elinden gelecek ne gayret, ne himmet var ise hiç [Sayfa 99] birisini diriğ etmeyerek 
Hünkar İskelesi Muahedesi’nin havi olduğu sem kanalında, arkasını Fransa’ya 
dayatmış olan Mehmed Ali’nin birbirini vely eden muzafferiyatını da tesirsiz bıraktı. 
Ve akıbet saltanat-ı Osmaniye’nin istiklalini ve devletin tamamiyet-i mülkiyesini 
Londra Muahedesi’yle, Rusya ve Fransa dahil olduğu halde umum Avrupa 
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devletlerine tasdik ettirdi. Rusya, çürümüş addettiği cism-i düveline taze hayat 
verecek yeni bir unsurun iltihakına mani olmak için Mehmed Ali’nin huruç ve 
istilasına mukavemet etmiş ve Devlet-i Osmaniye bir daha eser-i hayat [Sayfa 100] 
gösteremeyecek bir hale gelmiş itikadında bulunarak sevinmekte bulunmuş iken 
intikam-ı idareye hail olan su-i istimalat-ı dahiliyeye nihayet veren ve şeh-rah-ı 
irtikabı küşad eyleyen Tanzimat-ı Hayriye’nin vaz’ ve neşriyle beraber devlet 
harikulade bir kuvvet ve şevket kesb eylemeğe başladığından düvelini emr u nehyine 
tabi bir hale koymak veya bütün bütün mahv etmek azminde bulundu. Ve bir taraftan 
Devlet-i Aliye’yi tabiyet-i mutlakasına aldıracak tekalifi Mençikof vasıtasıyla kabul 
ettirmeğe ve diğer taraftan Mısır’la Girit ceziresini bahş ve terk etmeğe hazır [Sayfa 
101] bulunduğunu göstermekle İngiltere’yi celbe kalkıştı.  
İngiltere, Rusya İmparatoru’nun nazariyat ve teklifatını kabul etmekten başka 
Fransa’nın arz-ı Filistince olan hukuk-ı kadimesine karşı Rusya’nın dermeyan ettiği 
iddiaları redle mevkiini tahkim ve bu sayede Bonapart hanedanının hakk-ı saltanatı 
aleyhinde bulunan Viyana Muahedesi’nin ahkamını ıskat eylemek arzusunda bulunan 
üçüncü Napolyon’un gösterdiği istidattan bi’l-istifade Kırım Muharebesi’ni meydana 
getirdi.  
Fransa İmparatoru Üçüncü Napolyon [Sayfa 102] mücerret taht ve tacını tahkim için 
muhtaç olduğu münasebat-i siyasiyeyi tesis ve tevsi etmek üzere İngiltere’nin 
ittihadına güvenerek açmış olduğu muharebeyi aynı maksad-ı hususiyi temin için 
Rusya’nın ittifakı sevdasına düşerek kapatmağa kalkışmış olduğu halde İngiltere 
Kırım ile Kafkasya’yı Rusya’nın elinden koparıp daima Rusya’ya mukavemet 
edebilecek bir heyet-i İslamiye-i kaviye teşkil etmekten ve Karadeniz’i Rusya Gölü 
olmak ihtimal ve istidadından çıkarmaktan ibaret olan maksad-ı ulviyi takip ederek 
böyle bir neticeyi istihsal etmezden evvel de terk-i [Sayfa 103] muhasamaya razı 
olmayacağnı ve Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin atisini temin edecek bir suret-i sulh istihsal 
olunmazsa Devlet-i Osmaniye ile yalnız başına kalarak muharebeye devam edeceğini 
Fransa’ya da, Avusturya’ya da anlatmıştı. İngiltere’nin bu azim ve sebatını Devlet-i 
Osmaniye’ye en müsait şeraitle musalahanın akdine ve havza-i düveliyeye duhulüyle 
istiklal-i idaresinin umum Avrupa’nın damanı tahtına aldırılmasına sebep oldu. 
Gariptir ki İmparator Napolyon Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin tamamiyet-i mülkiyesine kafil 
olan Paris Muahedesi’nin mürekkebi kurumamış ve o uğurda dökülen kanlar 
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yeryüzünden [Sayfa 104] silinmemiş olduğu halde Tunus ile Trablusgarp ve tevabiini 
muahharan elinden almak üzere Sardinya’ya vermek ve Fas’ı Fransa’ya ve Mısır’ı 
İngiltere’ye aldırmak teklifinde bulundu.  
Lord Palmerston ise Paris Konferansı’nda birinci murahhas sıfatıyla bulunan İngiltere 
Hariciye Nazırı Lord Clarendon’a: “Lord Cowley Afrika hakkındaki teklifi 
reddettiğimizi imparatora beyan için ne kadar istical eder ise o kadar hayırlıdır. 
İhtimaldir ki birçok memalik Fransa’nın, İngiltere’nin, Sardinya’nın [Sayfa 105] 
idaresine geçecek olur ise daha ziyade mesut olur. Uzağa da gitmeğe hacet yoktur. 
İtalya, Sicilya, İspanya büyük misaldir. Fakat Fransa ile İngiltere beyninde caygir olan 
ittifakın ehemmiyeti iki devletin kuvve-i bahriye ve berriyesinden ziyade bu ittifaka 
esas olan kuvve-i maneviyeye müsteniddir. İttifakımızdan maksad na-hak taarruzata 
mukavemet etmek zebun ve mazlumu galibin pençe-i tahakkümünden kurtarmak, 
devletlerin muvazene-i mülkiye-i hazırasını muhafaza eylemektir. Fas’ı Fransa’ya, 
Tunus’la memalik-i saireyi Sardinya’ya, Mısır’ı İngiltere’ye zabt [Sayfa 106] 
ettirmekle Lehistan usul-i mukasemesini Afrika kıtasında tatbike nasıl cüretyab 
olabiliriz? Ale’l-husus İngiltere ile Fransa ki Türkistan’ın tamamiyet-i mülkiyesini 
taahhüd etmişlerdir. Bu iki devlet, Osmanlı padişahının hukuk-ı hükümranisine 
taarruz etmeğe Mısır ve Tunus’u elinden koparmağa kalkışmak için hangi hakka 
istinad edebilir,” mealinde bir mektup yazarak, imparatorun Türkistan’ın mukasemesi 
ve Bahr-i Sefid, sevahil-i cenubiyesinin Müslüman idaresinden çıkarılması 
hakkındaki tekalif-i garibesini şiddetle reddeyledi. 
[Sayfa 107] Rusya, Paris Muahedesi’nin ahkamını feshettirmek ve iki devlet 
beynindeki ittifakı bozmak himmetini Fransa’dan bekleyerek birkaç sene teenni etmiş 
ise de Napolyon’un İngiltere ittifakını kolaylıkla feda edemeyeceğini anlayınca 
Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin idaresine karşı ithamat bataryalarını çıkarıp mermiyattan daha 
müessir olan notaları yağdırmağa başlamış ve ibtida Rumları sonra da Islavları 
tahrikle Girit ihtilalini ve Hersek Bosna kıyamını meydana çıkarmıştır. Bu iki ihtilalin 
teskinine ve hele Bosna Hersek vekayii üzerine üç imparatorun eser-i ittifakı ve 
netice-i [Sayfa 108] müzakeratı olarak ibtida Kont Andraşi tarafından tertip ve 
kabinelere tebliğ olunan nota ve muahharan Berlin’de tanzim olunup düvel-i 
muazzamanın kabulüne mazhar olan mahud layiha münderecatını hükümsüz 
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bırakmak için İngiltere’nin tek başına mücahede edip muvaffak olması İngiliz 
politikasının ne derecede metin olduğunu ispat eder teşebbüsat-ı siyasiyedendir. 
Vaktaki Rusya kendi menafiine müsait gördüğü Avrupa politikasının ve Türkistan 
idare-i dahiliyesinin bir inkılab-ı azime uğramak istidadını hissedip fırsatı [Sayfa 109] 
kaçırmamak için cihanın mahfuziyet-i umumiyesine mazhar olmuş olan bina-yı 
Devlet-i Osmaniye’yi tek başına yıkmağı gözüne aldı. 
İngiltere, Bulgaristan vekayi-i müellimesinin tesiri üzerine efkar-ı umumiyenin 
aleyhimizde bulunması cihetiyle fiilen ve harben muavenet edebilmek imkanını 
görmediğinden Âli Paşa’nın ziya’ından sonra idare-i merkeziyece olan yolsuzlukların 
açmış olduğu yaraları kapatacak ve galeyana gelmiş efkar-ı umumiyeyi teskin edecek 
tedabir-i ıslahiyenin sürat-ı ittihaz ve tatbikini tavsiye etmekle beraber bu babdaki 
tekalif-i vakıa reddolunduktan ve Avrupa’nın [Sayfa 110] teklif ettiği ıslahat-ı 
hususiye yerine umuma şamil olmak ve dünyanın emniyet ve itimadını celp etmek 
üzere ilan edilen Islahat-ı Esasiye’nin mahiyet ve kuvveti izale edildikten sonra da 
yalnız başına kalacağını bildiği Devlet-i Osmaniye’yi Rusya’ya ezdirmemek için 
muharebenin vukuu ihtimalini ber-taraf ve ihtilafı vesait-i siyasiye ile halletmek 
çaresini istihsal eylemişti. Bu yolda olan sa’y u gayreti bir dereceye gelmişti ki 
hissiyat-ı insaniyet-perveraneye mağlup olan İngiliz efkar-ı müfrita ashabı itham ve 
Hristiyanlık gayretini güden Avrupa matbuatı [Sayfa 111] İngiltere idaresiyle İngiliz 
milletini adeta Hintleşmiş, Müslümanlaşmış ve salib tacını Müslüman sarığına 
değiştirmiş gibi sözleriyle tezyif etmeğe kalkışmıştı. 
İngiltere Devleti muharebeye iştirak edemeyeceğini kat’i ve pek resmi suretle 
bildirmiş ve Londra Protokolü ile muharebeye lüzum ve mahal bıraktırmamış olduğu 
halde devletin bunu redle bunca mesaib-i dil-hıraşa sebebiyet veren muharebeye 
girişmesi tarihin kolaylıkla tevil ve affedemeyeceği hatiat ve seyyiat-ı siyasiyedendir. 
Bununla beraber kendi ihtiyarımızla davet olunmuş [Sayfa 112] bir belaya düştükten 
ve iki taraf beyninde muhasamat başladıktan sonra da İngiltere muharebenin Devlet-i 
Osmaniye’nin izmihlal-i tammıyla hitam bulmasına imkan bırakmayacak teminatı 
istihsalden geri kalmadı. Rusya, İngiltere’nin bitaraflıktan çıkmasından fevkalade 
tevehhüm eylediğinden bu bitaraflığı temin için her türlü taahhüdata girişmeğe 
mecburiyet görmüş olduğundan İstanbul ile Hint tarik-i muvaredatını hiçbir suretle 
işgal ve tehdit edilmeceğine dair teminat-ı kaviye doğrudan doğruya imparator 
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tarafından verildiği gibi Mısır’a ve Fırat Vadisi’yle Basra Körfezi’ne de hiç [Sayfa 
113] bir suret ve namla taarruz vuku bulmayacağı ve Devlet-i Osmaniye Rus askeri 
Balkan silsilesinin cihet-i cenubiyesine geçmezden evvel sulha talip olur ise 
uğradığmız mukasemeye mahal bırakmayacak şerait-i hafife ile derhal terk-i 
muhaseme ve akd-i musalaha edileceği hem imparator ve hem de Rusya Devleti 
namına taahhüd edilmişti. İngiltere’nin bu hizmet ve himmetinden de istifade 
edilemedi ise de Rusya’nın Ayastefanos Muahedesi gibi mühlik ve adeta heyet-i 
devletin idamı hükmünü mutazammın bir ilam-i siyasinin hükümsüz kalması 
İngiltere’nin donanma ile İstanbul’un imdadına yetişmesi [Sayfa 114] ve toplarını 
Ayastefanos’ta bulunan Rus ordusuna çevirmesi sayesinde olduğunu umum 
Osmanlılar hem tasdik ve hem de ile’l-ebed lisan-ı şükranla yad ederler.  
İngiltere merkez-i saltanat olan İstanbul şehrini Rusya’nın darbe-i yedinden 
kurtardıktan ve Rumeli eyaletini Avrupa muvazene-i umumiyesinin istikrarına hadim 
olacak bir hale koyduktan sonra Rusya’nın tehdidi altında kalan Asya-yı Osmani’ye 
hasr-ı nazar-ı ehemmiyet etmiş ve memalik-i şahanece ciddi ve umumi ıslahat-ı 
mülkiye icraası taahhüd ve İngiliz askerinin Asya-yı Osmani’ye karib [Sayfa 115] bir 
mevki-i hakimde ikameti temin olunmak ve o mevki-i hakim daire-i mülkiye-i 
Osmaniye’den hariç tutulmamak şartıyla Rusya’nın taaruzat-ı atiyesine kuvve-i 
berriye ve bahriyesiyle mukabele etmeği taahhüd eylemiş ve Berlin Muahedesi tanzim 
olunmazdan evvel bu taahhüdat-ı mütekabileyi mutazammın olan Kıbrıs Muahedesi 
akd ve imza edilmişti. Kıbrıs gibi cesim ve mühim bir cezireyi feda etmek 
mukabilinde İngiltere ile akdolunan şu tedafüi ittifakın şimdiye kadar semere ve 
faydası görülmemiş ise de bu ittifak cism-i devlet için müzmin ve mühlik olan su-i 
idare marazının iltiyamını ve ecel-i hail gibi [Sayfa 116] daimen gözümüzün önünde 
tecessüm eden Rusya taarruzat ve mazarratının indifanı temin eylediğinden 
Osmanlılar nazarında selamet-i atiyelerine medar bir mümsek-i kıymettar olarak 
telakki olunur. 
Şimdi gelelim alem-i İslamiyet için en canlı, İngiltere ile Devlet-i Osmaniye beyninde 
revabıt-ı hub ve muvalatın tahkimine, münasebat-i siyasiyenin devamına hizmet eden 
mesailin en ehemmiyetlisi olan Mısır meselesine:  
Devlet-i Osmaniye mevcudiyet-i siyasiyesinin İngiltere menafi-i milliyesine olan 
hizmetinin derecesi İngilterece takdir olunduğu, meşhur Lord Chatham’ın: “Devlet-i 
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Osmaniye’nin tamamiyet-i [Sayfa 117] mülkiyesinin ehemmiyet ve faydasını takdir 
etmeyen İngiliz’e mecnun nazarıyla bakıp tevcih-i hitaba bile tenezzül etmem” 
sözleriyle İngiltere meslek-i siyasiyesini tayin eylediği günden beri İngiltere nazarı 
hakimiyet-i Osmaniye medarının iki nokta-i ihtirakı olan İstanbul Boğazlarıyla 
Mısır’a matuf olmuştur. Süveyş Cedveli’nin küşadı Mısır’ın zaten haiz olduğu 
ehemmiyet-i mevkiyesini bir kat daha artırmış olduğu gibi İngiltere’nin de bu hıtta-i 
mühimmenin memalik-i Osmaniye’ye devam-ı irtibatı hakkındaki arzu ve iltizam-ı 
ciddisini takviye etmişti.  
[Sayfa 118] [Bu] kadar kesb-i kudret eylemiş olan Mehmed Ali’nin adi bir eyalet 
valisi menzilesine indirilmesine ve Mısır valiliğinin Mehmed Ali ailesine tevarüs 
hakkının mücerret kavanin-i umumiye-i devlete tebeiyet-i mutlaka ve zat-ı padişahiye 
sadakat-ı kamile göstermek kaydıyla mukayyet ve meşrut olmasına sebeb-i mustakil 
olan o İngiltere Mehmed Ali ailesine mahsus bir hakk-ı tevarüsten ibaret olan bir 
imtiyazın Mısır idaresinin muhtariyete münkalib olduğuna delalet edecek şekil ve 
kalıba ifrağına ahiren gösterilen müsaadat-ı kuteh-[binliğin tevlid edeceği] mazarrat-ı 
siyasiyeyi [there is a missing line]  [Sayfa 119] geri kalmamıştır. Fransa ise öteden 
beri Bahr-i Sefid hakimliğini kurmuş ve bu amal-i milliyesinin husuliçün Afrika 
sevahil-i şimaliyesini boydan boya zapt ve teshir azminde bulunduğunu ta Saint Louis 
zamanından bugüne kadar gelen hükümdarların ve teessüs eden heyet-i idarelerin 
cümlesinin tefevvühat-ı resmiye ve teşebbüsat-ı siyasiyeleriyle ispat eylemiştir. 
Fransa Berlin Konferansı’ndan, nasipsiz çıktığından münfail olup cebr-i noksan için 
Tunus’u elimizden koparıp aldı. Ve hukuk-ı hükümraninin müdafaasıçün donanma-yı 
hümayunun sevk ve izamı ihtimaline karşı donanmamızın [Sayfa 120] bir ikinci 
Navarin’e gönderileceğini resmen beyanla Devlet-i Osmaniye’yi tehdit ve Mısırca 
olan amal-i istila-cuyanesinden fariğ olmadığını ispat eyledi. İngiltere, Fransa’nın şu 
malumat ve teşebbüsatına karşı tebassur ve ihtiyatı her vakitten ziyade artırarak 
gözünü Mısır’a atfetmiş olduğu sırada mahud Arabi Vakıası baş göstermişti. Bu vaka 
adi bir zamanda ehemmiyetten ari tutulabilirse de Mısır malik-i hakikisinin dehşet-
engiz bir harbin tesirat-ı cansuzunu henüz izale etmediği, Mısır idare-i hidiviyesinin 
muzlim bir buhran-ı mali ile pençeleştiği ve Fransa’nın [Sayfa 121] Tunus’u istila 
ettiği bir zamana tesadüf eylediğinden İngiltere’ye büyük endişeler verecek derecede 
ehemmiyetli idi. Bununla beraber İngiltere, Mısırca Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin hukuk-ı 
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hükümranisinin tahkim ve takviyesinden başka bir maksat takip etmediğinden Arabi 
kıyamının teskini için de kuvve-i Osmaniye’nin istimalinden başka çare aramadı. 
Fransa ise müdahale-i Osmaniye’ye şiddetle muhalefet ve bir tek Türk neferinin bile 
Mısır’a ayak basmasına razı olmayacağını beyan etmekle Tunus’dan Mısır’a geçmek 
ve Saint Louis intikamını yarım bırakmamak arzusunda bulunduğunu göstermiş ve 
İngilizlerin endişesini  [Sayfa 122] bir kat daha artırmıştı İngiltere’nin Mısırca 
gösterdiği ciddiyetle kabil-i telif olmayan Fransa’nın mütelevvinane ve münafıkane 
hareketi ve devlet-i hakimenin tereddüt ve teennisi meseleyi muhaberat-i resmiye ve 
mükalemat-ı düveliyeye düşürmüş ve erbab-ı kıyamın vaziyet ve cüretini İngiltere’yi 
kuvve-i cebriye istimaline mecbur kılacak dereceye vardırmış idi. Fransız 
donanmasının İngiliz donanmasıyla yanyana hareket etmekte iken İskenderiye’nin 
topa tutulacağı sırada İskenderiye’den ayrılıp kaçması ve İstanbul’da içtima eden 
konferans kuvve-i Osmaniye’nin Mısır’a sevkiyle hakk-ı hükümraninin [Sayfa 123] 
istimali ve vazife-i matbuiyetin ifası kararını bi’l-ittifak devlete arz ve teklif eylediği 
halde bu politikanın Fransa menafii için mühlik olduğunu ispat edecek yolda 
müzakeratın Paris Parlamentosu’nda cereyan etmesi Fransa’nın yegane maksadı 
saltanat-ı seniyenin Afrikaca olan hukuk-ı hükümranisini ıskat etmiş ve hilafet-i 
İslamiye’nin rabıta ve nüfuzunu ref’ u izale olduğunu meydana çıkarmıştır.  
İstanbul’daki konferans devleti Mısır’a asker sevkine davet etmek kararını verdiği 
sırada Paris Parlamentosu içtima ederek Fransa’nın nafizü’l-kelimi ve efkar-ı [Sayfa 
124] umumiyesinin tercümanı olan meşhur Gambetta şu yolda idare-i lisan eder: 
“Konferans Mısır’ı teskine Türkleri memur etmek kararını vermek ihtimali vardır. 
Bence karar Fransa’nın kabul etmeyeceği en muzır karardır. Türkü ehramların önüne 
tekrar getirmek bizim için Tunus’ta ve Cezayir’de ateşle oynamaktır. Türkü, Fransa 
sancağı altında olarak Mısır’a tekrar götürmek, tekmil şarka halife sizin hakiminiz 
olmuştur, demektir. Fransa’nın elli senelik politikasını, hayır yanılıyorum, Fransa’nın 
Nil vadisindeki birkaç asırlık politikasını imha [Sayfa 125] etmektir. Eğer bir musibet 
olmak üzere sultanın, halifenin muntazam taburlarını tekrar Cami-i Ezher önünde 
görecek olur isem Fransa’nın Mısırca olan amaline, Mısır’daki Fransızların ihraz-ı şan 
ve hakimiyet eylemesi hakkındaki temenniyatımıza elveda demekliğmiz lazım gelir.” 
Bu nutuk Fransa’nın Mısırca olan amalini ve makam-ı hilafete karşı beslediği 
hissiyatı teşrihe lüzum bırakmayacak surette tasvir etmiştir.  
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Fransa’nın şu hissiyat-ı garibesi İngiltere’nin Devlet-i Osmaniye ile ittihad-ı 
menafiine iras-ı nakısa edecek vesail taharrisi [Sayfa 126] arzusunda bulunanların 
tesvilatı Mısır meselesince ta bidayetten beri tevali eden hatiatın zuhuruna badi olan 
ahval-i ledünniyenin mahiyetini ve muahharen tanzim edilen ve kraliçenin kabul ve 
tasdikine iktiran eden Drummond Wolff itilafnamesinin teatisine Fransa sefirinin 
mümanaat eylemesinin illetini tayine kafidir. (Mısır mesele-i muhimmesi başkaca 
tedkik ve risale-i mahsusa ile neşredileceğinden bu babdaki hatiat ve ondan mütevellit 
mesuliyet ayrıca gösterilecektir.)  
Mısır bir heyet-i kaviye-i İslamiye’nin vücuduna, kuvve-i kudsiye-i hilafetin 
devamına ne kadar hadim [Sayfa 127] ise İngiltere ittifak ve itilafı dahi bu heyet-i 
kaviyenin mevcudiyeti Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin hayat-ı siyasiyesi için o kadar lazımdır. 
Mısır’ın İngilizlerle olan ittihad ve itilafımızın devamına mani farz olması alem-i 
İslamiyet için ne kadar büyük bir felaket ise, Devlet-i Osmaniye için o kadar büyük 
bir musibettir. 
Bu hale karşı her Müslüman, her Osmanlı ne kadar teessür gösterse becadır. Bununla 
beraber ihtilafın itilafa münkalib olmasına mani olan müşkilat-ı arıziyenin indifaından 
ve menafi-i mütekabilenin ilcaat-ı mübremesinden olan rabıta-i sahihanın iade ve 
istikrarından ümitvar değil [Sayfa 128] adeta mutmain olmakla müteselliyiz. 
İngiltere Mısır’ı kuvve-i askeriyesiyle işgal edeli, idare-i umumiyesine nezaret 
hakkında mutlaku’l-inan olalı on sekiz senedir bununla beraber Mısır’ın makam-
ı mualla-yı hilafete olan irtibat-ı manevisi ve ecza-yı mütemimme-i mühimmesinden 
olduğu Devlet-i Osmaniye’ye olan rabıta-i mülkiye ve siyasiyesi mahfuz kalmıştır. 
İdare-i hidiviye ammeye emniyet-bahş olacak hatta memalik-i şarkiyenin cümlesinden 
ziyade Mısır’da hüküm-ferma olan nüfuz ve müdahalat-ı ecnebiyeyi tenkis edecek bir 
hal-i intizama gelmiştir. ve şâvirhum fi’l-emr620 hükm-i [Sayfa 129] celiline ittibaa ve 
bu hikmet-i hükumet-i kuraniye dairesinde icra-yı hükumet sayesinde fevz ve felahla 
mübeşşer olan her heyet-i İslamiye için vacibü’l-imtisal olan usul-i meşveret 
mukaddematı mevki-i tatbike konulmuştur. Din-i Muhammedi’nin, medeniyet-i 
hazıranın damin olduğu adab-ı umumiye, hukuk-ı medeniye, hürriyet-i şahsiye 
                                                     
620
 “(…) İş konusunda onlarla müşavere et. (…)” (Â-i İmrân, 3/159.) 
 183 
muhafaza olunmakla beraber hürriyet-i fikrin, hürriyet-i kelamın, hürriyet-i neşrin, 
şarkta ve alem-i İslamiyet’te mümkinü’t-tatbik olduğu ispat olunmuştur. 
Mısır erbab-ı kaleminin, Mısır matbuat-ı İslamiyesi’nin ale’l-husus, Mısır menafi-i 
[Sayfa 130] umumiyesini muhafaza yolundaki mücahedat-ı mütetabiasıyla kesb-i 
iştihar eylemiş el- Müeyyed muharrir-i hamiyetkarın hissiyat-ı teali-perveranelerinin 
timsal-i mücessemi olarak telakki ettiğimiz neşriyat ve tazallümatını takdis ederiz. 
Fakat bu figan ve feryadlarını her şeye itiraz edebilmek salahiyatlerini bahş ve temin 
eden bir hürriyet-i kamileye nail olduklarına delil tuttuğumuzu da kendilerine ihtare 
mecburuz. 
İngiltere’nin Mısır’a şu müdahelesi, Mısır’ın tekemmülüne, Mısrıyyunun terakkisine 
olan şu hizmeti menafi-i ticariyesinin, muvasalat-ı bahriyesinin temini maksadına 
mebni olduğunda [Sayfa 131] şüphe yoktur. Fakat mademki İngilizler başlarında fes, 
önlerinde hilal olduğu halde daire-i Mısriye’yi ki izafeti cihetiyle daire-i Osmaniye 
demektir, onu tevsi ve Afrika mıntıka-i İslamiyesi’ni teşkil eden Sudan’ın rabıta-yı 
ittihadını tahkim ve bu mıntıkanın anasır-ı İslamiyesi’ni tenvire sa’y ediyorlar. Bu 
hizmet-i mühimmenin kendilerine bahşedeceği menafii teminle beraber menafi-i 
mütekabile muktezasından olan ittihad ve itilafı alem-i İslamiyet için mahz-ı nimet, 
Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin beka-yı mevcudiyeti için yegane çare-i selamet olarak kabul 
etmek lüzumunu itiraf eyleriz. 
[Sayfa 132] İngiltere’nin idarece olan meslek-i itidalkaranesinden, mümsek-i teali-
perveranesinden kaffe-i müstemlekat ve müstamerat-ı vasiası ve onda mütemekkin 
bulunan ahali-i mütenevvianin ale’l-husus haiz-i mevki-i mühim olan akvam-ı 
İslamiye’nin istifade ettikleri kabil-i inkar değildir.  
Hindistan’ı ele alalım: Yarım asır evvel Hint müstemleke-i cesimesi kumpanyanın 
elinden alınıp İngiltere Devleti’nin idaresine alınacağı sırada esas-ı idaresi mevki-i 
müzakereye konulmuştu. O vakıtın baş vekili ve Muhafazakar Fırkası’nın reisi 
bulunan Lord Derby [Sayfa 133] İngiltere’nin Hint idaresince olan nazariyatını 
atideki nutuk ile tasvir ve tayin etmiştir.  
“Hint akvamı elbette Avrupa usul-i idaresinden istifade edecek bir hale gelmemiştir. 
Fakat bugün kabul edeceğim bir hakikat var ise o da Hint kavmi idare-i umur-ı 
dahiliyelerine fiilen iştirak edebilmek akıl ve hikmetin müsaade eyleyeceği derecede 
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vasi bir iktidarı ihraz eylemeleri esbabının istihsaline çalışmak bizim için insaniyet, 
ahlak ve diyanet menafiinin icap ettirdiği bir vazife olduğunu itiraf etmektir. Bu 
akvam İngiltere hükumetinin, İngiltere kanununun [Sayfa 134] taht-ı himayesinde 
istimal-i hakk-ı idare etmekle İngiltere kanununu takdire, İngiltere kanununu taklide 
ve belki bir gün olur da ondan daha mükemmel bir kanun vaz’ına muvaffak olurlar. 
Eğer bu milletin umur-ı dahiliyelerini idare etmek hakkını tedricen ihraz etmesinin 
neticesi umur-ı adliyesinden başka umur-ı siyasiyesine dahi daha ciddi, daha vasi bir 
suretle iştirak etmesi arzusunun husulü olacak olursa Hintlilerin amal ve ihtisasatı 
İngiltere’nin Hindistanca olan kudret ve hükumetinin sukutunu bile intaç edecek 
derede tevessü edecek olursa bu güzel kudretle [Sayfa 135] Hindistan’da hüküm-
ferma olan İngiltere Hükumeti birkaç asır sonra kendi eliyle intihar edecek olursa 
Hindistan akvamını zulmet-i cehlden, ribka-i butlandan kurtarmış ve suret-i istimal ve 
istifadesini talim etmiş olduğumuz usul ve kavanin-i adliyenin tesiriyle suret-i 
müstakillanede idare olabilmek iktidarını kendilerine ihraz ettirmiş olacağımızdan 
millet-i muazzamamız daima şerefli ve Hintliler daima bize karşı minnettar 
kalacaktır.” Böyle nazariyat-ı ulviyeye müstenid olan bir usul-i idarenin tatbikat ve 
semeratı da elbette ulvi olur. Nimet-i adaletten hisse-mend olmak, [Sayfa 136] şeref-i 
insaniyeti takdire mani olan ahval-i maneviyeyi, makasıd-ı siyasiyeyi, mutekadat-ı 
batılayı azar azar tadil ve ref’ eylemek, insanın mesai-i mütevaliyesinden muntazar 
olan tekemmül ve temeddün şeh-rahını açmak gibi niyat-i ulviyeye, nazarıyat-ı 
hikemiyeye müstenid olan şu idare öyle birtakım eazım-ı rical-i siyasiyeye tevdi 
edilmiştir ki onların azim ve himmeti menabi-i servet-i tabiiyenin kesreti, nüfus-ı 
ahalinin vefreti, mevkiin ehemmiyeti itibariyle bir alem-i mahsus denilecek kadar 
mühim ve cesim olan Hindistan’ı sahihten irtika yoluna koymuş ve artık her 
manasıyla medeniyetin aksa-yı meratibine vusul [Sayfa 137] bulmak esbabını tehyie 
ve temin eylemiştir. Yollar açmak, büyük şehirler tesis etmek, envar-ı maarifi her 
tarafa yaydırmak, servet ve ticarete hadim olan karhaneler küşad etmek, muamelat ve 
muvaredatı teshil ve temin edecek vesait-i mütenevviayı bulundurmak, emniyet-i mal 
ve canı bahşeden kavanini vaz’ ve neşreylemek, onların mer’iyet-i ahkamını temin 
edecek idare-i mülkiyeyi tanzim, mehakim-i adliyeyi teşkil etmek, kudret-i hükumeti, 
kuvvet-i kanunu her hal ve ihtimale karşı tanıttıracak kuvve-i maneviyeyi kudret-i 
cünudiye ile beraber bulundurmak bir cemiyet-i beşeriyenin muhtaç olduğu [Sayfa 
138] medeniyetin vesait-i teminiyesinden madud ise bunların cümlesi Hindistan’da 
mevcuttur. Fakat İngilizler lüzum-ı intizamı tatmış, her cemiyet-i medeniyede 
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mevcudiyeti la-büd olan bu vesaiti istihzarla iktiza etmemiştir. İnsan tam medeniyet 
içinde bulunduğunu, tam madelete nail olduğunu itiraf edebilmek ve o sayede 
müsterihü’l-bal olabilmek için azim ve amali tezayüd ettikçe heyet-i hakime-i 
idarenin istimal ettiği vesayetin tenakus ettiğini görmeli, her zaman ve mekan için la-
yetegayyer olan kavanin-i ahlakiye ahkamına muhalif olmadıkça amal ve temenniyatı 
ne kadar vasi olursa olsun [Sayfa 139] husulünden ümitsiz olmamalı. İşte Anglo-
Sakson denilen unsurun akvam-ı salife ve muasırada görülmemiş bir fazilet-i 
mahsusası, bir kudret-i zeka-yı harikuladesi varsa o da bu dekayıkı bi-hakkın takdir ve 
kaffe-i ahval ve muamelatta bu dekayıkı düstur-ı imtisal addeylemesidir.  
Anglo-Sakson denilen tabaka-i ulviye-i beşeriye, medeniyetin terakkisini, hürriyetin 
derecesi ve hürriyetin derecesini hakk-ı vesayetin tedenni-i istimaliyle mukayese ve 
adaletin derece-i mükemmelliyetini İngilizlik şerefini ihraz etmiş her şahsında, her 
kavminde daire-i amal ve temenniyatının gayr-ı mahdud surette kabil-i ittisa 
olmasıyla muvazene eder. İngilizler [Sayfa 140] böyle ulvi bir mesleği insilak 
sayesinde o derecede akvam-ı saireye tefevvuk etmiştir ki yalnız eski Romalılar 
kendilerine şebih tutulabilir fakat müsavi tutulamaz.  
Romalılar kesb-i kuvvet ve  miknet etmiş bir eyalet valisinin tesis ettiği idareyi ref’ 
etmek için ordular sevk ederdi. İngilizler ise dünyanın en meçhul kıtalarında bir 
ticaretgah-ı azim tesis, bir devlet idaresi teşkil eden bir İngiliz’in menafi-i ticariyesini, 
makasıd-ı siyasiyesini temin için ordular sevk eder. Temenniyat ve teşebbüsat-ı 
şahsiye dairesinin gayr-ı mahdud surette [Sayfa 141] ittisa edebilmesi, kuvve-i 
hakime-i merkeziyenin en adi bir İngiliz’in muhafaza-i can ve şanına en edna bir 
menfaatin temin-i husulüne matuf ve münhasır olması sayesinde Anglo-Sakson 
unsuru dünyada misli görülmemiş bir medeniyet, bir şevket, bir hükumet vücuda 
getirmiştir.  
Hint valileri içinde ulviyet-i azm ve hürriyet-i fikr ile en ziyade iştihar etmiş olan 
Lord Ripon Hindistan İngiltere’nin idaresinde bulundukça İngiltere menafiini temin 
edecek esbaba tevessül lüzumunu itirafla beraber Hint tebeasının İngiltere’den 
mustağni [Sayfa 142] olması yolunu göstermek vücubuna da kail olmuş ve silsile-i 
ıslahatı bu fikrin tazammun ettiği hikmete tevfik eylemiştir. Lord Ripon idare-i 
karyeden başlayarak karyelerde örf ve adetle hükümden hey’et-i sulhiyeyi ibka ve 
idare-i maliye ve hususat-ı sairesini rü’yete memur olan ihtiyar heyetlerinin ve nahiye 
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ve kaza meclislerinin ve şehirdeki belediye dairelerinin ve Hint valisiyle Bombay ve 
Madras valileri nezdinde bulunan heyet-i nazımelerinin teşkilatını ve azasının suret-i 
intihabını ıslah etmiştir. Bu teşkilat idare-i mahalliyenin intizam-ı cereyanına ve 
Hintlilerin idarede [Sayfa 143] olan iştirakinin istihsaline pek çok hizmeti olmuş ise 
de Hindistan’ın hayat-ı kavmiyesinin mukaddimesi idare-i milliyesinin devre-i ulası 
denilecek bir şey var ise o da Hindistan muhibbi bulunan birtakım İngiliz ekabir ve 
muharririn sevk ve teşvikiyle birkaç seneden beri içtimaa başlamış ve kongre namıyla 
şöhret bulmuş olan meclis-i umumidir.  
Bu meclis-i umumi altı yüzden bin iki yüze kadar azası olduğu halde her sene 
Hindistan’ın meşhur şehirlerinin birisinde münavebe suretiyle içtima ederek sene-i 
sabıkanın ahvalini tetkik, neşrolunmuş kavaninin [Sayfa 144] muhassenatı meşhud ise 
beyan-ı teşekkür, nevakısı ve mazarratı görülmüş ise tariz ve esbab-ı ıslahiyeyi irae, 
şikayat-ı sabıkayı tekrar, ihtiyacat-ı cedideyi tadad ve tezkar, idare-i mülkiye, umur-ı 
nafia, ahval-i maliye, maarif-i umumiye, hıfzıssıhha, nizamat-ı sanaiye ve ticariye, 
kaht ve vebanın ref’i, mamuriyetin, hürriyetin tevessüü hakkındaki tedabirin ve bu 
gibi Hindistan’ın ahval-i içtimaiye ve siyasiyesine müteallik mesaili tetkik ve 
müzakere eder ve bu mesail-i mühimme hakkında aza-yı mevcudeden en natıkalı, en 
nüfuzlu, iki üç zat tarafından birer nutuk irad olunduktan sonra [Sayfa 145] ekseriyat-
i ara ile bir karar verir: Matbuat-ı Hindiye ise bu müzakerat ve mukarreratı telhis ve 
tenkit ederek enzar-ı umumiyeye vaz’ eyler.  
Bu meclis-i umumi Hindistan ahalisinin idare-i umur-i dahiliyesini tenkit ve 
murakabeye kesb-i istihkak eylediğini ve aza-yı müslimenin müzakerat ve 
mukarreratça icra ve imal ettikleri nüfuzu Hindistan’daki Müslümanların nüfusça 
ekseriyeti teşkil eden ahali-i saireye faik ve Hintçe nüfuzu müessir bir unsur olduğunu 
ispat ediyor. Müslümanların bu suretle ihraz-ı mevki-i iktidar ve imtiyaz etmesi şeref-
i dinin itilasına ve daire-i ihtidanın [Sayfa 146] ittisaına badi oluyor.  
İngiltere idaresinin bahşettiği hürriyet-i fikr, hürriyet-i kelam, hürriyet-i neşr gibi 
kuvvetin tesiriyle gerek Hindistan ve gerek müstemlekat ve müstemerat-ı saire ilan-ı 
kelimetullah için vasi bir meydan-ı cihad olmuştur. Müslüman tüccar ve esnafı ticaret 
ve sınaat arkadaşları arasında ve çırakları içinde, hüccac ve meşayih çarşı ve pazarda 
telkin-i diyanet ederler. Hacı Mehmed namında bir dindar bir iki sene zarfında iki yüz 
bini mütecaviz Hindi’yi daire-i ihtidaya almağa muvaffak olmuştur. Kadı Nasır Abad, 
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Safder Ali namında diğer bir zat [Sayfa 147] Khandesh şehrinin tekmil demirci 
çilingir esnafına İslamiyet’i kabul ettirmiştir. Kalküta, Bombay, Bengal gibi cesim 
şehirlerde telkin-i İslamiyet’e mahsus kürsüler müesses olup her gün edyan ve 
mezahib-i sairede bulunanlar hatta Avrupalılar akın akın gidip nur-ı diyanet-i 
Muhammediye’den istifaza ile ihtida edegelmektedir. İşte bu suretle Hindistan’ın 
daire-i ihtidası tevessü ve her sene elli binden altı yüz bine kadar can ihtida ederek bu 
son on sene zarfındaki muhtedilerin nüfusu uç milyonu tecavüz etmiştir.  
[Sayfa 148] İngiltere idaresinnin İslamiyet’e bahşettiği şu menafi ve fevaid kalıp 
Müslimini tesliyet ve sürurlarla meşhun kıldığı gibi makam-ı hilafet-i kübrayı dahi 
minnet içinde bırakmıştır. Kadıasker Ahmet Hulusi Efendi merhumun riyaseti 
tahtında bir heyet-i sefaret bundan yirmi otuz sene evvel tertip olunarak Hindistan ve 
Afganistan’a izam olunmuştu. Bu heyet-i sefaretin memuriyeti gerek Hindistan’da 
gerek Afganistan’da bulunan umera ve ulema rüesa-yı İslamiye’ye makam-ı hilafet-i 
kübra ile İngiltere beyninde caygir olan münasebat-ı dostanenin derece-i samimiyetini 
ilamla beraber [Sayfa 149] alem-i İslamiyet’in İngiltere ile olan ittihaddan istihsal 
edeceği fevaidi tadad İngiltere rukabasının zuhuruna sa’y u gayret ettikleri ihtilafın 
umum İslamiyet ve ale’l-husus şark akvam-ı İslamiyesi için mucib-i felaket olacağını 
ispat eylemekten ibaret idi.  
Hilafet-i İslamiye namına Asya akvam ve ümera-yı müslimesine icra edilen şu 
irşadat-ı diyanet-perverane ve vesaya-yı dur-endişane makam-ı hilafet-i kübranın 
İngiltere meslek-i siyasisi hakkındaki takdirat ve nazarıyatını tayin ve tasvir 
eylemiştir.  
[Sayfa 150] O vakitten bu güne kadar olan vekayi-i kevniye ve inkılabat-ı düveliye 
ise bu takdiratın mahiyetini kat’iyen tağyir etmemiştir. Muvazene-i hazıra-i dünyayı 
ihlal ederek tasavvurat-ı istila-cuyaneye mukavemet eden kuvve-i garbiye yok 
hükmüne girmiştir. Meslek-i siyasisi ve şekl-i idare-i dahiliyesi itibariyle esaret 
düşmanı ve hürriyet harisi olmak iktiza eden Fransa istibdadın timsal-i mücessemi 
denilecek kadar müstebid olan bir devlete karşı zanu-zede-i temelluk olup akvam-ı 
şarkiyenin amal ve istiklalini fedaya ve hele unsur-ı İslamiye’nin cihet-i camiası olan 
kuvve-i hilafeti ref’ u izaleye amade [Sayfa 151] olduğunu tereddüte mahal 
kalmayacak surette izhar etmiştir.  
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İngiltere’nin müstemlekatçe ve ale’l-husus Müslüman tebeası hakkındaki malumat ve 
nazariyatını tasvir ettikten sonra bunun mahiyet ve meziyetini zahire çıkarmak için 
sair Müslüman memalikine malik olan devletlerin idare ve muamelesi ile mukayese 
edelim ve Afrika’nın en mühim İslam kıtasını teşkil eden Cezayir’deki Fransız 
idaresinden başlıyalım: 
Cezayir-i Garb Fransa idaresine geçeli tam yetmiş sene olmuştur. Bugün tam dört 
milyon nüfus-ı İslamiye mevcut [Sayfa 152] bulunduğu halde mütemmimi haline 
konulduğu Fransızların idaresince değil kendi memleketlerinin idaresince bile bir 
gune hakk-ı iştiraki olmadıktan başka dünyanın en adi bir idaresi tahtında bulunan bir 
kavmin nail olageldiği hukuk-i tasarrufiye ve şahsiyeye tamamıyla mazhar değildir.  
Fransa milletinin ulviyet-i fikri, safvet-i vicdanı ve hak ve adl yolundaki hissiyat-ı 
samimiyetkaranesi münker değildir. Hatta Cezayir’in bidayet-i istilasında daha hiçbir 
yerde kilise yaptırılmamış iken müceddeden cami bina ettirmek hüccac kafilelerini 
meccanen [Sayfa 153] Hicaz’a götürüp getirmek, birçok ceraim ve isyanlara karşı af 
ve rıfkla muamele etmek gibi lütufların ibzali erbab-ı insafın hatır-nişanı olup daima 
lisan-ı şükranla yad olunur. Fakat çe fayda ki bu müessir fütüvvet bu iltizam-ı adalet 
pek az müddet sürüp idare başka nazariyata tatbik ve Cezayir Müslümanlarının hali 
diğer gune oldu. Ahali-i kadimeyi meziyat-ı diniyeden, kemalat-ı ilmiyeden tecrit, her 
türlü mal ve mülkten mahrum etmek yavaş yavaş sevahilden, şühur ve kasabattan 
çıkarıp dağlara sürmek, yerine Fransızları yerleştirmek, Cezayir’i Fransa toprağı 
[Sayfa 154] Hıristiyan memleketi haline koymak esası üzerine idareye başlandı. 
Cezayir şehirleri istiladan sonra idare memurları tarafından işgal ve emlak, büyut ve 
emakin zapt ve gasb edildi. Cezayir kasabasının haricinde birçok bağçeler, tarlalar 
Arapların elinden alınıp, Fransızlara tevzi edildi. Hatta bunların çoğu yeni 
mutasarrufları tarafından idare ve imar olunamadığından eski ashabına icare ile 
verilmiş ve bu suretle Araplar mutasarruf iken müstecir haline girdi. Müslümanların 
hakk-ı tasarrufu idare-i keyfiyeye tabi olduğundan Cezayir idaresi her ne vakıt araziye 
lüzum [Sayfa 155] görürse ashabını zorla memleketlerinden, mevallarından çıkarmayı 
emlak ve arazisini bir gune kaideye riayet etmeyerek ve bedel tahmininde mübalat 
göstermeyerek istediği gibi ellerinden alıp Fransızlara ve Fransız kolonilerine tefviz 
etmeyi mücaz görmüştür.  
 189 
Cezayir’de istiladan evvel birçok cevami ve medaris ve imaret mevcut ve fünun ve 
ulum tedris olunagelmekte iken Fransa idaresi bunların cümlesine ve vaz’-ı yed 
eyledi.    
Evkaf varidatını zapt, müessesat-ı hayriyeyi seddettirdi. Bir aralık kütüb-i diniyeyi 
hükümet-i hazıranın teessüsüne, medeniyet-i [Sayfa 156] garbiyenin intişarına mani 
addıyla medaris ve mekatib-i İslamiye yerine İslam’a mahsus olarak Fransız mekatibi 
tesis ve ihdas etmiş ise de Cezayir ahali-i İslamiyesi’nin her türlü terakki ve temeddün 
kabiliyetinden mahrum olup kendilerini tenvir etmekten ise haiz oldukları envar-ı 
ilmiyeden dahi bütün bütün mahrum bırakmak ve kendi mülkünde ve toprağında 
oturtmaktan ise daire-i ikametinden yavaş yavaş sürüp yerlerine Avrupa unsurunu 
yerleştirmek ve kuvve-i cebriye ile daire-i itaatte bulundurmak suretlerini tercih 
ettiğinden bu mekatibi dahi ref’ ve dört milyon ahalinin [Sayfa 157] talim-i sıbyanı 
için senede yüz bin Frank gibi hasis bir miktarı tahsis etmekle iktifa eyledi. Hele koca 
Cezayir’de mukarrerat ve ilanat-ı resmiyeye mahsus hükumet gazetesinden başka bir 
Arabi gazetenin bulunmaması şayan-ı dikkat ve hayrettir. İdare-i memleket bütün 
Fransa memurin-i askeriye ve mülkiyesi elinde bulunmakla beraber beldiye işlerine de 
müslüman ahali karıştırılmıyor. Müstakil devair-i belediye Fransızların mütemekkin 
oldukları şuhur ve kasabata mahsus olup Müslüman nüfusu ekseriyeti teşkil ettiği 
halde hakk-ı intihabları mahdud ve birtakım kuyudla mukayyeddir. Mesela belediye 
azası [Sayfa 158] intihab edebilmek için bir Müslüman yirmi beş yaşından yukarı, iki 
seneden ziyade o şehirde ikametgah sahibi olmak ve devlet memuru ya Fransız 
nişanını haiz bulunmak lazım gelir. Bu müntahibler de belediye aza-yı mevcudesine 
nisbetle yalnız bir rub’unu intihab edebilir. Belediye reisi intihabında iştirak 
hakkından mahrumdur. Muhtelit belediyeler ise Fransa hükumeti tarafından tayin 
olunan memur-ı mahsus vasıtasıyla idare ediliyor.  
Vilayat meclis-i umumi azası yalnız Fransızlardan intihab olunmuş sırf Fransız’dır. 
Her bir meclis-i umumide Cezayir valisi [Sayfa 159] tarafından tayin olunmuş altışar 
Müslüman aza mülazımı bulunuyorsa da meclis-i kebir-i vilayette hiçbir Müslüman 
aza bulundurulmuyor. 
Cezayir’in kısm-ı küllisi hala idare-i askeriye tahtında bulundurulmakla beraber ahali-
i kadime-i İslamiye dünyanın hiçbir tarafında efal-i memnuadan madud olmayan 
birtakım ahvalden dolayı taht-ı mesuliyet-ı şahsiye ya müctemiaya aldırılmış bir 
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kanun-ı mahsus hükmüne tabidir. Bu kanun hükmünce bir Müslüman davasını tekrar 
eder veya bidayaten ikame ettiği davada haksız çıkarsa hapis cezasıyla mahkum olur. 
Her nerede bir cürm vaki olsa faili zahire [Sayfa 160] çıkarılmadığı halde heyet-i 
müctemia mucrim addolunarak mesul olur... Ormanların ekserisini ihrak edenler 
Fransız kolonileri olup böyle bir harikin zuhurunda Müslümanlar itfaya can hakkıyla 
çalıştıkları halde de Fransız kolonileri mesuliyetten beri tutulup yalnız Müslümanlara 
tahmil-i mesuliyet edilir. Ve pek ağır cezalar ve tazminat-ı nakdiye heyet-i 
müctemiaya hükmettirilir. Fransa memurin-i mülkiyesi pek çok ahval ve hususattan 
dolayı re’sen Müslüman ahalisini mahkum kıldıkları gibi mevadd-ı cezaiye için 
Müslümandan hiçbir hakim olmadıktan başka [Sayfa 161] Yemenililer de kamilen 
Fransız’dır. Bunların ekseriyesi ise Müslümanlar aleyhine saika-i gayz u garazla 
müthiş surette ağır ve haksız hükümler verirler. Fransa erbab-ı insaf ve merhametin de 
musaddakı olan bu ahval Fransa idaresinde bulunan Müslümanların hakk-ı müsavat 
ve hürriyetten nasıl mahrum tutulduklarını tamamiyle ispata kafidir.    
Rusya’nın İslav olmayan ve kendi din ve mezhebinde bulunmayan akvama karşı nasıl 
muamele ettiğini tarife bile hacet görmeyiz. Bununla beraber idare-i siyasiyesi 
hakkındaki nazaryatı tebdil akvam-ı saire hakkındaki muamelatı [Sayfa 162] tadil 
olunmak lazım gelse mademki devr-i istilasının infilak-ı subhunda bulunup kuvvetini 
şimalden cenuba doğru yaydırıp yürütecektir matmah-ı nazar olan memalik-i vasia ve 
ebhar-ı mühimme-i cenubiyeye geçebilmek için mutlaka şark-ı şimali ile şark-i cenubi 
beynindeki mıntıka-i İslamiye’yi çiğnemeğe ve husul-i amaline muvaffak olur ise bu 
mıntıkayı terkip eden heyet ve akvam-ı İslamiye’nin istiklal-i idaresini ve hayat-ı 
siyasiyesini ref’ eylemeye mecbur bulunacaktır. Hindistan Rus kabza-i teshirine 
geçerse Rus liva-yı hakimiyeti Bahr-i Sefid ile, Bahr-i Ahmer ve Bahr-i Muhit-i 
Hindi’de temevvüc eder [Sayfa 163] ise Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin Devlet-i İraniye’nin 
ve Afgan’ın beka-yı istiklali ve atide başka bir heyet-i İslamiye’nin teşekkül ve kesb-i 
istiklal ve şan etmesi muhaldir. Hollandalılar ise müstemlekatındaki ahalinin 
terakkiyat ve islahatını kat’an nazar ehemmiyete almayıp koca iklimleri adeta 
hükumet mezraası ve miri çiftliği addedip içindeki milyonlarca ahaliyi ücretli amele 
gibi kullanırlar. Cava, Sumatra ahali-i İslamiyesi’ni hakk-ı tasarruftan ve serbesti-i 
bey’ ve şiradan mahrum tutukları gibi muhtaç oldukları eşya ve havaic-i sairenin 
ekseriyesini devlet istediği [Sayfa 164] fiyata satıp başka kimsenin ithal ve füruhtuna 
ve mahsulat-ı arziyesini de mesela tüccara kırk elli Florine satılacak bir mahsulu on 
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dört on beş Florin bedel ile ellerinden ellerinden alıp başka kimsenin iştirasına 
müsaade etmiyorlar. 
İngiltere ile düvel-i sairenin müstemlekat idaresince ittihaz ettikleri usul ve mesleğin 
mukayesesinden şu hakikat istihrac olunur ki Asya’da ve dünyanın ekalim-i 
muhtelifesinde yalnız İngiltere kendi teali-i şanına ve insaniyetin husul-ı menfaatine 
hadim olacak teşebbüsat ve icraatta bulunabilir. İngiltere müstemlekat-ı [Sayfa 165] 
vasiasını menfaat-cuyane bir suretle idare etmez, onları terbiye ve tarik-i selameti irae 
eder. Bu hakk-ı terbiyeyi öyle bir suret-i müşfikane ve dil-nevazanede ifa eder ki misli 
akvam-ı sairenin hiçbirisinin tarih-i amal ve efalinde görülmez. Kendi memurininin 
kuvvet ve nüfuzunu kuyud-ı ihtiyatiye ile tadil ve her hal ve mahalde istibdadı takyid 
ve her cins ve kavimden muktedir olanlara her memuriyete girmek hakkını temin 
eder: Kendi nezaret-i feyz-bahşası tahtında olarak her idare-i kavmiye tarik-i irtikayı 
küşade bulur. Her yerde mektepler tekessür, matbuat serbesti-i tam ile [Sayfa 166] 
intişar eder. Edyan-ı muhtelifeye karşı olan vaziyet ve muamelesi sırf bi-tarafane ve 
müsaadekaranedir.  
İngiltere’nin şu teşebbüsat-ı medeniyet-bahşasının muvaffakiyatını temenni eylemek, 
insaniyetin ve medeniyetin irtikasını cidden temenni eylemektir. Böyle bir maksad-ı 
insaniyetkarane ve hürriyet-perveranenin husuliçün İngiltere’ye rabıta-i kalbiye ile 
merbut olmak ve ümid-i necatını onun himmet-i teali-perveranesine hasretmek 
mazlum milletler, terakki ve temeddün arzu-keşi olan kavimler ve ale’l-husus ehl-i 
İslam için bir vazifedir. 
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Appendix IV. “The Transvaal Question from the Mussulman Point of View.” The 
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Appendix V. La Question du Transvaal ou le Role Civilisateur de l’Angleterre Juge 
au Point de vue Musulman. Bruxelles: A. Vromant, 1901. 
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Appendix VI. Front and back cover of La Question du Transvaal ou le Role 
Civilisateur de l’Angleterre Juge au Point de vue Musulman. London: Forgotten 
Books, 2018. 
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Appendix VII. Mas’ala al-Transfal. Translated by Hoca Kadri Nasıh. Cairo: Matbaa-
i Osmaniye, 1901. 
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Appendix VIII. Map of Southern Africa in 1899. 
 
Appendix IX. The first page of Afrika-yi Cenubi Muharebesi (The South African 
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Appendix X. Medallion of Major Aziz Bey given by British Queen Victoria 
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Appendix XI. “A Turk Disappears: Ismail Kemal Bey, Newly Appointed Official, 
Takes To Flight,” The New York Times, 02 May 1900. 
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Appendix XII. Şehbal, no. 14 (14 October 1909), 272. 
 
 
